A Slightly Odd View of the American Civil War

Johnston's Strength around Richmond in 1862

2011-10-18T01:36:00.002+01:00

I recently purchased a copy of Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnstonand the Defence of Richmond (amazon) - his PhD thesis.

Appendix B I found fascinating, which was an attempt to derive Johnston's actual strengths, and Newton calculates a much larger force than Johnston is typically credited with. On the Peninsula his starting point is the almost complete 30th April trimonthly field return (there should be returns for the 10th and 20th April, but they seem not to have survived). Newton notes the figure given is for "effectives" and excludes a few organisations. Using Livermore's conversion (which is simply to add back in officers usually) Newton estimates a strength on 30th April of 65,015 PFD. Given known disease rates Newton calculates Johnston arrived on the Peninsula with roughly 72,739 PFD. This is a significantly higher figure than usually supposed.

More impressive is Johnston's force at Seven Pines, which is calculated at 87,890 PFD on 31st May. With reinforcements that arrived the next day the field force would be 94,813 PFD, and this excludes the heavy artillery in the Richmond fortifications and other posts.

This makes Lee's strength of 113,282 (fn 75 to chapter 10 of Harsh, McClellan's War, referencing LW Tenney's MA thesis) during the Seven Days more credible. It always seemed odd the sudden apparent jump in strength under Lee. It now seems likely the strength increase was far more moderate.

Ballistics redux

2011-05-03T21:25:00.006+01:00

One thing I've noticed is that the ACW has much less lethal musketry than earlier wars. A typical mid or late war battle produces 6 or 7 wounded for every man killed, whilst early war battles and older Napoleonic battles often produce 2 or 3 wounded per man killed. There is an explanation. The new rifled small arms in use are in fact lower energy than the old smoothbore muskets. To wit I calculate:

Figure 1: kinetic energy of an M1842 smoothbore round (.65 ball, ballistic coefficient 0.095, muzzle velocity 1,500 fps) vs an M1861 rifle-musket round (.5775 Burton ball, ballistic coefficient .160, muzzle energy 963 fps).

My *very* rough calculations suggest that roughly 90% of those shot with a Springfield or Enfield type weapon survived the wound, which seems to be an improvement over the maybe 75% who survived smoothbore balls. The problem is that our statistics are skewed, as those killed outright never got to the hospitals to make it into the statistics (the same happened to the killed and wounded in the Crimea, with a doctor reporting only 6% of those he saw were shot in the chest (ref)).

Joseph Harsh's PhD Thesis online

2011-04-09T17:11:00.002+01:00

While looking something else up google has just located Joseph Harsh's PhD thesis; George Brinton McClellan and the Forgotten Alternative. (link)

Superb.

Comparative Strength at Chancellorsville

2011-03-16T18:02:00.003Z

History hasn't been very kind to Joe Hooker. He's ridiculed for various made up reasons to do with the Battle of Chancellorsville. This is an assessment of the effective combat strength of his army against Lee's during Chancellorsville.

The main source of Federal strength is the return in the OR (ref) and for the Confederates I'm using Allen and Hotchkiss's work (ref). This makes the standard Lost Cause aggregate present against "muskets" apples-oranges interpretation. I will use their "musket" figure, but strip the Federal figure down to the direct comparative number. This will be based on the enlisted only PFDE figure, which is still a slight overstatement since "muskets" excludes Sergeants and the like. Sgts are estimated at 8% of Federal numbers, so I am using 92% of PFDE (enlisted), which is as stripped down as I can get. I will round to the nearest 100.

The strengths (infantry only) of the Federal Corps are thus roughly:

Hooker's main body

2nd Corps (-): 9,000 (Gibbon's division, detached)
3rd Corps: 15,200
5th Corps: 12,900
11th Corps: 10,600
12th Corps: 11,200
Total "muskets": 58,900

Left at Fredericksburg were:
1st Corps: 13,500
6th Corps: 19,500
Gibbon's Division, 2nd Corps: 4,300
Total "muskets": 37,300

Lee's main body of 43,100 muskets and 2,700 sabres* (45,800 total) opposed Hooker's main body, whilst Early's division of 7,400 muskets held the fortifications.

In light of this we must note that Hooker's main body did not have an overwhelming advantage in numbers as some would maintain. Given Federal dispositions he has close to parity at the actual point of contact.

At Fredericksburg without 1st Corps (sent to the main body when Lee gives them a bloody nose on the 1st), Sedgwick has 23,800 against Early's 7,400, and grinds through, but Lee is able to turn on him with the main body stopped.

All this goes a long way to explain the battle. Hooker's 96,200 muskets do seriously outnumber Lee's 53,200 muskets (and sabres), but they're too widely dispersed. Lee gets a result by defeating the two Federal forces in detail.

* The Federal cavalry are staging a raid and the bulk of the Confederate cavalry are also elsewhere.

Wargaming: The Battle of Resaca (Volley and Bayonet)

2011-01-23T10:52:00.007Z

“Now the entrenchments looked imposing indeed.”

The Battle of Resaca – May 1864

Bryn Monnery

In May 1864 Sherman embarked on a campaign to seize Atlanta and destroy the Army of Tennessee under the wiley Joe Johnston. The overcautious Sherman squandered his first opportunity to crush Johnston at Dalton because of enmity with his senior subordinate, Thomas, and favouritism towards McPherson. McPherson reached the outskirts of Resaca with 4 divisions, but blinked when faced with an enemy brigade and withdrew. Johnston slipped away and blocked Sherman’s advance at Resaca, digging heavy entrenchments on hills dominating the route Sherman intended to advance. The position had good flank protection. Johnston is intending to give Sherman a bloody nose.

The Battle of Resaca, from Harper’s Weekly, 18^th June 1864 edition.

The Historical Battle

The Army of the Tennessee started the 14^th on the field opposite Resaca. Their sharpshooters and artillery opened fire at 6am, but the attack was not ready until 1pm. Sherman launched a series of disjointed attacks, each with a single Corps which all petered out. Hood’s Corps then left their entrenchments and, at 5pm, turned Sherman’s left. In a show of amazing sangfroid a single Union battery stopped the Confederate attack dead after the Federal infantry on the left had been routed, allowing the single division Sherman kept in reserve to move and refuse the flank. To prevent the Confederates on their left reinforcing the attack McPherson threw his one intact Corps at Polk and gained a lodgement. Polk then counterattacked McPherson and but was repulsed. This placed the rail bridge (Johnston’s line of communication) within the range of Federal guns.

On the 15^th Sherman launched an attack on the Federal right, which was repulsed. Johnston committed Hood to attack back, but this attack was aborted when news reached him that a detachment of Sherman’s army had placed pontoons over the Oostanaula at Lay’s Ferry 3 miles away and his lines are now threatened. During the night the entire army withdraws undetected over the river, pulls up their pontoon bridge and fires the railway bridge.

Game Length and Victory

The game lasts two days, unless Resaca is occupied on the second day, in which case a third day may be played. First turn is 6am, and the last turn is at 7pm (14 turns/day).

The Union win outright in two ways. One, if they occupy the town of Resaca (and attendant rail bridge) for a whole day, in which case the Army of Tennessee becomes out of supply and will be effectively destroyed. Two, if they damage the Army of Tennessee it can no longer function without taking too much damage. If the Confederates lose more than 25% of their infantry (20 SP) then the battle is an outright Federal win.

Conversely, the Confederates only have one way to win. Inflict as many casualties as possible on Sherman. If they inflict 25% casualties on Sherman’s infantry (25 SP) then Sherman’s already wavering nerve falters, and he withdraws north and asks for more men, saving Atlanta (for the while at least).

Board

The scenario is designed for a small board (4x6 ft). The main features are the two ridgelines, which are separated by a water feature. The eastern ridgeline is not continuous and has a gap through which the road of Snake River Gap to Resaca runs. The Western and Atlantic Railway runs behind the Confederate lines through Resaca, and the Wagon Road also bisects the battlefield N-S. The Connasauga River bounds the eastern edge of the combat area, and the Oostanaula River bounds the southern edge. There are three bridges over the Oostanaula, the Wagon Road Bridge, Rail Bridge and a Pontoon Bridge. There is one area of heavy forestation.

Setup

Unit start locations are as indicated.

All Confederate units are stationary and are located in fieldworks. The Federal units are also stationary, but have no works. All guns are unlimbered.

Special Rules

1. All infantry is slow and linear

2. Artillery has NOT been included in exhaustion calculations (add 1 in each case)

3. Units with Poor Musketry have a maximum range of 2” and shoot on the PM line of the table. Those without PM shoot as normal rifle-musket armed troops (max range = 4”)

4. ALL batteries are classed as “mixed”, it hits on a 4-6 upto 4”, and on a 6 upto 15”.

5. There are optional command rules, see below.

6. There are optional artillery ammunition rules, see below.

Command Rules

These are based on existing GDW rules from “A House Divided”. Each side rolls 1 dice for command points at the beginning of their turn. In the case of a poor AC (such as Sherman) then the allowed range is 1-4, all 5’s and 6’s become 4’s. For a normal AC (such as Johnston) the allowed range is 2-5, 1’s counts as 2’s and 6’s as 5’s. For an exceptional AC (such as Thomas, who replaces Sherman if he is killed) the allowed range is 3-6, count all 1’s and 2’s as 3’s.

There are several uses of CP’s:

1. To activate units (corps or divisions)

2. To move the AC (since the entire command system must adjust to sending information in different directions)

3. To recover from rout

4. To alter command arrangements

It costs 1 CP to activate an exceptional CC, 2 for a normal CC and 3 for a poor one. If the AC is within 6” of the CC then number of CP required is reduced by 1 (so exceptional CC are activated for free). If the distance is greater than 24” (of journey rather than as the crow flies) then an additional CP is required, and will require more than one turn as orders propagate at 24” per turn (so between 24” and 48” the activation will take effect next turn, between 48” and 72” in two turns time etc.). This time restriction does not apply if an army has wig-wags set up (which neither does in this scenario), but the extra CP must still be paid.

Once activated, a Corps can be used as normal, they can move, attack or entrench. Unactivated Corps remain in place and can’t move, attack or entrench. They may still defend themselves and fire their artillery as normal.

Moving the AC costs 3 CP at all levels. The AC (and command post) may move 24” before setting up again.

Rallying a unit from rout, whether conducted by AC or CC costs 1 CP (in a modification of 7.5.2).

CP’s may be spent to cross-attach divisions (or a part of a division) to different corps (or attach army troops). The division must be within 6” of the receiving CC and 1 CP spent to transfer the division. The division is now effectively part of the receiving Corps. In the process divisions may be split, creating new temporary divisions. Use your best judgement.

Also note, the DC’s have been assigned quality ratings, but these have been used to determine exhaustion numbers (poor DC = 40%, normal = 50% and exceptional = 60%).

Artillery Ammunition

To prevent both sides simply blasting each other with artillery there is a ration on artillery ammunition. Both sides have an ammunition track. Every time a battalion fires reduce it by one.

The Union army has 66 shots with it (6/ unit). The Confederate army has 33 shots (3/ unit), which is only what is in the caissons, as the train has crossed the river.

Notes – Federal Army

The first thing to note is that there has been an attempt to disentangle the Federal fighting strength from their “present for duty”, a task made even more difficult when Sherman moved the sick and extra duty men into the “effective” category. Using Sherman’s own estimates as a guide the combat strength of each division was set at 60% of their Aggregate Present strength (Sherman estimated 57-67% of his PFD was “effective”, which as noted included the sick etc., in June he would try and make 75% “effective” by arming the wagon train, the cooks, and various other non-combatants). We end up with, after detachment of several divisions elsewhere, an infantry force less than 50,000 bayonets strong.

The Federal force consisted of 3 “armies”. In fact the Army of the Ohio was simply a 3 division Corps (of which one is not present) and a cavalry division which was placed under the Army of the Cumberland’s Cavalry Corps (which is not on the table) and the Army of the Tennessee only had 4 divisions of which one is not on the table. To simplify matters the Army of the Tennessee has been consolidated into a single Corps (which the Confederates believed it was). The other three Corps belong to the Army of the Cumberland. The IV and XIV Corps were the original Army of the Cumberland which began as XIV Corps, before being split into XIV, XX and XXI, with XX and XXI being consolidated into a new IV Corps after Chickamauga. The new XX Corps under Hooker is the 3 divisions of XI and XII Corps he brought west from the Army of the Potomac. This army was under Thomas, but he was frequently bypassed and so has been removed to simplify the command structure. Incidently, Thomas technically outranked Sherman. This further complicated command arrangements.

For the purpose of this game the Union Army consists of 5 infantry corps (four with 3 divisions, one with 2 divisions). In the Army of the Cumberland every division consists of 3 brigades and an artillery battalion. In the other two the brigades are weaker and have been consolidated for game purposes.

The armies are a mix of M4 and M5, with the artillery of 1/IV rated as M6 for their heroic defence at the real battle. XX Corps and XXIII Corps were apparently better, and are generally rated M5, IV and XIV Corps and the Army of the Tennessee aren’t quite as good and are rated generally as M4 (except Hazen’s and King’s brigades, which are notably better and rated as M5). The end result is that 21 of the 36 brigades are M4, and 15 are M5.

The unit count is 1 army commander, 5 corps commanders, 13 division commanders, 33 infantry brigades and 11 artillery battalions.

Notes – Confederate Army

The Confederate force consists of two armies, but they have merged operationally into a single unified command. The Army of Mississippi is in the process of reinforcing the Army of Tennessee. It has only brought up a single division (Loring’s), a cavalry division (placed under Wheeler and off the table) and half the artillery.

Johnston has rejuvenated the Army of Tennessee, instituting a programme of training that includes proper training in the application of fire. The Army of Tennessee can shoot better than any other army in the Civil War. They’re trained to Continental European standards. Hence they don’t have the PM penalty. Polk’s Corps of course wasn’t there for the months of intensive training and so remain poor shooters. Johnston’s weakest troops (Walker’s division) are off table, leaving the Confederates with 4 M4 brigades but 23 M5 brigades.

The roster count is 1 army commander, 3 corps commanders, 9 divisional commanders (2 for artillery), 27 infantry brigades and 11 artillery battalions.

Notes – The Table

The table is much more generalised than the map, but has the essential features, notably two ridgelines with a disordering creek between much of them and a thick disordering forest in one area. It is very simplified.

Table setup (simplified from map). 4 ft x 6 ft. The two ridgelines are about 6-8” apart (i.e. beyond close artillery range).

Union Army (49,500 bayonets and 132 guns)

Military Division of the Mississippi

MG William T. Sherman (Poor AC)

Army of the Cumberland

(MG George Henry Thomas – Exceptional AC if used)

IV Corps

MG Oliver O. Howard (Poor CC)

First Division (4,500 bayonets, 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 5

MG David S. Stanley (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(MG Charles Cruft; 21st Illinois, 38th Illinois, 31st Indiana, 81st Indiana, 1st Kentucky, 2nd Kentucky, 90th Ohio, and 101st Ohio)

2nd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG Walter C. Whitaker; 96th Illinois, 115th Illinois, 35th Indiana, 84th Indiana, 21st Kentucky, 40th Ohio, and 51st Ohio)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(Col William Grose; 59th Illinois, 75th Illinois, 80th Illinois, 84th Illinois, 9th Indiana, 30th Indiana, 36th Indiana, 84th Indiana, and 77th Pennsylvania)

Artillery (M6, Fd) OO

(Cpt Peter Simonson; 5th Indiana Light Battery and Battery B, Pennsylvania Light)

Second Division (4,000 bayonets, 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 4

BG John Newton (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(Col Francis T. Sherman; 36th Illinois, 73rd Illinois, 88th Illinois, 44th Indiana, 28th Kentucky, 2nd Missouri, 15th Missouri, and 24th Wisconsin)

2nd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(BG George D. Wagner; 100th Illinois, 40th Indiana, 57th Indiana, and 97th Ohio)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG Charles G. Harker; 22nd Illinois, 27th Illinois, 42nd Illinois, 51st Illinois, 79th Illinois, 3rd Kentucky, 64th Ohio, and 125th Ohio)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Charles Aleshire; Battery M, 1st Illinois Light and Battery A, 1st Ohio Light)

Third Division (4,500 bayonets, 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 5

BG Thomas J. Wood (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG August Willich; 25th Illinois, 35th Illinois, 89th Illinois, 32nd Indiana, 8th Kansas, 15th Ohio, 49th Ohio, 124th Ohio, and 15th Wisconsin)

2nd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(BG William B. Hazen; 59th Illinois, 6th Indiana, 5th Kentucky, 6th Kentucky, 23rd Kentucky, 1st Ohio, 6th Ohio, 41st Ohio, 71st Ohio and 93rd Ohio)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG Samuel Beatty; 79th Indiana, 86th Indiana, 9th Kentucky, 17th Kentucky, 13th Ohio, 19th Ohio, and 59th Ohio)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Cullen Bradley; Bridges' Illinois Light Battery and 6th Ohio Light Battery)

XIV Corps

MG John M. Palmer (CC)

First Division (4,500 bayonets, 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 5

BG Richard W. Johnson (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG William P. Carlin; 104th Illinois, 42nd Indiana, 88th Indiana, 15th Kentucky, 2nd Ohio, 33rd Ohio, 94th Ohio, 10th Wisconsin, and 21st Wisconsin)

2nd Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG John H. King; 11th Michigan, 1/15th U.S., 2/15th U.S., 16th U.S., 1/18th U.S., 2/18th U.S., and 19th U.S.)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(Col Benjamin Scribner; 37th Indiana, 38th Indiana, 21st Ohio, 74th Ohio, 78th Pennsylvania, 79th Pennsylvania, and 1st Wisconsin)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Lucius Drury; 1st Illinois Light Battery and Battery I, 1st Ohio)

Second Division (4,500 bayonets, 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 4

BG Jefferson C. Davis (Poor DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG James D. Morgan; 10th Illinois, 16th Illinois, 60th Illinois, 10th Michigan, 14th Michigan, and 17th New York)

2nd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(Col John G. Mitchell; 34th Illinois, 78th Illinois, 98th Ohio, 108th Ohio, 113th Ohio, and 121st Ohio)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(Col Daniel McCook, Jr.; 85th Illinois, 86th Illinois, 110th Illinois, 125th Illinois, 22nd Indiana, and 52nd Ohio)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Charles Barnett; 2nd Illinois Light Battery, 2nd Minnesota Battery and 5th Wisconsin Light Battery)

XX Corps

MG Joseph Hooker (Exceptional CC)

First Division (4,500 bayonets and 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 5

BG Alpheus S. Williams (DC)

1st Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(BG Joseph F. Knipe; 5th Connecticut, 3rd Maryland, 123rd New York, 141st New York, 46th Pennsylvania, and 3rd Wisconsin)

2nd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(BG Thomas H. Ruger; 27th Indiana, 2nd Massachusetts, 13th New Jersey, 107th New York, and

150th New York)

3rd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col James S. Robinson; 82nd Illinois, 101st Illinois, 45th New York, 143rd New York, 61st Ohio, 82nd Ohio, and 31st Wisconsin)

Artillery (M5, Fd) OO

(Cpt John D. Woodbury; Battery I, 1st New York Light and Battery M, 1st New York Light)

Second Division (4,500 bayonets) – Exhaustion = 5

BG John W. Geary (DC)

1st Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col Charles Candy; 5th Ohio, 7th Ohio, 29th Ohio, 66th Ohio, 28th Pennsylvania, 73rd Pennsylvania, 109th Pennsylvania, and 147th Pennsylvania)

2nd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col Adolphus Buschbeck; 33rd New Jersey, 119th New York, 134th New York, 154th New York, and 27th Pennsylvania)

3rd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col David Ireland; 60th New York, 78th New York, 102nd New York, 137th New York, 149th New York, 29th Pennsylvania, and 111th Pennsylvania)

Third Division (4,500 bayonets and 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 5

MG Daniel Butterfield (Poor DC)

1st Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(BG William T. Ward; 102nd Illinois, 105th Illinois, 129th Illinois, 70th Indiana, and 79th Ohio)

2nd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col John Coburn; 20th Connecticut, 33rd Indiana, 85th Indiana, 19th Michigan, and 22nd Wisconsin)

3rd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(Col James Wood; 33rd Massachusetts, 136th New York, 55th Ohio, 73rd Ohio, and 26th Wisconsin)

Artillery (M5, Fd) OO

(Cpt Marco B. Gary; Battery I, 1st Michigan Light and Battery C, 1st Ohio Light)

Army of the Tennessee – elm. XV and XVI Corps

MG James B. McPherson (Poor CC)

First Division, XV Corps (2,500 bayonets and 10 guns) – Exhaustion = 3

BG Peter J. Osterhaus (DC)

1st and 2nd Brigades (M4, PM) OOO

(1^st:BG Charles R. Woods; 26th Iowa, 30th Iowa, 27th Missouri, and 76th Ohio, 2^nd: Col James A. Williamson; 4th Iowa, 9th Iowa, 25th Iowa, and 31st Iowa)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(Col Hugo Wangelin; 3rd Missouri, 12th Missouri, 17th Missouri, 29th Missouri, 31st Missouri, and 32nd Missouri)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Clemens Landgraeber; Battery F, 2nd Missouri Light and 4th Ohio Light Battery)

Second Division, XV Corps (3,000 bayonets and 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 3

BG Morgan L. Smith (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(BG Giles A. Smith; 55th Illinois, 111th Illinois, 116th Illinois, 127th Illinois, 6th Missouri, 8th Missouri, and 57th Ohio)

2nd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(BG Joseph Lightburn; 83rd Indiana, 30th Ohio, 37th Ohio, 47th Ohio, 53rd Ohio, and 54th Ohio)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(Col John M. Oliver; 48th Illinois, 99th Indiana, 15th Michigan, and 70th Ohio)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Frances DeGress; Battery A, 1st Illinois Light, Battery B, 1st Illinois Light, and Battery H, 1st Illinois Light)

Fourth Division, XVI Corps (3,000 bayonets and 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 3

BG James C. Veatch (DC)

1st Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(BG John W. Fuller; 64th Illinois, 18th Missouri, 27th Ohio, and 39th Ohio)

2nd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(BG John W. Sprague; 35th New Jersey, 43rd Ohio, 63rd Ohio, and 25th Wisconsin)

3rd Brigade (M4, PM) OO

(Col William T. C. Grower; 25th Indiana, 17th New York, and 32nd Wisconsin)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Cpt Jerome B. Burrows, Battery C, 1st Michigan Light, 14th Ohio Light Battery and Battery F, 2nd U.S.)

Army of the Ohio - XXIII Corps

MG John M. Schofield (Exceptional CC)

Second Division (2,000 bayonets) – Exhaustion = 2

BG Henry M. Judah (DC)

1st Brigade (M5, PM) OO

(1^st: BG Nathaniel C. McLean; 80th Indiana, 91st Indiana, 13th Kentucky, 25th Michigan, 3rd Tennessee, and 6th Tennessee)

2nd and 3rd Brigades (M5, PM) OO

(2^nd: BG Milo S. Hascall; 107th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 111th Ohio, and 118th Ohio, 3^rd: Col Silas A. Strickland; 14th Kentucky, 20th Kentucky, 27th Kentucky, and 50th Ohio)

Third Division (2,500 bayonets and 12 guns) – Exhaustion = 3

BG Jacob D. Cox (DC)

1st Brigade (M5, PM) OO

(Col James W. Reilly; 112th Illinois, 16th Kentucky, 100th Ohio, 104th Ohio, and 8th Tennessee)

2nd and 3rd Brigade (M5, PM) OOO

(2^nd: BG Mahlon D. Manson; 65th Illinois, 24th Kentucky, 103rd Ohio, 5th Tennessee, 63rd Indiana, and 65th Indiana, 3^rd: Col Robert K. Byrd; 11th Kentucky, 12th Kentucky, and 1st Tennessee)

Artillery (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Henry W. Wells; 15th Indiana Light Battery and Battery D, 1st Ohio Light)

Confederate Army

Army of Tennessee (40,500 bayonets and 132 guns)

Gen Joseph E. Johnston (AC)

Hardee's Corps

LTG William J. Hardee (Poor CC)

Cheatham's Division – Exhaustion = 7

MG Benjamin F. Cheatham (Exceptional DC)

Maney's Tennessee Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG George E. Maney; 4th C.S., 1st and 27th Tennessee, 6th and 9th Tennessee, 41st Tennessee, and 50th Tennessee)

Strahl's Tennessee Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Otho F. Strahl; 4th and 5th Tennessee, 19th Tennessee, , 24th Tennessee, 31st Tennessee, and 33rd Tennessee)

Wright's Tennessee Brigade (M5) OOO

(Col John Carter; 8th Tennessee, 16th Tennessee, 28th Tennessee, 38th Tennessee, and 51st and 52nd Tennessee)

Vaughn's Tennessee Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Alfred J. Vaughn; 11th Tennessee, 12th and 47th Tennessee, 29th Tennessee, and 13th and 154th Tennessee)

Cleburne's Division – Exhaustion = 7

MG Patrick R. Cleburne (Exceptional DC)

Polk's Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Lucius E. Polk; 1st and 15th Arkansas, 3rd C.S., 5th C.S., 2nd Tennessee, and 35th and 48th Tennessee)

Govan's Arkansas Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Daniel C. Govan; 2nd and 24th Arkansas, 5th and 13th Arkansas, 6th and 7th Arkansas, and 8th and 19th Arkansas)

Lowrey's Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Mark P. Lowrey; 16th Alabama, 33rd Alabama, 45th Alabama, 32nd Mississippi, and 45th Mississippi)

Granbury's Texas Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Hiram B. Granbury; 6th and 15th Texas, 7th Texas, 10th Texas, 17th and 18th Texas, and 24th and 25th Texas)

Bate's Division – Exhaustion = 5

MG William B. Bate (DC)

Smith's Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Thomas Benton Smith; 37th Georgia, 4th Georgia Sharpshooters, 20th Tennessee, 30th Tennessee, and 15th and 37th Tennessee)

Lewis' Kentucky Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Joseph Horace Lewis; 2nd Kentucky, 4th Kentucky, 5th Kentucky, 6th Kentucky, and 9th Kentucky)

Finley's Florida Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Jesse J. Finley; 1st and 3rd Florida Cavalry, 1st and 4th Florida, 6th Florida, and 7th Florida)

Hardee's Corps Artillery

Col Melancthon Smith (DC)

Hoxton's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Llewelyn Hoxton; Phelan's Alabama Battery, Perry's Florida Battery and Turner's Mississippi Battery)

Hotchkiss' Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Thomas R. Hotchkiss; Goldwaite's Alabama Battery, Key's Arkansas Battery and Shannon's Mississippi Battery)

Martin's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Robert Martin; Howell's Georgia Battery, Bledsoe's Missouri Battery and Beauregard's South Carolina Battery)

Cobb's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Robert Cobb; Gracey's Kentucky Battery, Slocomb's Washington Louisiana Battery and Mebane's Tennessee Battery)

Palmer's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Joseph Palmer; Lumsden's Alabama Battery, Anderson's Georgia Battery and Havis' Georgia Battery)

Hood's Corps

LTG John B. Hood (Poor CC)

Hindman's Division – Exhaustion = 6

MG Thomas C. Hindman (DC)

Deas' Alabama Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Zachariah C. Deas; 19th Alabama, 22nd Alabama, 25th Alabama, 39th Alabama, 50th Alabama, and 17th Alabama Sharpshooters)

Manigault's Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Arthur Middleton Manigault; 24th Alabama, 28th Alabama, 34th Alabama, 10th South Carolina, and 19th South Carolina)

Wathall's Mississippi Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Edward C. Walthall; 24th and 27th Mississippi, 29th and 30th Mississippi, 34th Mississippi, 41st Mississippi, 44th Mississippi, and 9th Mississippi Sharpshooters)

Tucker's Mississippi Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG William F. Tucker; 7th Mississippi, 9th Mississippi, and 10th Mississippi)

Stevenson's Division – Exhaustion = 6

MG Carter L. Stevenson (DC)

Brown's Tennessee Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG John C. Brown; 3rd Tennessee, 18th Tennessee, 26th Tennessee, 32nd Tennessee, and 45th and 23rd Tennessee)

Cumming's Georgia Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Alfred Cumming; 34th Georgia, 36th Georgia, 39th Georgia and 56th Georgia)

Reynold's Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Alexander W. Reynolds; 46th Alabama, 58th North Carolina, 60th North Carolina, 54th Virginia, and 63rd Virginia)

Pettus' Alabama Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Edmund W. Pettus; 20th Alabama, 23rd Alabama, 30th Alabama, and 31st Alabama)

Stewart's Division – Exhaustion = 6

MG Alexander P. Stewart (DC)

Stovall's Georgia Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Marcellus A. Stovall; 40th Georgia, 41st Georgia, 42nd Georgia, 43rd Georgia, 52nd Georgia, and 1st Georgia State Line)

Clayton's Alabama Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Henry D. Clayton; 18th Alabama, 32nd and 58th Alabama, 36th Alabama, and 38th Alabama)

Gibson's Louisiana Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Randall L. Gibson; 14th Battalion Louisiana Sharpshooters, 1st Louisiana, 13th Louisiana, 16th and 25th Louisiana, 19th Louisiana, and 20th Louisiana)

Bakers's Alabama Brigade (M5) OOO

(BG Alpheus Baker; 37th Alabama, 40th Alabama, 42nd Alabama, and 54th Alabama)

Hood's Corps Artillery

Col Robert F. Becham (DC)

Courtney's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj Alfred R. Courtney; Dent's Alabama Battery, Garrity's Alabama Battery and Douglas' Texas Battery) (M4, Fd) OO

Eldridge's Battalion

(Maj John W. Eldridge; Oliver's Eufala Alabama Battery, Fenner's Louisiana Battery and Stanford's Mississippi Battery)

Johnston's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj John W. Johnston; Corput's Cherokee Georgia Battery, Rowan's Georgia Light Battery and Marshall's Tennessee Battery)

Williams' Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Lt Col Samuel C. Williams; Kolb's Barbour Alabama Battery, Darden's Jefferson Mississippi Battery and Jefress' Virginia Battery)

Polk’s Corps – “The Army of Mississippi”

LG Leonidas Polk (CC)

Loring's Division – Exhaustion = 5

MG William W. Loring (Poor DC)

Featherston's Mississippi Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG Winfield S. Featherston; 3rd Mississippi, 22nd Mississippi, 31st Mississippi, 33rd Mississippi, 40th Mississippi, and 1st Mississippi Sharpshooters)

Adams' Mississippi Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG John Adams; 6th Mississippi, 14th Mississippi, 15th Mississippi, 20th Mississippi, 23rd Mississippi, and 43rd Mississippi)

Scott's Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG Thomas M. Scott; 27th Alabama, 35th Alabama, 49th Alabama, 55th Alabama, 57th Alabama, and 12th Louisiana)

Cantey’s Independent Brigade (M4, PM) OOO

(BG James Cantey; 17th Alabama, 29th Alabama, 37th Mississippi and Alabama Sharpshooter Battalion)

Polk’s Corps Artillery

Myrick's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj John D. Myrick; Bouanchard's Louisiana Battery, Cowan's Mississippi Battery, and Barry's Lookout Tennessee Battery)

Preston's Battalion (M4, Fd) OO

(Maj William C. Preston; Tarrant's Alabama Battery, Lovelace's Selma Alabama Battery, and Barrett's Missouri Battery)

Small arms ammunition expenditure at Gettysburg

2010-12-31T02:44:00.005Z

I now have located three figures about small arms ammunition.

The first is the Chief Ordnance Officers request for resupply after the battle, which is a pretty fair indication of the amount expended (ref).

800,000 .57 rifle-musket cartridges (for Springfield and Enfield rifles*)
100,000 .69 rifle-musket cartridges (for M1842 converted to rifles)
200,000 .54 rifle-musket cartridges (for Lorenz rifles)
200,000 .69 musket cartridges
30,000 Sharp's cartridges

= 1.33m infantry and cavalry weapon cartridges

(Average per infantryman = 18.2 rounds expended, or 22.1 if 6th Corps excluded)

1st Army Corps Ordnance Officer reports his expenditure (including some issued to 3/11th Corps) in the OR (ref)

67,000 .58 rifle-musket cartridges

107,000 .57 rifle-musket cartridges

18,000 .54 rifle-musket cartridges (inc. 13,000 issued to 3rd Division, 11th Corps)

1,000 .69 cartridges (not stated whether they were rifle or smoothbore, but probably rifle, as it was issued to 3rd Division who had no smoothbore armed units)

34,000 cartridges of all natures by 2nd Division

= 241,000

Additionally the record shows that the Ordnance Officer issued 5,000 rounds of captured ammunition to 3rd Division.

Broken down as:

1st Division expended 80,000 rounds = 20.9 rounds per man

2nd Division expended 34,000 rounds = 10.9 rounds per man

3rd Division expended 119,000 rounds (adding the captured rounds) = 25.7 rounds per man

The third source is Geary's Report on 2nd Division, 12th Corps of 29th July (ref). He reports an expenditure of 277,000 rounds (69.4 per man), but it is "in the fight on 3rd July, and in the subsequent skirmishing;" (emphasis mine). This basically means it is for the campaign rather than just that day, although of course the bulk would be fired at Gettysburg. One assumes Geary took this figure from his Division Ordnance Officer, and one must make the assumption that all these rounds were issued to Geary's Division (if Williams' train wasn't present...).

The fact that Geary calls attention to this figure implies it is abnormally high. An examination of their situation on the night of the 2nd/3rd July shows they spent the whole night "in contact". After they stormed the works they simply laid down a continual barrage at the woods to their front, for some 7 hours. My copy of Gottfried's "Brigades of Gettysburg" references several primary accounts here which show Geary's (and Williams') situation was different to much of the rest of the field. Their skirmish lines fired continuously into a woods at an unseen foe.

Thus, taking the 12th Corps as an aberration,

1st Corps fired 228,000 rounds and was engaged on all three days. Geary's division expended upto 277,000 rounds on the 2nd/3rd. The rest of the infantry thus expended 795,000 rounds (18.2 rounds per man if 6th Corps fired none). This of course includes officers, sergeants and non-combatants. Deducting 35% for non-shooters (15% being officers and sergeants with the combat units and 20% being non-combatants) then roughly 38,169 riflemen were engaged (again, excluding 6th Corps) which pushes the ammunition expended by the average rifleman to 34.1 rounds.

In perspective, this is a fairly high ammunition expenditure. 20 rounds per man was the expectation of a typical battle at the time.

Edit: There is a fourth figure. The Berdan's Sharpshooters used 14,400 rounds from their Sharps in the 3 days. Their 450 riflemen give an average expenditure of 32 rounds per rifleman (ref). This is in line with the above estimates.

* As has been noted elsewhere, .58 ammunition was rarely issued for Springfields by this point. They used .57 because it was looser and the musket would foul less quickly.

Peter Tsouras, Check Your Sources!

2010-12-29T22:18:00.002Z

Many years ago I tried tracking down where all the British regiments were in 1862 using regiments.org as a source. I made a mistake and misassigned a regiment. This shouldn't matter. I'm just some guy off the internet.

However, on reading Peter Tsouras' "Rainbow of Blood" I find the mistake repeated in his orbat section. A carried through mistake is prima facie evidence. Ergo he must have sourced his dispositions from me, complete with an incorrect regiment. A reference would have been nice. I don't really mind, but that kind of thing has a name.

Caveat Emptor Peter! Since I did that work many years ago we can now access the Army List online!

I'll correct you soon.

More on the Cavalry at Antietam

2010-11-27T17:38:00.003Z

In a correction to my last, I now know that the orbat of the Cavalry Division contained in the OR is early October 1862. The organisation on the field at Antietam was:

Cavalry Brigade (Pleasonton)

5th US Cavalry (all 12 coys?), 8th Illinois (all 12 coys?), 1st Massachusetts (8 coys, A-H), 4th Pennsylvania (all 10 coys?), 6th Pennsylvania (7 coys only) and 3rd Indiana Cavalry (all 6 coys?)

(8th Pennsylvania Cavalry arrives 18th after a recce towards Gettysburg, PA)

Thus I can make a stab on the strength on the strength of the cavalry in the centre. At 30 sabres per company there would be about 1,600 sabres in the centre. This being a question a posed over a year ago resolved.

Cavalry Deployments at Antietam

2010-11-22T20:50:00.003Z

Lately my thoughts have turned to the cavalry, and especially the cavalry under McClellan. I got to wondering a few things and so have read parts of all the regimental histories to check what regiments did at Antietam. A starkly different picture emerges. In the following I'll mark links to regimental histories, but I bookmarked the book, not the page.

At Antietam the apparent organisation of the cavalry is:

Centre (Pleasonton's group)

5th US Cavalry

2nd Brigade (Col. Farnsworth): 8^th Illinois (ref), 3^rd Indiana (ref), 1^st Massachusetts (ref) and 8^th Pennsylvania Cavalry (no ref found for 8th PA)

3rd Brigade (Col. Rush): 4th and 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry (no refs found, but Pleasonton's report puts them here)

4x Horse Batteries

Right Flank (attached to 1st Corps)

4^th Brigade (Col. McReynolds): 1^st New York (ref), 12^th Pennsylvania Cavalry (ref)

5^th Brigade (Col. Davis): 3^rd Pennsylvania (ref) and 8^th New York Cavalry(ref) (note, both histories agree they were on the right flank with Hooker, which is contradicted by Pleasonton's report, but supported by Hooker's report)*

15^th Pennsylvania Cavalry (det, 200 men at most) (ref)

2^nd New York Cavalry (2 sqns) (no ref, but was 1st Corps escort unit)

Left Flank (attached to 9th Corps)

6th New York Cavalry (ref)

The 6th US Cavalry was not on the field at any point during the 16th-18th, being in the Pleasant Valley attached to 6th Corps (ref)

In summary there were 14 major cavalry units on the field (excluding escort squadrons etc.). 7 were with Pleasonton, 6 were with Hooker and screened his advance. Only one was with on the left flank, the 6th New York Cavalry (only 4 sqns, one was detached as an escort). The opening shots of the battle were fired on the 16th by the 3rd squadron of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry skirmishing in front of Hooker's Corps.

The history of the 6th NY is enlightening about the Battle of Antietam. They state that they did cross the Antietam and skirmished with Munford's brigade of cavalry, taking a few prisoners. Carman's map seems to place Whitting's regular cavalry brigade there too.

There is a lot of ambiguity here. No-one has done much research into the cavalry operations in this campaign, I suspect because even a casual inspection of the histories shows that the Federal cavalry totally dominated the Confederate cavalry on the field and this doesn't fit in with the required storyline (see Wittenberg for the current consensus). A lot more work needs doing, especially to find out what half of McClellan's cavalry were up to on the far right flank.

* Incidently, the 8th NY Cavalry was the only escapee unit from Harper's Ferry on the field.The 12th Illinois, 7th RI Sqn and 1st Md Sqn seem to have joined the army after the 17th.

PS: Many of the regimental histories describe the operations of the 14th-21st September 1862 as a single continuous fight. These continuous battles can be named by their conventions:

14th: Battle of South Mountain

15th: Battle of Boonsboro

16th: Battle of Sharpsburg Turnpike

16th-18th: Battle of Antietam

19th: Battle of Botoler's Ford

20th: Battle of Shephardstown

21st: Battle of Williamsport

AP Hill's attack at Antietam

2010-11-07T18:25:00.004Z

On a message board recently several people, including Eric Wittenberg, have insisted AP Hill made a flank attack against 9th Corps. This is understandable, even Harsh's Taken at the Flood says he did.

He didn't.

The descriptions in the OR don't match the events described in most books. I suspect it derives ultimately from Bruce Catton since whenever I've found an unsupportable myth in ACW history it usually started there.

All data is derived from the after action reports online at www.aotw.org.

First that actually happened is this. AP Hill crossed his division at Boteler's Ford 3 miles in the Confederate rear, moved down the Saw Mill Road and ployed at the junction of the Harper's Ferry Road.

At the time Rodman was attacking NEE towards Sharpsburg. A break had occurred in his division, in Harland's brigade. The 8th CT attacked in the right direction, but the 16th CT moved down a slope and lost contact (carrying the 4th RI with it). They enter the Otto Cornfield and it is here they encounter AP Hill's lead brigade, Gregg's. According to the orders issued these two Union regiments should have been closed up to the 8th CT 500m to the NEE. As they advance east (further widening the gap with their parent brigade) they are encounter Gregg's brigade advancing in the reciprocal direction. The Confederates charge frontally and drive the two Union regiments back in disorder.

Rodman has received warning of AP Hill's movement "Look out welll on the left! The enemy are moving a strong force in your direction", and had ordered the 16th CT and 4th RI to close up and refuse Fairchild's flank. Harland, the Brigade Colonel comes back from the 8th CT to find them facing the wrong way and orders them to wheel round and attack the Confederates to the west (Toomb's brigade). As they are advancing they run straight into Gregg's brigade coming the other way.

Lt-Col Curtis of the 4th RI states he was flanked by a brigade of infantry advancing in 3 lines firing over each other. The only unit anywhere near the 4th RI which could have advanced was the 1st SC Rifles, who confirm it was them.

What seems to have happened is this:

1. 16th CT (maybe 700 bayonets, probably less) advances to contact with both 12th and 1st SC (about 400 bayonets between them). It overlaps the Confederate flank on the Confederate left, leading to concern about a flank move (which never happens).

2. There is a firefight.

3. 12th SC charges and breaks the right wing of the 16th CT. 4th RI moves to flank the 1st SC.

4. 12th SC is disordered and withdraws back to rally. 4th RI flanks the 1st SC.

5. 1st SC Rifles (maybe 200 bayonets) advances forward into the open flank the 4th RI have opened up.

6. The Union line crumbles and is routed.

While there is indeed a flank attack by the Confederates it was not deliberate. The 4th RI opened a flank and the 1st SCR took it, advancing roughly to their front.

Meanwhile Fairchild's brigade is doing well. They've driven back Drayton's and Kemper's brigades; "Arriving near a stone fence, the enemy - a brigade composed of South Carolina and Georgia regiments - opened on us with musketry. After returning their fire, I immediately ordered a charge, which the whole brigade gallantly responded to, moving with alacrity and steadiness. Arriving at the fence, behind which the enemy were awaiting us, receiving their fire, losing large numbers of our men, we charged over the fence, dislodging them and driving them from their position down the hill toward the village.... We continued to purse the enemy down the hill." (Fairchild's Report on the Battle).

However, his left flank is in the air. The 8th CT misses him, goes past and engages in a fight with Kemper's brigade on it's own! This isn't as stupid as it first sounds as the 8th CT is about the same strength as Kemper. When Fairchild withdraws, they didn't and basically were flanked on both sides and broken, losing more than half the regiment.

Fairchild states " It was then discovered that the enemy were moving up from the corn-field on our left to flank us, and I ordered the brigade to retire about 250 yards to the rear of the position we now held", however the Cornfield was 500m away. Thus it was at the Otto Cornfield the action was lost. Fairchild dodged a possible flank attack, but one that developed by a frontal assault on the 16th CT and 4th RI as the "break in". The Union force was never turned or flanked, the extreme left wing crumbled leading to the rest pulling back to compensate.

The action isn't over. Archer and Toombs(-) will make a frontal assault on Scammon's brigade as the Kanawha division attempts to repeat Rodman's attack, and will drive it back. However at least the Kanawha division gave the broken remnants of the 8th CT somewhere to run to, preventing the regiment being utterly lost.

9th Corps doesn't try again after this. Of their 8 brigades three (Ferrero's, Fairchild's and Harland's) have ceased to exist as meaningful units for the time, Scammon's (under Ewing) is disordered and has taken heavy casualties, as have Christ's, Nagle's and Moor's (although earlier, they've recovered order). Only Welsh's brigade is relatively fresh with about 1,000 bayonets available for the attack. Hence the doubt that 9th Corps could even hold their position if attacked.

On a minor related note, it's been suggested that McClellan should have cavalry piqueting the Harper's Ferry Road to block Hill. There are several problems with this. First, Hill didn't come up the Harper's Ferry Road. Second, the whole of Munford's cavalry brigade was piqueting it themselves. Thirdly, it's on the wrong side of the Antietam! If you could get cavalry there then the entire battlespace would be altered, but you couldn't.

US Economic Progress (An Odd Graph I Happened to Have Made)

2010-11-05T00:51:00.004Z

One of the oddest graphs I ever made was taking the US economic growth per capita deducting inflation and multiplying by the previous amount. It gave a chart of PC wealth of the average American over the whole of US history:

The economic damage wrought by the Civil War is obvious. The US was set back by 20 years by this event. It is equalled only by the Great Depression as a loss of wealth, and dwarfed by a long slide since the Oil Crisis of the 1970's which is totally beyond the scope of this blog.

Other minor economic crises are visible, the WW2 manufacturing boom is visible (and goes back down when the US enters the war). It's fairly interesting, but was simply kicking around my harddrive.

Charges of US Naval Guns

2010-10-26T14:47:00.003+01:00

Minor piece of data, the authorised charges for US naval guns:

Strength of the Army in the East and West

2010-08-16T20:32:00.007+01:00

Using the aforementioned data, the chart for the Army of the Potomac is interesting:

It shows, for example, that although McClellan's force on the Peninsula was the weakest the Union ever fielded in the East, it was disproportionately large compared with total army strength. The large dip in summer 1864 is partially artificial, as Grant detached very significant forces to the Valley under Sheridan.

If we graph all forces facing Lee (including the Washington garrison) it looks like this:

The decreasing priority given to the Eastern theatre is obvious. By the time Gettysburg is fought the Eastern theatre has barely a quarter of Union manpower. The large spike under Burnside is obvious, he had far greater forces available than any other Union commander in the East (including Grant). The massive drop in winter-spring 1863 isn't combat, nor the usual January disease losses (which usually removed as many men as a major battle), it is a massive wave of desertions that undermined the Union Army.

The effects of Grant's Overland Campaign are also obvious. He built up his forces to a level not seen since Hooker wrecked the army and then brought it down by a series of mismanaged battles that were devastating to both sides (such as the Somme was in 1916, and there is much fair comparison between Grant and Haig - BTW I think both did good jobs). The Union's voracious conscription system and employment of foreign "mercenaries" was able to keep Grant reinforced whilst Lee withered on the vine, crushed by the application of overwhelming force (as McClellan intended to do in Spring 1862).

This we can identify a "bottoming out" of resources in the East at around Gettysburg. Comparing the Eastern and Western Combat Theatres (not including the Gulf or Missouri depts in the West) looks like this:

The large jump is in March-April 1862 when McClellan's planned campaign to cut the Confederacy in two via the river systems is finally enacted (and as he moves onto the Virginia Peninsula). The gradual rise is the feeding in of continual reinforcements to try and push Grant forward towards Vicksburg, and as soon as it falls troops are pulled out and sent elsewhere. The West holds onto it's higher priority though until Grant pulls forces East to support his Overland Campaign.

If we're to look for a shift of focus then by these numbers it is Burnside's failure that inaugurates it.

Grand Total US Forces

2010-08-15T22:45:00.004+01:00

I've just finished tabulating the strength figures from the Medical and Surgical History. You can tell a lot. Whilst I'm busy looking at the data, this is the aggregate present of the US Army during the period:

Spot the recruiting shutting in April 1862 (the blip in July 1862 is unexplained, and seems to be a case of double counting in the Washington defences)? Spot the passage of the 1862 Militia Act and the enactment of conscription?

The changing strength of the Eastern Union Army under Grant

2010-08-15T14:51:00.003+01:00

Using the Medical and Surgical Histories, this is a chart of the Aggregate Present in the Atlantic Region (including the Dept of Western Virginia, transferred in August 1864). "Grant" on the graph is those forces actively engaged with the enemy (the Depts of the Potomac, Virginia and Western Virginia), whilst "Garrison" is all the other Depts. Colored troops were only returned by Region and so can't be assigned.

As you can see, Grant lost a gross of over 90,000 men in April to August 1864. Some of these are battle casualties, some are sick and some are discharged. However, this is already offset by new recruiting somewhat, so the actual loss to the army is considerably greater.

The weight of ACW artillery guns

2010-08-14T16:29:00.002+01:00

I recently had trouble finding the weights of ACW field artillery, I finally have found the weights of the gun, carriage and limber complete (ref)(ref)

8 horse teams
12 pdr (old pattern): 39.8 cwt (32 rds on the limber)
20 pdr Parrott: 39.3 cwt (24 rds)

6 horse teams
Light 12-pdr (M1857 "Napoleon"): 34.8 cwt (32 rds)
10 pdr Parrott: 28.5 cwt (50 rds)
6 pdr (M1841): 28.4 cwt (50 rds)
3" Ordnance: 27.8 cwt (50 rds)

(1 cwt = 112 lbs, or 1/20th of a long ton)

The allowances for horses are below Napoleonic standards, which would suggest eight horses for the M1857. Making matters worse, horse teams were often reduced to four, especially in the Confederate Army (where sometimes Mules were substituted!). Numbers worth knowing.

I can't spare this man, he fights.

2010-07-27T16:57:00.004+01:00

Another stock ACW soundbite traced to its' source, in this case much more reputable. Alexander McClure reports them in 1892, in response to his attempt to have Grant removed (although Lincoln never did intervene, and it was Halleck that reinstated Grant to avoid McClernand getting an army). Brooks Simpson has shown it also to be false.

Also of interest is Lincoln's response to the suggested gerrymandering of the 1864 election in Pennsylvania (ref),Lincoln is concerned that unlike Sherman, Grant might not actually selectively furlough Republican voters. Lincoln thinks Grant is incorruptible; I regard this as high praise for Grant.

Lick 'em tomorrow though

2010-07-27T15:24:00.003+01:00

One of the stock quotes from the battle of Shiloh is:

Sherman: "Well, Grant, we've had the devil's own day, haven't we?"

Grant: "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow though."

I recently tried to trace the original source of the quote and came to the conclusion that it is a later invention. This soundbite enters ACW historiography in 1960, in Bruce Catton's "Grant Moves South". It is not present in any previous history, nor in either Grant nor Sherman's memoirs.

Thanks to the large scale digitisation of millions of books we can do keyword searches. I've found the phrase only once before 1960, in Charles Wingate's "What Shall Our Boys Do For a Living":

We can assume this is the ultimate source of the soundbite, and we have to assume as Catton was not big on citations. The Napoleon quote also doesn't seem to appear until around the time of the Civil War (when it appears in American magazines).

Thus it appears that the phrase was invented by Wingate ca. 1898, used without citation or verification by Catton in 1960 and has been promulgated unquestioned ever since.

Some musings on the "politics" of ACW history

2010-07-17T03:13:00.003+01:00

This is basically some thoughts I've been having, and they've only partially coalesced.

I've recently been thinking a lot about the "political" spectrum of ACW history, historians and general enthusiasts. One well known extreme is the "Lost Cause" and many a neo-Confederate can be found on any internet forum on the war. What is less recognised is that the Lost Cause in fact occupies one wing of a spectrum of ideology about the war. For simplicity I shall put the Lost Cause as the extreme left wing of this spectrum. The extreme polar opposite I shall labelled the "Radicals" since they espouse the ideologies of the wartime Radical Republicans. In the centre would be the Conservatives.

The left and right wings are polar opposites. For example, the cause was economic or slavery at these two ends of the spectrum, neither side will acknowledge that both had an impact. Another example is Sherman's scorched earth policy, condemned as ethnic cleansing on one side, and the righteous punishment for daring to leave the Union on the other.

This ideology even extends into what theatre of war is regarded as the one of prime import. The left wing (Lost Cause) focuses heavily on Virginia and the likes of Robert E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson, whilst the right wing (Radicals) focus on the Mississippi theatre (and, to a lesser extent the Tennessee-Kentucky theatre) and the likes of U.S. Grant and W.T. Sherman. Neither side likes any criticism of their marble men, and decry their opposites as "butchers".

My train of thought has been taken down this road by "meeting" a very extreme example of a radical on a forum. It was fairly obvious this individuals opinions were as extreme as the most ardent Lost Causer, at least as flawed but not stigmatised to the same extent. I thus got to thinking about where popular ACW history sits. To me at least it seems the vast majority of the popular histories sit to the right of the centre, although some would be centre-right, although there is every possibility I simply missed some far left schlock (I just wouldn't have read it, and thus forgotten picking it up). An example of far right schlock would be Edwin Bonekemper and his terrible books. For a position on the right the far left looks a lot more dangerous than the far right, so you attack that. The myths of the far right thus go unchallenged.

Meanwhile the centre (Conservative or Moderate) tends to get pilloried from both sides..... I'm still ruminating.

Phil Kearny's Words

2010-07-10T18:14:00.002+01:00

Many popular histories contain the following phrase, or a variant on it:

"I, Philip Kearny, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order for retreat,- we ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy and take Richmond. And in full view of all the responsibility for such a declaration, I say to you all, such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason."

I say variant because this is the original form that appeared, and no author I can find has referenced the original source since 1944. The original of this statement is in Rev J.J. Mark's "The Peninsula Campaign in Virginia" (page 294). This is an interesting work in its own right and deserves to be read (more later). Modern authors do not use the original source; McPherson in his "Battle Cry of Freedom" references Catton's "Mr Lincoln's Army", whilst altering the form of the statement slightly. Catton references Kearny's grandson's work on his grandfather, which was reviewed that "the work as a whole must be dismissed as lengthy family glorification" (ref). Thomas Kearny so objected to the review that he sued (ref). Sears in his "To the Gates of Richmond" alters the quote (although not materially) and does not reference it. The current keepers of the wikipedia page on Kearny not only alter the quote and fail to reference it, but insist he actually wrote it.

Apparently in the 1860's there was considerable controversy about whether Kearny had actually uttered these words, as John Watts de Peyser actually comments on it dismissing such claims (ref). In the 1860's the quote was used to criticise Kearny for "over-rashness" (while admitting McClellan's "over-caution"), since it is plainly obvious that Kearny is actually wrong (ref).

On of the major problems with Rev. Marks' story was that he wasn't there. He had volunteered to remain behind with the field hospital when McClellan began his change of base and had to abandon them. He never actually returned to his unit, going to Libby Prison with the wounded, and resigning his Commission upon return to the north. This was pointed out and Marks replied it was confirmed by an (unnamed) "officer of high rank".

I've no idea whether Kearny said the above or not. It seems in keeping with his character certainly. I do however object to the fact that everyone references Catton, who is not using the statement in its' original form.

What the Pinkerton estimates were of, an answer.

2010-06-28T16:09:00.003+01:00

Although he missed the point, the information needed to work out what the parameter Pinkerton was reporting (and McClellan using) is in Fishel's Secret War for the Union.

Pinkerton obtained the roster strengths, that is the "aggregtate present and absent" and applied a correction factor to take out the sick. He meant to use 15%, but apparently his computer used 1/15th instead, thus overstating the enemy strength by about 10%.

Thus is explained why, by inspection, Pinkerton's numbers usually seem in good aggreement with the aggregate present and absent, they were the basis of his reports, and he is not doing his maths properly. It does not explain some of the figures his interogators were producing.

The 68 Pounder 95 cwt

2010-06-27T13:57:00.003+01:00

For years I've taken Lambert's Warrior at its word, the initial velocity of a 68 pounder was ca. 1,580 fps. Now, reading contemporary works from the 1860's I find that this is not the velocity with a "far" or "battering" 16 lb charge, but seems to be the velocity with the 12 lb "service" charge.

Reading Holley's Treatise on Ordnance and Armour I find that with the 16 lb charge the gun developed a muzzle velocity of over 2,040 fps. This goes an awfully long way to explain why the Royal Navy kept this gun as an anti-armour piece into the mid-1860's. For comparison, with a 60 lb charge (of Mammoth) and a 451 lb ball a 15" Rodman only developed around 1,200 fps.

The key parameter to consider is the powder charge: shot weight ratio. In the 15" even with 60 lbs of powder the powder charge is only 13% the shot weight. In the 68 pdr it is around 25%. The slow burning Mammoth is less efficient, and the shorter barrel (in calibres) means the burning charge has less time to accelerate the projectile.

Simply correcting myself after years of using the 1,580 fps figure....

R.I.P. Paddy Griffith

2010-06-27T00:02:00.002+01:00

Paddy Griffith passed away at his home in Manchester on the 24th June. He will be sorely missed. His contribution to the study of the American Civil War was outstanding.

R.I.P. Dr. Paddy Griffith (1947-2010)

The Royal Navy Force Designated for America, 1862

2010-06-24T23:52:00.002+01:00

This is a bit of a datadump, it's information accumulated that I've posted on line elsewhere, but ought to here.

Using the defence plans for Canada, and the Hydrographer's report to Adm. Milne we can estimate the British Royal Navy force that they planned to use in the event of war with the United States.

WO33/11 gives the planning figures for the defence of Canada:

At Quebec: 2x line of battle and 1x ironclad battery

Operating between Quebec and Montreal: 2x ironclad battery, 2x corvettes (noting a maximum draught of 18 ft), 2 dispatch vessels and 7 gunboats

On Lake St. Francis: 4x gunboats

On Lake Ontario: 3x ironclad battery, 4x dispatch vessels, 16 gunboats

On Lake Erie: 3x ironclad Battery, 20x gunboats

On the Richelieu River: 6 gunboats

Total for the inland seas of Canada: 2 line-of-battle, 9 ironclad batteries, 2 corvettes, 6 dispatch vessels, 53 gunboats = 72 vessels

Three of the nine ironclads were to come from the existing Crimean War ironclads, probably as only one (HMS Aetna) can actually transit onto Lake Ontario (she just squeezes into the locks with 6 inches to spare at the beam). None of the batteries have engines strong enough the run the rapids. Six of these ironclads are available for service (Meteor is already uncased and awaiting wrecking, Trusty has been converted into an experimental turret vessel and is likely too unstable to risk at sea). The cost of these six new ironclads was set at £300,000 for all six, slightly cheaper than the ironclads of 1854-5. Build time was to be 90 days.

The force recommended by Captain Washington to blockade the Unites States was:

Penobscot Bay: 2x sloops, 2x gunboats

Kennebec River: 1x sloop, 2x gunboats

Portland: 1x frigate, 2x sloops, 2x gunboats

Portsmouth, NH: 2x sloops (and notes the defences mean a mortar vessel can range on the navy yard without any return fire)

Salem and Marblehead: 1x sloop

Boston: 1x line of battle, 2x frigates, 2x sloops, 2x gunboats

Nantucket Island: 1x frigate

Narrgansett Bay: 3x sloops, 3x gunboat

Long Island Sound: 1x line of battle, 1x frigate, 2x sloops, 2x gunboats

New York Harbor (South Entrance): 2x line of battle, 2x frigates, 2x sloops, 2x gunboats (much ink is spilled over how to attack New York)

Delaware River: 1x line of battle, 1x frigate or sloop, 2x gunboats (4 if possible) (much ink is spilt noting that a gunboat flotilla could penetrate up the Delaware as far as Trenton, NJ, and that a gunboat force on the river could destroy the Dupont powder mills, smash Philadelphia and other such nastiness)

Chesapeake Bay: 2x line of battle, 2x frigates, 6x sloops, 6x gunboats

Port Royal, SC: 1x frigate, 1x sloop

Total blockade: 7x line of battle, 12x frigates, 25 sloops, 23x gunboats = 67 vessels

This didn't include a cruising force of 25 vessels of the West India Squadron. Nor does it include Milne's planned particular service squadron, which was to include Warrior, Black Prince, Defence and some other ironclads (probably the available three), plus some line of battle and a large gunboat force. This last force was the most worrying, Milne planned on reducing coastal fortifications (starting with Fort Monroe and moving into the Chesapeake) and sending gunboats up the navigable rivers to destroy everything that was shellable. Unfortunately for the US that is quite a lot of war industries.

Livermore, numbers, black confederates and trying to arrive at a true "effective strength" value: part 1

2010-06-15T21:30:00.005+01:00

One century and one decade ago Thomas Livermore published "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-5". It is out of copyright and freely distributed here. In it he made the first serious stab at trying to level the playing field and use directly comparible numbers. To wit:

The Records, apparently following the reports and returns of the commanders, give the numbers in the different campaigns and battles variously as “present for duty, “present for duty equipped”, or “effective. Sometimes the last-named class excludes on both sides the non-combatants, and on the Confederate side the officers and even artillery and cavalry ; and, in the effort to number only the men bearing muskets in the firing-line, the stragglers, even those who have left the ranks on the field of battle, are sometimes excluded in reports of battles.

This practice of counting as effective in the infantry only the men bearing muskets in the firing-line is of great value for informing commanders what weight of fire they can deliver, and the state of discipline in the ranks; but it cannot be followed in ascertaining numbers for comparison between the two sides in the civil war, or between the numbers in battles of that war and other wars, because the published accounts of the Union army, and of armies in other wars, do not usually state numbers on this basis. Officers, artillery, and cavalry are assuredly essential parts of the effective force of an army, and the efficiency of an army is certainly to be gauged quite as well by the number of combatants who fail to join in battle as by the valor of those who come into the firing-line. On the other hand, it is reasonable to exclude non-combatants from those counted as effective for battle. In both the Union and Confederate armies, the members of the regimental, medical, and quartermaster’s departments, and the musicians, were non-combatants, and few of them were ever present in the firing-line, for even the drummers and fifers were usually employed in caring for the wounded; and these non-combatants, although essential to successful campaigns, cannot be said to have had any influence in the decision of battles in the civil war.

...

[T]here is no reason for concluding that [the number of non-combabtants] was ever less than seven per cent, of the total “present for duty” in the infantry and artillery. Repeated instances are found in the Records where the numbers given as “effective” in infantry corps or divisions are from 89 to 93 per cent, of the number present for duty, while in the cavalry the per cent, is often from 83 to 86. The lower per cents, may be accounted for by the deduction of men without arms in the infantry, and of men without mounts in the cavalry. It is apparent that the commanders of corps in the Union army did not all follow the same classification in counting the numbers “present for duty equipped” or “effective” for in some returns these numbers are the same as, or under one per cent, less than, the number “present for duty” and sometimes they are stated as even greater.

Although the Confederate returns bear evidence of having computed the “Effectives” more consistently, yet it is apparent in some cases that a sufficient deduction is not made for the non-combatants. In view of these facts, the writer, adopting the number of effectives given in the Official Records in the few cases where they seem to* be properly determined, or where the number present for duty is not given, has in other cases computed the number of effectives in the infantry and artillery at 93 per cent., and in the cavalry at 85 per cent., of the number present for duty. In cases where the number of effectives given in the Confederate returns is used, an addition is made for officers if they appear not to have been included. In this connection it is to be observed that in the Union armies the number of officers ran from 4 to 7 per cent, of the total present for duty, while in the Confederate armies it ran from 6 to 11 per cent.

- Livermore, Thomas; Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-5, pgs66-70

Livermore essentially used the relationship between the Confederate "Present for Duty" and "Effective" figure and applied it to the Union. He also notes the Confederates had a larger percentage of officers overall. This is telling, both sides recruited officers at the same rate (34 officers per infantry regiment). Either the Confederate army atrophied more by non-combat losses or we have two different counting methods for "Present for Duty".

In fact this is true. Some Confederate returns have an additional column between "Present for Duty" and "Aggregate Present" labelled "Total Present". This appears to correspond with adding back in those "duty men" who were not available for line of battle.

Also, the Confederate "effective" column corresponds with the "Present for Duty - Enlisted" in those cases I've checked.

Making matters more complicated, neither side reports civilians attached to the army. In the Confederate Army this included their "negros", both free and slave. These were not enlisted and do not show up on the returns for the armies*. Whilst some white Confederates did serve as teamsters they were few and rapidly replaced by the non-whites to free them for the firing line. However in the Federal Army a large number of men had to be detached for this work (and they were detached for six months at a time, and were borne as "present for duty" on their parent registers rolls irrespective of the fact they were on regimental parades).

These facts add up to the fact that Livermore didn't get the factors right. One of his fundamental premises, that "present for duty" meant the same in both armies, is false. In part 2 I shall look at other estimates by those that took part in the war, and show the impact on the force balance of various civil war battles.

* Ingalls (Quartermaster, Federal Army of the Potomac) acquired 2,000 negro workers for his quartermasters corps on the Peninsula and took them with him. They don't show up on Federal states as far as I can tell.

McClellan's numbers - which ones?

2010-06-14T17:05:00.002+01:00

Anyone who was delved into the morass of civil war statistics is well aware that we have various different numbers we can use for measuring armies with various different meanings. The two extreme values are combat effectives (the number on the battleline only) and aggregate present and absent (the total number of names enlisted, including those physically not with the army).

Now, when McClellan (or any other officer) makes an estimate of enemy strength, which one of these numbers is he using? This is important as if he was using the highest categories of enemy strength he's actually correct in his "phantasmal" numbers. If he is using the lowest he is wildly overestimating. Unfortunately he never actually says.

We do know that the numbers he adopted for the force in front of him at Yorktown after the siege were from a captured ration roll, showing 119,000 men. This is an expression of the aggregate present and absent. After this he consistantly uses the figure of 100-120,000 until not long before the Seven Days. In this there is absolutely nothing wrong, it is a very reasonable deduction (approximately this figure appears in Livermore). Of course, viewed from the angle of combat effectives there seems to be a lot wrong. The question is what did McClellan think these figures were, effectives, present or aggregate?

Here we don't know, and this is the crux of the problem. The best idea in my head is to keep an open mind and look at how he behaved, the clues are likely there....

Short Review: Controversies and Commanders by Stephen Sears

2010-06-13T13:41:00.005+01:00

Happened to read this book yesterday, and it's a mixed bag.

Firstly we have several more chapters on why McClellan and friends were so bad. These are essentially a continuation of his previous arguments.

However, we then have two very good chapters. "The revolt of the generals" covers the dysfunction that effected the Army of the Potomac's command structure after McClellan was removed, culminating in Burnside trying to dismiss almost the whole of the top level command before being relieved of duty. It of course has the typical swipes at McClellan one would expect from Sears; "McClellan had managed (at least to the satisfaction of the officer corps) to disguise the reverses of the Seven Days and shift responsibility and lay the blame on shoulders other than his own.". As if the entire officer corps of the Army of the Potomac were a bunch of shills to be conned.... This chapter should be read with the next; "In defence of Fighting Joe", a well written attempt to vindicate Hooker. Only putting these two together can we understand the authors overall intent, to build a picture in which Hooker's failure is the fault of others. Even the blurb on the back spells out that Hooker's firing was not justified in Sears' eyes.

Much of the rest of the book is taken up with examining other Generals and a pattern emerges, the Republican Generals are lauded and defended whilst the Democrat Generals are derided and subject to character assassination. In this I've come to the conclusion that Sears has a "Radical Republican" agenda, which makes his works much easier to understand.

Beauregard in the Seven Days?

2010-06-07T19:59:00.003+01:00

One thing about the Seven Days Battles is the question of why McClellan's intelligence apparatus suggested that Beauregard was at Richmond. In point of fact he was at Richmond, after having been fired from command of Department No. 2. The northern papers had reported it, such as this article in the New York Times dated 24th June 1862. Later they report on the 29th that his army is following, the day before that they reported a considerable portion of it had arrived already. They'd reported that Beauregard may move there a month earlier.

It appears that the Union papers (and hence intelligence apparatus) had detected the start of Bragg's change of base from Tupelo to Chattanooga, but combined with the appearance of Beauregard in Richmond had put two and two together and made five. It looked like a detachment of Beauregard's army was going to Richmond.

Now, McClellan's apparatus apparently detected the movement of the force under Holmes from the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. Under questioning prisoners from Holmes claimed to be part of Beauregard's Army (matbe Pinkerton's interrogators asked leading questions....). They too put two and two together and made five. The result was that McClellan was getting intelligence from several directions, although he does not necessarily believe it. His communique to Edwin Stanton states he would "have to contend with vastly superior odds if this were true." (emphasis mine). Of course there is sufficient weight of evidence to give some credence to this at the time.

McClellan was wrong about Beauregard's army being in Richmond. However, there was sufficient evidence to that effect that pointed to it that the conclusion was reasonable given what was known at the time.

The discrepancy between "global returns" and real life

2010-06-05T22:06:00.008+01:00

When considering the overall strength of the Union army tables like this are usually brought up:

This table, from the OR (OR 3, Vol 2, 957) shows an aggregate strength of the Union Army as 664,163. This is quite a force. Compare with the number of regiments published a month earlier:

Now, lets consider the average strength of a volunteer infantry regiment (counting an independent company as 1/10th of a regiment). There are 816.7 Regiments with an aggregate PFD of 573,420 and an aggregate absent, sick or wounded of 107,109. That means the average Union regiment just before the Battle of Fredericksburg was 702 PFD and 131 absent, sick or wounded (833 aggregate present and absent).

Doing the same for the cavalry yields 89.7 regiments with 700 PFD and 133 absent, sick and wounded (833 aggregate present and absent). The artillery has 28 regiments (of 12 companies) with 958 PFD and 176 absent, sick or wounded (1,134 per regiment).

Now, have you ever read of 700 man regiments in the field? They're incredibly rare.

Burnside's Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg has 265.5 infantry regiments (including a few regular units not in the volunteer count above), in round figures a third of the Union infantry. They also have 18.9 cavalry regiments and 70 companies of artillery. If they were "average" as above they'd have:

186,231 infantry PFD
13,230 cavalry PFD
5,588 artillery PFD
= 205,049 men PFD

In fact (using his 10th December 1862 return (ref))his three active "Grand Divisions" used in the count above only sum to 118,952 PFD and only 103,190 infantry PFDE (adding in the Vol engr bde it becomes 104,695). Using the latter figure the average infantry regiment in Burnside's army (accounting for ca. a third of the total infantry) is 394 (56% of the count above). The PFDE (all arms) of the three Grand Divisions is 114,612 and the aggregate present 138,927, or 17.5% of the aggregate present are not PFDE, this is the sick list (at ca. 1 in 6 is absolutely typical of an army in the field). The PFD or PFDE must be reduced by taking out the daily and special duty men to arrive at an effective combatant strength. We can estimate the Grand Divisions had 90,000 with the combat units and around 77,000 effective infantry (about 71,000 enlisted effectives, the normal CS measure). Thus the musket strength of an average infantry regiment in Burnside's army is now down to around 266 muskets.

If this was typical of the entire Union Army then not 220,000 muskets would be in the field. It is this thinking that has me doubting that the Union ever had 600,000 effectives in the field. I tend to regard Union strength as around 300,000, maybe 350,000 depending on exactly when we measure.

Numbers in Stephen Sears' Books, part 1: The Landscape Turned Red

2010-06-05T19:47:00.003+01:00

In a short series of posts I will deal with the strength figures in the books of the author Stephen Sears, starting with his book on Antietam "The Landscape Turned Red", principly because it is the easiest.

The first strength figure is on page 102 and deals with the total strength of the Army of the Potomac on 7th September. It lists 85,000 "under arms" (i.e. effectives) in McClellan's Army and 72,500 left to defend Washington. Sears states that because of serious straggling ans sickness en route to Frederick McClellan was setting forth with nearly a 2:1 advantage, 3:1 if he could call in reserves from Washington.

The figures are from (a) Palfrey's the Antietam and Fredericksburg pg 7 and (b) OR19(2) 264-5. Although the latter carries the caveat in the original (not reproduced in Sears) "There is the old exaggeration in these figures, due to failing to distingish between for duty and extra or daily duty.". The former 85,000 was obtained by Palfrey taking the 20th September return of 89,452 (this figure being the aggregate present), deducting the strength on that date of Porters Corps (19,477) and adding the casualties sustained of 14,794 yielding, in round figures 85,000. Although represented by Sears as an effective strength, this appears to be an aggregate present strength (or at least PFD). Lee on this date had around 75,000 "for duty" and a larger number "aggregate present". Thus rather than 2:1 or even 3:1 superiority, McClellan's army had rough numerical equality.

On page 117 Sears adopts the value in McClellan's report of 87,000, noting that this is "almost exactly double". It is roughly parity.

On page 163 Sears states that "60,000 fighting men" (i.e. effectives, in fact this figure would fit the PFD of the force present on the field on dawn of the 17th) were with McClellan at Antietam on dawn of the 16th September, giving him a 4:1 superiority in numbers (then quips about McClellan's "phantom calculation). In fact McClellan had 48,000 effectives strung out, still on line of march (Harsh, Taken at the Flood, p330). Only 2 of McClellan's Divisions were on the field, Richardson's (lead division of Sumner's wing) and Sykes' (lead division of Burnside's wing), with maybe 6,000 effectives between them. Rather than outnumbering Lee by 4:1 as Sears suggests, McClellan's forces on the field at dawn were outnumbered 3:1, although this quickly changed during the day as the columns came off their roads and ployed into position. There was no massive superiority in numbers that McClellan missed (and in fact McClellan endeavoured to attack as soon as he had 3 Corps up but the movements of his subordinates were too slow).

On pages 173-4 Sears has his last words on strength, giving a statement of the balance of strength. He states that "by roster counts" McClellan had 75,000 of "all arms and services", plus another 19,000 in the Loudon Valley under Franklin. He also gives the whole armies effective strength at 71,500 (although not explicit, running through the attached footnote and repeating his maths shows that he has included both the force in the Loudon valley and Humphrey's division in this figure, which is based on Carman's figures with an attempt to add the forces Carman didn't count in them. There is no attempt to fix, i.e. downrate to "effectives", those figures given by Carman as PFD or even aggregate present). Lee has "fewer than 26,500" including his artillery and cavalry after Jackson and Walker arrive (i.e. McLaws, Anderson and AP Hill aren't up yet, as the text makes explicit, but no numbers are given for them in the book, in a footnote Sears quotes "less than 40,000" and "not 35,000" excluding cavalry).

It is clear Sears understands the difference between effectives and present (since it is explicit in his main source, Carman), but seems to adopt the maximum possible value by including forces not on the field on the 17th (covering this as forces under McClellan's command), whilst adopting the lowest possible effective value for the Confederates (for example, following Carman only half of AP Hill's division is counted). McClellan certainly did have superior numbers during the battle, but a careful examination of Carman places this figure between 5:4 and 3:2, rather than 2:1 used here.

Overall, although the figures chosen are those that make Sears' case look best, by using Carman Sears has not majorly run off track (although his figures for the morning of the 16th are very wrong, they're not referenced and so were probably taken from the known strengths at the end of that day rather than the begining). The most serious mistake is including forces that didn't arrive in time to participate in the battle.

Next we shall look at his Richmond Campaign, and see his figures without the crutch of Carman. Then I'll read his Chancellorsville and Gettysburg books.

Yorktown: Some Context

2010-06-01T00:08:00.006+01:00

On the 22nd April 1862 Joe Johnston famously wrote "No-one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack." (ref). This quote is widely used in many general history books but as far as I can tell no-one has ever looked at what Johnston and McClellan actually thought the force balance was.

The Confederates believed McClellan had 200,000 men(ref), whereas when he contacted the Confederate works he had 45,000 PFD (ca. 30,000 effective infantry, plus supporting arms).

McClellan believed that the Confederate position was 18,000 or 20,000 strong, reinforced to 30,000 on the 7th (ref, and next page) and that his total force, including that not up yet was 68,000 PFD.

Earl J. Hess in his Field Armies and Fortifications of the Civil War, the Eastern Campaigns 1861-4 calls the Yorktown entrenchments "one of the strongest defensive positions of the war." (ref). Thus the combat power of Magruders, later Johnstons force is magnified many times.

Johnston's comment of the 22nd April is based upon the false notion that McClellan had over 10 to 1 supremacy in numbers when he contacted the Warwick Line. In fact it was closer to 3:2. When McClellan's entire command was up it numbered roughly 72,000 present (plus another division afloat after the 16th April), and thus maybe 60,000 effectives of all arms. Johnston had 55,000 effectives of all arms in the entrenchments and in reserve at Williamsburg. Thus there is rough numerical parity. To be fair, we should point out that towards the end McClellan received intelligence that Lee was reinforcing Johnston to 80,000 (ref), although it should be pointed out that this is an entirely reasonable "aggregate present" figure, and that according to Livermore the aggregate present and absent of Johnston's command is around 125,000 (Numbers and Losses, p43-4).

There certainly may have been an opportunity for assault. Beattie's coverage of events here is excellent (Army of the Potomac vol. 3, chapter 16). McClellan's army stepped off on the 5th April with orders to roll over the Yorktown position, but rain slowed the march, the rivers swelled and when they arrived the position was completely dominated by Confederate artillery. The Federals tried to assault twice anyway (although only reconnaisances in force, had either been successful the whole line was in place to attack), and McClellan didn't decide on a siege until 17th April (Beattie, chapter 21). It took two weeks to build irresistable siegeworks and the Confederates didn't wait to be on the receiving end of the bombardment.

In conclusion there is no reason to believe that McClellan was in the dark about what faced him, he just believed (IMHO, correctly) that the position was too strong, and tested this by several probes before settling down to blast it out. When half a century later generals ordered assaults on prepared positions with large fields of fire for crew served weapons we call them butchers and "donkeys", yet we deride a general who had learnt this lesson (from viewing the siege of Sebastapol) and declined the casual butchery in favour of actually winning.

McClellan's View from the Pry House

2010-06-01T00:02:00.002+01:00

You find some odd things on youtube:

Ballistics

2010-05-16T22:31:00.011+01:00

I'm interested in why the rifle didn't revolutionise combat in the Civil War, as per Griffith etc.; here are some thoughts.

Using a ballistic coefficient of 0.145 for the Burton ball and the calculator here I've calculated the ballistic arcs of the 0.58 Springfield rifle-musket.

Figure 1: Springfield with sights set at 100, 300 and 500 yards. -60 inches is the approximate ground level (edit: as Fred points out below, there was no real "zeroing" of the weapons, and is sloppy nomenclature on my part).

The purple line is 12 inches above the bore and the turcoise line at -60 inches is approximately the ground. When the arc is between these two lines it may hit a target.

The default 100 yard sight setting means that the bullet describes a single dangerous space out to roughly 200 yards (assuming the musket is approximately 5 feet above the ground, i.e. shoulder height, if the shooter is prone the bullet strikes the ground roughly at 120 yards). Set at 300 yards we get the pattern described in Fred Ray's recent blog post. At 500 yards setting the round is out of the dangerous space around 10 yards into flight, and comes down on a step plunging trajectory with a very small dangerous space of about 50 yards. As an aside, these arcs are not symmetrical, the round is accelerating towards the ground in them.

If we make a comparison with the smoothbore musket then we find that if both are zeroed at 100 yards there is no significant difference, both are still in the dangerous space out to about 200 yards. The superior muzzle velocity of the smoothbore beats the superior ballistic coefficient of the rifle.

Figure 2: Comparison of M1861 rifle musket and M1842 smoothbore musket

This of course ignores the fact that the rifle bullet will disperse less and is effected by wind only around a third of the ball. For firing at picked targets on the skirmish line the rifle will be better at 200 yards. If firing at a massed target (i.e. a battleline) there is essentially no difference. At around 100 yards there is little discernable difference in whether or not the target is hit.

Assuming the following minutes of arc, figure 3 shows the chances of hitting a 2 foot circular target (roughly a torso) for various weapons:

M1861 Springfield rifle-musket: 10.5 MOA
M1842 Springfield percussion musket: 24 MOA (edit: this may have been a patched ball)
P1853 Enfield rifle-musket: 7.5 MOA
British Baker Rifle (Napoleonic weapon): 18 MOA
French Charville Musket (Napoleonic weapon): 36 MOA

Figure 3: Chance of hitting a 2 foot target. "Effective range" was reckoned on the 20% hit line.

This shows that, ignoring the problem of rangefinding and wind effects, the Springfield had 3.5x the range of an old flintlock, and twice the range of the percussion musket it replaced. It also shows that the Confederate were right that the Enfield was a far more accurate weapon. In fact this accuracy was never achieved for the Springfield due to concerns over loading; after only a few rounds the barrel would become so clogged that the .58 bullet could not be loaded, the Ordnance bureau started supplying the 0.57 bullet for the Enfield as standard, which increased windage (and ease of loading) at the expense of accuracy.

Figures 1 and 3 must be considered together, and can be summed (which I won't do here as it is a lot of work). Firing at a target 225 yards away with a Springfield is difficult, you must set your sights at 300 yards, then aim below the targets feet, awkward when poorly trained soldiers naturally shoot high. The solution adopted for the line infantry of the US, CS and also most of continental Europe was to set sights at 100 yards, and only shoot at 150 yards or less. Sharpshooters, jaegars, chasseurs and other specialist troops would be trained in the full use of sights and long range shooting. Only the British would stick to training their line infantry to shoot at long ranges.

CS Industry

2010-05-09T18:27:00.004+01:00

Recently I ran into an argument about whether the trans-Mississippi had any military value. As a counter I surveyed the 1860 US Census and took the value of bar, sheet and railroad iron produced as an indicator of heavy industry. The result for the Confederacy was:

Figure 1: Breakdown of CSA (not including border states) heavy industry

This only reflects heavy industry. If all manufactures (which include such goods as liquor and cider) are measured then by value the CSA breaks down as follows:

Figure 2: Manufacturing output of the CSA by state

This shows the disparity between the rich trading states of the coasts (and Tennessee, which could access the coast using the river) and the rest. However, this is small potatoes compared to the whole US:

Figure 3: Manufacturing output of the US, 1860.

It shows just what the border states were worth, they would have doubled the CSA manufacturing output. In heavy industry they would more than double the percentage and a CSA including the border states has a clear third of the combined US heavy industry. As it stands the CSA had 15% of the heavy industry and the border states had 17%. US heavy industry is dominated by four states; Ohio (17%), Massachusetts (16%), New York (13%) and New Jersey (10%). The first two have more heavy industry than the whole CSA. Virginia in the Union also had a 10% share of heavy industry, equal to New Jersey.

My point being an agreement with Brian Holden Reid (America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield 1861-3, pg 130); Virginia was by far the most important state of the Confederacy and that the focus on defending it was fully justified. The Mississippi theatre mattered little to the Confederacy's military power.

Firefight range at Gettysburg

2010-04-26T23:48:00.004+01:00

A survey of the OR for yards, paces and rods has yielded the following firefight ranges (identified opening fire range):

The mean is 95 yards and the mode 100 yards, but three distinct peaks are visible. It seems the average open field range of 100 yards is reasonable, with the lower ranges being in restricted terrain.

During Pickett's charge 2 Union regiments (7th MI and 20th MA) opened fire at 200 yards, the rest at 80-100 yards except the 12th NJ who reserved fire to 20 yards. The attacking Confederates stopped to fire around 80 yards and stopped moving forward well clear of the fence.

The end of my absence

2010-04-16T23:18:00.003+01:00

I've not posted for a while, as I've been knee deep in my MPhil to PhD upgrade exam. This is an examination taken about half way though a PhD programme at a British university as a check that you're of sufficient standard to stand a chance of passing a PhD viva. I passed. If you have a choice, don't do your PhD at Imperial College, even if it is one of the best in the world. It's much more stressful than Oxford, King's or UCL.

Whilst busy with my day job (making poly(oxazolines)) I'm preparing my next post. I've located a copy of the map of the Confederate gravesites at Gettysburg. Once I've deconflicted the casualties of Anderson's division on the 2nd and Longstreet's on the 3rd I'll post on where the bodies fell during the Longstreet/ Pickett etc. charge, and the implications of this data.

A google found a short video clip of the same map being used in a TV program (ref). Unfortunately the related clips from the same program talks of 12,000 CS dead in "Pickett's charge", against "General Grant". Oh dear...

Oh, and Foyles bookshop, one of the few UK bookshops to stock a reasonable range of ACW material, have majorly increased their prices, to the point where they're 50%(+) more expensive than amazon even after the delivery costs. I can wait for 5 days to save £11 ($18), thanks.

Expect a proper post in around a week.

US Ironclads in Service and the Passaic class.Monitor

2010-01-30T18:47:00.006Z

In a recent "discussion" on an internet forum I was "informed" that the USN had dozens of Monitors and they'd sweep the seas of the British. My response was to post figures showing that at no point did the USN actually have more armoured ships available for service than the RN. One of the offshoots was I made a chart showing US ironclad strength (excluding the Mississippi flotilla, which were not really ironclads, although the fact this chart excludes the Milhawkee class of river monitors is debatable).

What is apparent is that the Passaic class Monitor are the absolute backbone of any defence of the US during the period when the RN might intervene (i.e. upto July 1863). Starting the early 1864 the USN ironclad force becomes much more powerful as the Canonicus and other 15" armed Monitors start to come into service, although about this time the RN starts putting ordnance into service capable of piercing Monitor turrets at extreme ranges.

The Passaic was an improved Monitor, although the design work was done before the US had actually fought the Monitor. 10 units were ordered at a contract price of ca. $400,000 each, now of which was reached. The cost per unit was more than double that of Britain 1854/5 ironclads (at a fixed £1 = $3 exchange, which in reality flutuated immensely) and the cost of 2 Passiacs would purchase a Defence or Hector class for the RN, and 3 Passiacs would purchase a Warrior or similar. A Passiac cost about the same as a two deck steam ship-of-the-line. They were not cheap vessels by any stretch of the imagination.

They were fairly large, 200 feet long, 46 feet in beam and had a draught of 11 ft 6. Builders measurement was 844 tons, placing them in the same size class as a sloop of war. This makes them far too large for much riverine work (they could not transit the St. Lawrence for example). The engines were the same Ericsson vibrating lever type used in Monitor, but pushing a larger vessel. At 320hp the Passiacs could approach 7 knots with clean bottoms, however after any period at sea due to their lack of coppering barnacles rapidly reduced their speed below 4 knots. Her turning circle is, at 350 yards, high for a monitor (Onondaga had a turning circle of 260 yards, and Dictator 230 yards, even the Russian copies had much tighter turning circles), and about the same as an RN ship of the line or 2nd class armoured frigate (the much finer 1st class armoured frigates often had much larger turning circles, Warrior's being measured at 760 yards at 12 kts, although a "mere" 608 yards at 5 knots).

Armament was designed to be 2x 15" Dahlgren guns. However, the lack of such ordnance meant only one per ship could be supplied, and they were armed with a 15" and a 11" for the most part. The guns could be reloaded in 7 minutes. Against armoured vessels only the 15" really matters, but against wood the 11" would have been effective. The real problem was that the 15" gun completely blocked the port, the gunners could not aim the piece, hence the entire turret was aimed using the 11" gun, and the 15" gunners simply fired when the 11" gunners fired. Since the guns have differing angles, this meanbt that shooting the 15" above 300 yards (point blank range) was an exercise in futility. I can only speculate how the gunners of Cammache (which had 2x 15") and those of the post-ACW Passaic (also with 2x 15") actually aimed their guns.

Armour was originally as Monitor (which had been uparmoured after Hampton Roads), 11 x 1" plates on the turret, 3-5 x 1" plates on the hull and a single 1" plate on the deck. This proved inadequate at Charleston in 1863, and all were uparmoured in places, notable armoured rings were placed around the turret bases as even the most minor damage in that area would jam the turret. The turret is unlikely to be pierced by any weapon at sea in 1863, although the Battle of Charleston showed that the guns could be knocked out by concussion very easily. The hull is much more vulnerable, especially against a vessel whose guns have reasonable height, since the deck would start to take strikes.

Whilst a useful ship, the Passaic is not a competitor for most European ironclads. The best matchup would be against an old Crimean War ironclad, which has similar speed and handling characteristics, although is heavier armed. I retain my doubts that the Passaic would be 50/50 against a wooden frigate.

Confederate Meaning of "Effective"

2010-01-20T23:34:00.002Z

It seems to be generally taken that when the Confederates say "effective" they are only including enlisted combatants, a position I have previously subscribed too. To wit, US Grant wrote in Century Magazine:

"The effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 at Shiloh. Lew Wallace brought 5000 more after nightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician, or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers -- everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought 20,000 more: Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. Our loss in the two-days' fight was 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 missing. Of these, 2103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1728 were killed, 8012 wounded and 957 missing: This estimate must, be incorrect. We buried, by actual count; more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4060 was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field. Beauregard reports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th."

In fact, whilst reading the OR's it has become clear to me that their meaning of "effective" is simply the number of not-sick enlisted men, see Rodes' state going into Gettysburg for an example(ref).

By the statements of the two armies commanders Shiloh was 20,000 Confederate combatants wrestling with 25,000 Federals. It's food for thought.

Lee Letters

2010-01-09T14:22:00.000Z

An interesting find on archive.org, Lee's Despatches not included in the OR: http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030913978

The 1862 Defence Plan for Canada

2009-12-29T16:29:00.002Z

Over a year ago I visited the PRO at Kew and read the defence plan for Canada published in mid-1862. To the best of my memory (having lost a sheet from my pad) it was published in WO33/11.

The defences and dispositions were:

Military District 1 (London)

Permanant Works
Fort Edward at Sarnia: 500 men and 20 guns
Fort Malvern and a Fort on Bois Blanc Island at Amherstburgh, both 500 men and 20 guns
A fortified place of arms at Sarnia with 1,000 men and 50 guns

Temporary Works
North and south side of Goderich Harbor, east and west side of Port Stanley, and the mouths of the Thames River and Sydenham, each with 150 men and 10 guns

Entrenched positions at London, Paris and Chatham with ca 11,600 men

Military District 2 (Toronto)

Permanant Works

On the Niagara frontier and Welland Canal:
Fort Erie with 500 men and 20 guns
Fort Mississagua with 500 men and 20 guns
Port Dalhousie with 300 men and 15 guns
Port Colborne with 200 men and 10 guns
A fortified place of arms with 1,000 men and 50 guns

At Burlington Bay (Hamilton) a battery with 100 men and 6 guns
At Toronto New Barracks 500 men and 25 guns
New naval dockyards to be constructed at Dunnville and Port Maitland

Temporary Works
Opposite Black Rock on the Niagara River; a battery with 150 men and 5 guns
At the entrances to Collingham and Sydenham Harbours; 150 men with 10 guns each
At Port Hope several batteries totalling 400 men and 20 guns

Entrenchments on the Queenstown Heights (a Corps of Observation of 10,000), in front of Hamilton and at Toronto near the Holland River (2,200 between the two)

Military District 3 (Kingston)

Permanant Works
At Kingston; Murney Tower, Shoal Tower, Market Battery, Cedar Tower, Fort Henry and Fort Patrick totalling 94 guns (no manning figure, but by inspection 3,300 men in the district are remaining after other positions filled)

Prescott: a fort with 500 men and 20 guns
Bay of Quinte: a new naval dockyard

Temporary Works

Port Cobourg: a battery with 100 men and 5 guns
Kingston Mills: a fort at the mouth of the canal with 500 men and 12 guns
Brockville: a battery on a St Lawrence river island with 100 men and 10 guns
An entrenched camp at Prescott with 500 men

A field division of 5,000 men to be based at Prescott

Military District 4 (Montreal)

Permanant Works
Montreal: Citadel with 2,000 men and 50 guns, St. Helen's Island with 500 men and 15 guns, St. Lambert's Island and Tete de Pont with a total of 400 men and 40 guns

St Johns: the fort was to be rearmed with 20 modern guns
Isle aux Noir: this fort was also to be rearmed with 20 modern guns

Temporary Works
Cornwall canal: 200 men and 10 guns to protect of locks
Coteau du Lac: on the site of the old fort a battery of 100 men and 4 guns

At Montreal:
Vandreuil: 200 men and 10 guns
Isle Perrot: 300 men and 20 guns
Nun's Island: 300 men and 20 guns
St. Lambert: 600 men and 40 guns
St. Helen's Island: 30 guns to reequip the existing garrison
Bout de l'isle: 150 men and 10 guns
Lachine: 150 men and 10 guns

St John's, at Tete du Pont 200 men and 15 guns
Chambley, at Tete de Pont 150 men and 10 guns
Richmond, redoubts with 400 men and 25 guns

Entrenchments west of Montreal Mountain, at Sherbrooke and at St. John's with 10,650 men (including some manning works above, probably 10,000 troops in the field force)

Military District 5 (Quebec)

Permanant Works
Repair of Quebec Citadel, the addition of a battery of 10x 110 pounder rifles and a new work replacing the old French works with 200 men and 15 guns (number garrisoning the Citadel unknown, but probably 2-3,000)

Point Levi: enclosed work with 500 men and 30 guns

Temporary Works
On the left bank of the St. Charles a battery of 200 men and 12 guns, and an entrenched position on the Plains of Abraham
At Riviere du Loup, 200 men with field artillery to protect the railway, at Fort Ingall and Black Rover another 100 men each with field artillery also protecting the railway

Naval force:

A force of 550 guns manned by 9,350 men, including 9 small ironclads to be placed on the Lakes

Manpower:

The planning figure for Canada is 50,000 regulars and 100,000 militia. Around 20,000 militia are in the garrisons above, leaving 130,000 for the field army. Around half this field force is spread out in 5 Corps de Observation of 10,000 men at 1 per military district. The remaining 60-70,000, including the bulk of the regulars, were to form a field army to counterattack any US invasion force.

This of course excludes the Maritimes, which expected to receive 25,000 regulars, 25,000 militia and a force of 10,000 British militia to guard Halifax.

Slightly OT: Hits per round at Vittoria (1813)

2009-12-24T13:37:00.004Z

This is slightly OT, but as it's a commonly used comparitor (not least in Nosworthy's The Bloody Crucible of Courage) I thought it was appropriate to put here. Sorry for the digression into the Napoleonic War.

A commonly quoted figure of musket rounds fired per hit achieved is 1 in 459. The source of this figure is Henesay (original source). However his figures do not add up. For a start, only 3 British Divisions were heavily engaged at Vittoria (2nd, 3rd and 5th); only 10 British and 3 Portuguese regiments, and the Royal French Chasseurs Brittanique suffered more than 100 casualties. The 3 heavily engaged divisions had marching states of ca. 25,000 Officers and Present Under Arms on their state of 25th May, and had been marching and skirmishing for nearly a month before the main event. Henesay's count of 50,000 engaged infantry is highly unlikely. Also, the nature of the fighting at Vittoria precluded many standup musketry duels. While some may have occurred at river crossings, most of the real fighting was close quarter bayonet work, especially for the 3rd Division.

So, if Hennesay's estimate of over 3.6 million rounds fired is inaccurate, do we know how many rounds were fired? Yes, Henesay himself gives that information.

The way ammunition resupply worked on the Peninsula was that boxes of ball-cartridge were dropped by the Commissary behind companies, who would then send small details back to open them and distribute the rounds, the soldiers cartridge boxes were kept constantly full. Henesay's figures indicate that 1.35 million rounds were thus distributed. However Henesay notes only roughly half of these were fired. Thus we arrive at the approximate number of rounds the British actually fired, about 675,000, which is well within the norms for European combat (which reckoned on 20 rounds per infantryman being used in a battle).

Henesay's estimate of casualties is too high. The French Armies suffered 5,210 killed and wounded, exclusive of much of their artillery (no returns except for the Army of the Centre, whose artillery was overrun at bayonet-point) or the attached Spanish Royal Guards or elements of the Army of the North. Oman estimates (from pro-rating officer casualties, which were recorded) hundreds of extra casualties, probably, in my opinion between 5,700 and 5,900.

The proportion of these hit by artillery will never be known, but the artillery played little role in the British attacks, since the infantry kept outrunning their artllery support. If we make the assumption that no-one was hit by artillery then the proportions of musket rounds expended per hit is about 1 per 116. This is a high estimate, and in all probability the real ratio is in the 1 in 150 to 1 in 200 range common in American Civil War firefights.

Confederate Straggling in Maryland and Lee's strength at Antietam

2009-12-20T00:33:00.004Z

I'm interested in just how badly the Confederate Army straggled in Maryland. Using the 22nd September field returns (ref), the casualties in the campaign (from Harsh's Sounding the Shallows, supplemented by the OR's to add in South Mountain casualties) and the estimated strength 2nd September as reported in Harsh.

Longstreet's Command

DR Jones straggles heavily. Of his 8,615 man division only 4,403 are with him on 22nd September and 1,435 are casualties, leaving 2,777 stragglers (32%).

Hood's and Evan's "divisions" have 4,834 on 2nd September, but only 3,403 on the 22nd, with 1,109 casualties. Therefore they do not straggle badly and have only lost 322 (7%),

Jackson's Command

Jackson's own division enters the campaign with 5,650 and has 3,494 on the 22nd, after losing 648. Thus they straggle heavily with 1,508 (27%) disappearing. In his report Jackson seems to try and cover up the straggling by moving these into the killed and wounded, exaggerating how hard his division fought (sustaining more casualties than Jackson reported with the colors on the 17th).

Ewell's division (under Lawton then Early) entered the campaign with 6,383, lost 1,338 and had 4,066 left on the 22nd, implying 979 stragglers (15%)

The Light Division enter the campaign with 8,570, lost 417 but only have 5,468 on the 22nd, losing 2,685 stragglers (31%)

The other divisions

DH Hill did not suffer badly from straggling, of his 9,764 on 2nd September, 5,821 are with him and 3,241 as casualties for a balance of 732 (7%) straggling.

Walker did not suffer badly either. Of his 5,159 he still had 3,871, despite losing 1,120 at Antietam for a difference of 168 (3%).

McLaws suffers terribly. Of 7,652, he only has 4,018 remaining, after 1,119 casualties. 2,515 men (33%) have straggled out of the ranks

Anderson's huge division of 11,294 straggles badly. He has only 6,298 remaining on the 22nd after 1,278 casualties. 3,718 men (33%) have taken leave from him.

There is a general pattern. The formations which executed the more arduous marches had the stragglers. The general implication is that ca. 15,404 men were lost to Lee for the battle of Antietam.

If we take the 22nd September morning state, add back in the Confederate casualties for Antietam, and remove Thomas's brigade (absent the field) we arrive at a figure of roughly 50,000. Adding in the cavalry and half the artillery reserve we have roughly 55,000. This is probably close to the strength of Lee's army on the field on the 17th.

McClellan, the Signal Corps and his time on USS Galena

2009-09-25T22:34:00.004+01:00

The Signals Corps

There are many claims made about the nature of the American Civil War being novel. Many of these are spurious but some are true. One of the most "modern" features of the ACW is the activities of the United States Signal Corps. This small and overlooked body of men ran a tremendously effective communications system. Communiques McClellan sent from a field command post on the outskirts of Richmond would arrive at Washington, DC a mere ten minutes later. Using this system McClellan was able to achieve a level of command and control of his Corps as then unrivaled in the world. Indeed this was the first Signals Corps created in the world ever (in the British Army, for example, Signals would remain a part of the Engineers for decades).

McClellan wasn't working in a void. He'd seen the advances in communications technology made by the armies of Europe, and resolved to implement them fully. The general history of the Signals Corps during the war can be read on wikipedia.

The electric telegraph was short ranged and unreliable. A semaphore based system, the "wig-wag" worked very well within line of sight. It was the wig-wag that McClellan would use to control his army before Richmond. Such "frippery" as signals didn't emerge in the Army of the Tennessee for over a year (although it was very advanced in the Army of the Ohio/ Cumberland), the likes of Grant and Sherman simply had no time for it.

McClellan thus commanded his army from a central command post with signals to the subordinate commands (divisions, even after the establishment of Corps). He could leave his CP and, as long as he had an efficient signals troop with him, he could maintain command of the battle from anywhere.

Glendale and Malvern Hill

This brings me to the accusation that McClellan abandoned his army at either Glendale or Malvern Hill (both are sometimes mentioned), and to the related issue of the fantastic tale of an army commander having lunch on a boat off shore while his army fought.

It is important to note that McClellan established his General Headquarters Command Post at Haxall's Landing on Malvern Hill. From this position he was in communication with all his commanders and with the naval force on the James River (by way of a signals detachment sent on board her).

Figure 1: approximate schematic of McClellan's signals at Glendale (Porter's two divisions preparing positions on Malvern Hill omitted for clarity)

At Glendale, McClellan placed his divisions personally earlier in the day. He had effectively adopted a taskorg of three wings, one at White Oak Swamp with 3 divisions under Franklin, Sumner and Heintzelmann had a line facing west, whilst Keyes and Porter were detached from the main line on other tasks (Keyes would march with the army's trains to Harrison's Landing, whilst Porter was preparing a fallback position and acting as a reserve). He had direct contact with the four divisions to the west and contact with a relay station on the northern flank that connected the other 3 divisions in the line. He also had communications with Porter (whose signals were higher up on Malvern Hill and relayed a lot of intelligence). Keyes was marching, but may well have kept in contact with Porter after he broke contact with McClellan.

According to the report of McClellan's signals detachment show after fighting started McClellan went to the front to check, returned to his CP, then went to the fleet. Whilst with the fleet he maintained contact with all his commanders via his signals and received their reports. He directed the naval gunfire that decisively defeated Holmes's movement (and Lee's battleplan) personally. He then returned to shore and his CP.

The next day, after the withdrawal to the prepared killing area of Malvern Hill. He didn't sleep that night, inspecting positions and positioning divisions, and around 9am boarded the Galena for a personal recce of Harrison's Landing and to consult with the naval commander. During this period he would still have been in contact with his commanders. He had 3 signals stations that could view the river; one at Haxall's Landing, one on Malvern Hill and one at Harrison's Landing. He left the Galena at 1330hrs (after having given the order to open fire with the artillery on the massing Confederates) and was on the field at 1400, over 90 minutes before the Confederate attack. He was thus present for the battle.

Conclusion

On of the great overlooked achievements of the Union Army during these battles is that the commanding general could be anywhere, even miles down a river on a recce. General McClellan commanded from many different places during the battles, but he was always in command.

The British Ultimatum

2009-09-24T14:35:00.005+01:00

Something I'd never read before but found interesting was the text of the British Ultimatum to the US during the Trent Affair:

Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1861.

My Lord — Intelligence of a very grave nature has reached her majesty's government.

This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of the admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the contract steamer Trent.

It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated 'Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,' that the Trent left Havana on the 7th instant, with her majesty's mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing her, at 1:15 p. m., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent exploding half a cable's length ahead of her. The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and, compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons he had named were then standing before him. The commander of the Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking by force out of the Trent these four passengers, then under the protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship's company at quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was therefore out of the question and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was not insisted upon.

It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage — an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law.

Her majesty's government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the government of the United States must be fully aware that the British government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty's government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.

Her majesty's government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the government of the United States that government will, of its own accord, offer to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.

You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secretary of state, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it.

I am, etc., Russell.

There was also a covering letter sent to Lord Lyons:

In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of her majesty, to make certain demands of the government of the United States.

Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her majesty's government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation and repair immediately to London. If, however, you should be of the opinion that the requirements of her majesty's government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her majesty's government for their consideration and remain at your post until you receive further orders.

You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the American government, and you will send him a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think fit to make.

You will also give all the information in your power to the governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other of her majesty's possessions as may be within your reach.

It adds weight to the quotes from Dunlop and other British commanders in theatre that they had already been issued their war orders and were awaiting the decision of whether or not to proceed.

Longstreet on Straggling in Maryland

2009-09-17T13:42:00.002+01:00

"Only a glance at these figures is necessary to impress one with the number of those who were unable to stand the long and rapid marches, and fell by the wayside, viz, 9597. The Virginians who have written of the war have often charged the loss of the Maryland campaign to “laggards”. It is unkind to apply such a term to our soldiers, who were as patient, courageous, and chivalrous as any ever marshaled into phalanx. Writers who do so ignore the facts and circumstances that surrounded our troops. Many were just out of the hospitals, and many were crippled by injuries received in battle. They were marching without sufficient food or clothing, with their muskets, ammunition, provisions, and in fact their all, packed on their backs. They struggled along with bleeding feet, tramping rugged mountain roads through a heated season, seeking another opportunity to offer their lives in defense of their people. Such soldiers should not be called “laggards” by their countrymen. Let them have their well-earned honors though the fame of others suffer thereby."

- James Longstreet, quoted from Century Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 315

Well said Lieutenant General Longstreet.

Sherman's "Grand Strategy"

2009-09-16T16:37:00.001+01:00

I've just been reading this in the Century Magazine.

I'm totally at a loss as to why Sherman keeps exaggerating Union Losses. Never the less, elements of this article seem truer than his Memoirs. Interesting read...

How Many Bayonets

2009-09-12T14:28:00.002+01:00

Clearing out an old folder I found a half written article I thought I'd post:

The American Civil War (ACW) presents an interesting challenge when assessing combat due to the very different reporting systems used in America. For example, the British of the Napoleonic Wars report army strength in terms of Effectives, the number of rank and file in the infantry and cavalry, excluding their officers, excluding those detached (for example to the Wagon Train) and excluding the Ordnance (mainly Artillery) and other attached arms such as the wagon drivers and hospitals. In the ACW however, strengths stated are typically those of all arms, including those detached to the wagon train etc., and sometimes even including the Sick List as combatants.

The digitised records of the 91st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry here, which is a very useful resource.

The figures given in the morning state of 23rd September 1863 are in summary:

Present:
15 Combat Officers (including the Adjutant)
2 Medical Staff (Assistant Surgeon and Hospital Steward)
16 Sergeants
22 Corporals
16 Musicians
22 Blacksmiths and Artificers
146 Riflemen

= 239 Present for Duty, of whom 168 (70%) are “effectives” (i.e. men in the firing line)

On Special, Extra or Daily Duty: 7 (1 offr and 6 ORs)
Sick: 8

Absent

On Detached Service: 56 (6 Offrs and 50 ORs)
Sick: 128
Confined: 1

Thus, a Regiment reporting a total strength of 433 Officers and Men can only put 168 Riflemen (39%) of the men borne on the Rolls into combat.

This problem is not unnoticed by high command. Sherman notes in his Memoirs (and indeed in the Official Records) that on taking command of the Army of the Tennessee fully half his army consisted of non-combatants, and he took steps to limit this to 75%. Typically most of these non-combatants were in the wagon train (which averaged 7-8 men per wagon, thus a typical 5,000 wagon army train could consume 40,000 men, those men still being borne on the rolls and often included as “combatants” in many books), although there were also hospital staff, provosts, officers servants, cooks etc., none of whom were in the firing line.

Union Arms Supplies

2009-09-11T17:08:00.002+01:00

This post is meant partially as references to data I will need to come back to, but some may find this interesting:

Arms supplies at the outbreak of the rebellion (ref)

Acquisitions in the (long) first year. (ref)

Acquisitions in the second year. (ref)

Acquisitions in the third year. (ref)

Acquisitions in the final year. (ref)

Average Firefight Range at Antietam

2009-09-10T00:43:00.005+01:00

I've spent this evening going though the OR's and searching vol 19 pt 1 for the term "yards" and noting those which were the range that infantry opened fire. Mark Grimsley has done this before and found 21 useful "definite ranges". I only found 16, but also found several for South Mountain (3) and Harper's Ferry (2) which I didn't include.

The page numbers in the text which include the ranges are; 235, 263, 306, 336, 470, 493. 505, 508, 509, 865, 872, 887, 905, 931 and 1037. In three cases a small distribution was given (I assumed the centre in each case), and in five cases it was indicated by the word "within" that the range was slightly shorter (I ignored this and stuck with the number).

The average range of the 16 samples for opening fire was 84 yards (all numbers to be rounded to the nearest whole number.

However, one sample is out of kilter. On page 263 it is stated that the 26th NY opened fire at 350 yards, expended all their ammunition and then withdrew. An examination of their situation indicated they were firing at Ripley's brigade more than 450 yards away. The brigade commander makes no mention of this fire, and we can assume it had absolutely no effect. Removing this figure reduces the average range of opening fire to 64 yards.

Two of the remaining statements indicate 100 yards, the rest are lower, all of the remainder are between 50 and 80 yards.

I found several other incidents involving range worth reading. On page 867 the (Federal) enemy has cleared a 40 yard killing area in front of breastworks, which was judged to be too strong to charge. On page 925 artillery unlimbers at 150 yards from the enemy, but starts to suffer from "sharpshooters". There are a few indicative ranges elsewhere but nothing definite.

This result is much shorter than I expected.

Strength of 12th Corps at Antietam

2009-08-30T16:40:00.002+01:00

As per before.

Greene's Division

Greene simply gives the aggregate present, 2,504. Carman states he believes the number taken into action was far less, but accepts it. I shall make a 25% reduction to 1,878 engaged, this includes attached artillery. The division suffered 651 casualties.

Williams' Division

Gordon's Brigade

Gordon states he carried into action 2,210 (OR). He suffered 646 casualties.

Crawford's Brigade

10th ME: An officer states it went into action with 21 officers and 276 men. This appears to be a morning state, hence PFD. Assume 223 combatants. Casualties were 72 (32.2% of estimated engaged).

68th NY: The adjutant states the regiment had 68 in action. Casualties were 12 (17.6%).

46th PA: Survivors estimate 135-140 in action, say 140. Casualties were 19 (13.6%).

124th, 125th and 128th PA: New regiments, "quite full when they left Washington". Carman estimates 2,010 PFD for all three, which I will take to mean (40% reduction) 1,206 engaged. Combined casualties were 327 (27.1% of estimated engaged).

5th CT: Stated as "not in action" and not included in reports. It was left at Frederick, assumidly as a train guard.

CORPS TOTAL: 5,585
Add in artillery (392) = 5,977 (59% of PFD)

This is slightly lower than 1st Corps effective percentage, but this Corps was largely new levies only weeks in the army. I'm inclined to believe they would have straggled more.

Strength of 9th Corps at Antietam

2009-08-30T15:07:00.003+01:00

As per the last post:

Willcox's Division

1st Brigade

28th MA: Less than 200 in line, quoted from Fox. Estimate of 200 accepted. Casualties were 48 (24%).

17th MI: 525 from an interview. Assume PFD, therefore 394 on the firing line. Casualties were 107 (27.2%)

79th NY: Carman quotes an unknown history of the regiment as 300 engaged. Casualties were 32, which indicates this may be PFD. Assuming as much the firing line may be 225 officers and men strong.

50th PA: Carman gives 370 officers and men with no source. Casualties were 57, so assume this is PFD for a combat strength of 278.

TOTAL: 1,097

2nd Brigade

8th MI: At an estimate of the surviving officers Carman quotes 435 officers and men. Casualties are 31. Assume PFD, so 326 combatants.

46th NY: The OR gives strength at both South Mountain and Antietam, giving us a chance to examine straggling. At South Mountain there were 23 officers and 369 men, marching strength (i.e. PFD), they suffered 1 killed and 6 wounded. At Antietam the PFD ("went into battle with") is 16 officers and 262 men. 7 Officers and 100 men have disappeared in the meantime. Another 19 were killed or wounded at Antietam.

This means roughly a quarter of the regiments strength has disappeared. Had it not been for the dimutation of officers I would be willing to accept this is a case of comparing PFD with effectives (officers and men). For the moment I will accept the figure (278) until further evidence comes to light.

45th PA: Carman says 20 officers and 540 men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 420 combatants. Casualties were 38 (9% of combatants).

100th PA: Carman says 350 officers and men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 263 combatants. Casualties were 8 (3% of combatants).

TOTAL: 1,287

DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,384

Sturgis' Division

1st Brigade

2nd MD: Carman states 162 officers and men "engaged" from an unknown source. I accept this. Casualties were 67 (41.4%).

6th NH: Carman's interview with the regimental historian says 150 officers and men. I accept this. Casualties were 18 (12%).

9th NH: Carman's interview with surviving officers states 30 officers and 680 men in action, but it had suffered heavily from straggling. Deducting 40% as a PFD to engaged conversion yields 426 engaged. Casualties were 59 (13.8% of estimated engaged).

48th PA: Estimated to have 390 officers and men by survivors. Assuming PFD this is 293 engaged. Casualties were 60 (20.5% of estimated engaged).

TOTAL: 1,031

2nd Brigade

21st MA: A regimental history shows about 150 engaged. This I accept. Casualties were 48 (32%).

35th MA: The regimental historian states 30 officers (including Surgeons) and 750 muskets. This must be a PFD figure. The 35th MA was only formed from new recruits 26 days before, had undergone a hard march (see Gallagher), and major battle and had blue on blued at South Mountain (see Murfin). Applying a 40% reduction yields 426 combatants. Casualties were 214 (50.2% of the estimated engaged).

51st PA: Carman has the muster roll, showing 336 PFD on the 17th September. Taking this and deducting 25% yields 252 engaged. Casualties were 120 (47.6% of the estimated engaged).

51st NY: Carman has no data, simply saying it was about the same strength as the 51st PA with nothing to back the claim up. They lost 87 casualties. Given that they were exposed to the same fire as the 51st PA, I will prorate by casualties instead, estimating 183 engaged.

TOTAL: 1,011

DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,042

Rodman's Division

1st Brigade

9th NY: Fox says 373, which is a PFD figure. This yield 280 engaged. Casualties were 235 (84%). However, I have found a reference in Battles and Leaders which states around 600 crossed the Antietam.

89th NY: Carman states it was about the same size as the 9th NY, without justification. Casualties were 103, which while far less than those for the 9th NY are about right for a regiment of that strength heavily engaged, so I accept it and estimate 280 officers and men.

103rd NY: Only 6 coys present, at an estimated 200 officers and men. Assuming PFD this gives them 150 combatants. Casualties were 117 (78% of the estimated engaged).

TOTAL: 710 (or 930 if the higher figure for the 9th NY)

2nd Brigade

8th CT: Two officers interviewed by Carman said 23 officers and either 398 or 396 men present. Assuming PFD then there were about 315 combatants. Casualties were 194 (61.6% of the estimated engaged).

11th CT: Carman sats 430 officers and men without a source. Assuming PFD this yields 323 engaged. Casualties were 139 (43% of the estimated engaged).

16th CT: Carman simply states "it was a new regiment" and seems to assume 750. This regiment was so new it only loaded muskets for the first time the day before the battle. Taking the guess above and reducing by 40% yields 450 engaged. Casualties were 185 (41.1% of the estimated engaged).

4th RI: Carman states "our best information" gives the regiment 247. Assuming this is PFD the engaged was 185. Casualties were 100 (54%).

TOTAL: 1,273

DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,983

The Kanawha Division

1st Brigade

12th OH: Carman states about 200 engaged. I accept this. Casualties were 33 (16.5%)

23rd OH: Carman states it was about the size of the 30th OH with no justification. Casualties were 69, prorating against the 30th OH yields 223 men engaged.

30th OH: Carman has the morning's muster state: 22 officers and 321 men. Adjusting down 25th to engaged figures yields 257. Casualties were 80 (31% of the estimated engaged)

TOTAL: 680

2nd Brigade

11th OH: Carman's "best information" was 430 officers and men. Assuming PFD this is 323 combatants. Casualties were 21 (6.5% of the estimated engaged)

28th OH: From a memorandum of one of the officers the regiment had 25 officers and 750 men. This must be a PFD figure and adjusted down 40% yields 465 engaged. Casualties were 21 (4.5% of estimated engaged).

30th OH: An officer of the regiment simply states that it was quite full when it started to march to join McClellan's force, and must have been over 800 strong at Antietam. Assuming this is PFD and adjusting down 40% yields 480. Casualties were 25 (5.2% of the estimated engaged).

TOTAL: 1,268

DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,948

TOTAL INFANTRY: 8,357
Add in artillery at 979 (Carman): 9,336 (67.6%)

The final figure sits around that of the calculations for 1st Corps, and is thus not unacceptable.

Strength of 2nd Corps at Antietam

2009-08-29T15:18:00.001+01:00

I'm checking up on Carman's figures. The two sets of figures I'm most worried about are 2nd and 9th Corps. Even a casual inspection of 9th Corps has shown several PFD or even just Present figures adopted as "engaged", leaving a obvious overestimation of Burnside's/ Cox's fighting strength. 2nd Corps is more difficult. Annoyingly there is a whole book about 2nd Corps at Antietam, Armstrong's Unfurl Those Colors, but it never addresses the strength of the Corps even one.

One thing I noticed is that in a few cases Carman has the strength at South Mountain, deducts the losses, and finds the unit at Antietam was short of this (often by about 20%). This would be indicative of considerable straggling on the Federal approach march to Antietam.

One of Carman's sources is Fox's Regimental Losses. Footnotes occasionally comparing the strength given in the table with that in the OR's makes it clear Fox's "engaged" figure is in fact generally PFD, and in at least one case from a brief inspection possibly aggregate present. I will treat all figures derived from Fox as PFD.

Richardson's Division

1st Brigade

5th NH: Stated to be 300 Rifles and 19 Officers, but the official report mentions 21 officers. The received 111 casualties (34.8%), however, their killed to wounded ratio is very low (13 wounded per man killed!), indicative that something is wrong with the figures. In all probability the number of wounded is exaggerated, by at least a factor of two, maybe even three. Comparing the report for Fredericksburg I find a similar exaggeration.

7th NY: The OR contains only the casualties (61). Assuming casualties were 20%, then strength was around 305 at an estimate.

61st NY: From an interview carried into action 23 officers and 205 muskets. Assume this is the combat strength. They received 41 casualties (18%).

64th NY: 214 officers and men in action. They received 50 casualties (23.4%)

81st PA: The OR contains only the casualties (51). Assuming casualties were around 20% then strength was about 255 at an estimate.

TOTAL: 1,107

2nd Brigade

29th MA: From an interview about 20 officers and 360 men, probably PFD. Casualties were 39 (10.1% of the PFD).

63rd NY: 341 according to Fox. Casualties were 202 (59.2%!)

69th NY: 317 according to Fox. Carman states this is exclusive of officers, bringing the total up to 331. Casualties were 196 (59.2%!)

88th NY: Stated to have 302 men (OR). Casualties were 102 (33.8%). This may be exclusive of officers.

TOTAL: 1,354 (assume the duty men and the officers of the 88th NY cancel out)

3rd Brigade

2nd DE: Carman states members of this regiment stated there were about 310 officers and men. The OR shows 16 officers engaged, a ratio of more than 18:1 (very high), but the officer to men hit ratio shows this estimate to be reasonable. Thus about 16 officers and 294 men. Casualties were 58 (18.7%).

52nd NY: 12 Officers and 107 R&F (OR). Casualties were 18 (15.1%).

57th NY: 309 officers and men (OR), possibly a PFD figure given the mention of the Surgeon. Casualties were 101 (32.7%), but with a higher than normal killed to wounded ratio.

66th NY: Carman simply states survivors believed it about the size of the 2nd DE and 57th NY and assigns it 310 officers and men. The OR shows an extreme dimutation of officers, with 3 Captains occupying the field positions and 2nd Lts commanding nearly all the companies. Casualties were 103 (33.2% of the given figure), but with an even worse killed to wounded ratio.

53rd PA: No figures known, but the casualties were 25. This implies a fairly small organisation of, assuming a 20% casualty figure, 125 officers and men.

TOTAL: 1,173 (if a 25% deduction is taken for the regiments which appear to be PF the figure reduces to 845)

DIVISION INFANTRY: 3,306 (including reduction)

Sedgwick's Division

1st Brigade

15th MA: Carman states 606. The OR shows 582 muskets "ready to march", thus this is a PFD value. This includes an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 344, including the sharpshooters. This is 56.8% of the PFD.

1st MN: Carman gives the regiment 405, the OR shows 445 men, including an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 114 (25.6%). The figure is probably PFD.

34th NY: Carman gives 311, using Fox as a reference. Thus this is certainly PFD. Casualties were 154 (49.5%)

82nd NY: Carman gives 339, again using Fox, so PFD. Casualties were 128 (37.8%).

TOTAL: 1,701 PFD (but excluding the officers of 1st Minnesota). This is slightly higher than Carman, probably because he excluded the MN SS. A reasonable deduction of 25% for non-effectives suggests a combat strength of about 1,275.

2nd Brigade

Howard's brigade is awkward, even Carman can find no hard data, relying on the fact that survivors reckoned the casualties were about 1/3rd of the total taken in, and then adding on a bit for good measure. I have the 30th September morning states for present, and have added back in the casualties from Antietam to yield a "present" figure of 2,262 in the whole brigade, this of course includes sick and wounded. If we assume 25% non-effectives, and ignore the sick etc. then strength would be 1,697, close to the figure of 1,635 taken by multiplying the killed, wounded and missing by 3.

I thus have to accept the 1,635 figure. I see no justification behind Carman rounding it up to 1,800.

69th PA: 92 casualties = 276 officers and men. Present at Antietam (working back from 30th September muster state) = 505

71st PA: 135 casualties = 405 officers and men. Present (as above) = 536

72nd PA: 237 casualties = 711 officers and men. Present (as above) = 719

106th PA: 77 casualties = 231 officers and men. Present (as above) = 502

TOTAL: 1,635 (very rough)

3rd Brigade

19th MA: From estimates of the survivors it had 26 officers and 392 men (Carman). 146 casualties (34.9%)

20th MA: Carman quotes about 400 men. No further data. 124 casualties (31%)

7th MI: Carman finds, by interview, 27 officers and 375 men "present". Assume this is PFD. Casualties were 221 (55%)

42nd NY: 345, from Fox, treat as PFD. 181 casualties (52.4%)

59th NY: 381, from Fox, treat as PFD. 225 casualties (59.1%)

TOTAL: 1,946, deducting 25% for the PFD regiments leaves 1,664.

DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,584 (including reductions)

French's Division

14th IN: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 320 officers and men in action. The OR actually says men. 180 casualties (56.3%)

8th OH: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 17 officers and 324 men. 161 casualties (47.2%)

132nd PA: Carman uses the OR, but it is interesting and contradictory. The colonel states he took ca. 750 into action but only had 364 left after the action (not counting officers), since casualties were only 152, this would imply a strength of 516. My reading is that 750 was the regiment's muster state, it probably carried around 540 officers and men into action (using this figure casualties are still only 28.1%, much lower than the veteran regiments of the brigade and hence still suspiciously low).

7th VA (note, West Virginia hasn't been admitted to the Union, the Regiment fought the battle as the 7th Virginia, and changed to the 7th WV about a year later): Carman's interviews show 340 officers and men, with no indication whether this is present, PFD or engaged. Casualties were 145 (42.6%), roughly in line with the other two veteran regiments of the brigade.

TOTAL: 1,541 (and probably high, I believe the 132nd PA straggled badly and wasn't on the firing line in anything like the above strength)

2nd Brigade

14th CT: Carman acquired a figure from an oral interview of 31 officers and 720 men. I believe this is present or PFD rather than engaged. Deducting 40% (the top of Carman's estimate for the worst disciplined organisations) yields an estimate of 451. Casualties were 156 (20.8% of the present)

108th NY: Carman simply assigns it a similar figure to the 14th CT. It suffered 195 casualties. I shall do the same and give it about 450 officers and men engaged.

130th PA: Oral interviews by Carman show 690 officers and men. Again, this is likely present or PFD. A 40% reduction gives 414 engaged. Casualties were 178 (25.8% of present)

TOTAL: 1,315 (but highly questionable)

3rd Brigade

1st DE: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 708. I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 230 (32.4%)

5th MD: An oral interview by Carman assigns this regiment about 550 officers and men. This is likely PFD. Casualties were 163 (29.6%)

4th NY: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 540. Again, I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 187 (34.6%)

TOTAL: 2,191 PFD, a 25% reduction would give them 1,643 engaged.

DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,499

Total infantry of 2nd Corps: 12,389
Add Artillery of 859 (Carman's figures): 13,248 (70.4% of present)

This is still slightly higher than 1st Corps (which was meticulously assessed at the time to get only 63% of it's PFD into the firing line), but is at least in the believable range.

A note of sources

I downloaded Fox's Regimental Losses from archive.org.

Dave Powell has a blog

2009-08-28T15:08:00.000+01:00

Dave Powell has recently started a blog on the Battle of Chickamauga. I've read a few of his bits over the years and find him excellent in his tactical analysis.

Its URL is http://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/

McClellan's Infantry Strength at Antietam

2009-08-26T00:15:00.000+01:00

Recently I've had call to defend McClellan over the fact that his army was utterly wrecked when he canceled Franklin's attack at Antietam, and indeed Lee was planning exactly the counterattack McClellan feared (see Harsh or Rafuse on this matter).

However, I've previously started an article estimating the strength of the AoP at Antietam, and I'm going to merge the two.

By deducting out non-infantry capbadges we've gotten a closer comparison to Lee's army (which is typically reported in terms of effective infantry, in an attempt to further the lost cause theory).

The infantry effectives in Lee's army are reported by Carman as 29,222 engaged (this excludes ca. 1,339 effectives of 2 of AP Hill's brigades not engaged, estimated at 60% of the 3 that were). The estimate is thus 30,561 infantry.

Going Corps by Corps for the Union:

1st Corps
Official Strength: 14,856
Meade's statement of those carried into battle: ca. 9000
Approximate infantry strength: 8,619 (Carman)
Casualties: 2,590
Approximate infantry strength the morning of the 18th: 5,327 (Sears, p300)

Sears notes that in addition to Meade's complaints about large numbers of men on the roster ("present for duty") simply not being present, at least another 800 had straggled and were never in the firing line. We can thus estimate that on the morning of the 18th, 1st Corps fielded around 4,000 effectives. We should not forget estimates that 3rd Division only had 300 men with the Colours on the afternoon of the 17th; this implies that the formation was so wrecked it could probably only muster 1,000 or so men at that point.

Of the 10 brigades in the corps, only Hoffman's brigade (727 PFD) wasn't wrecked, since it had been detached as the right flank guard and wasn't used in the attack. They only suffered 10 casualties during the day.

2nd Corps
Official Strength: 18,813
Richardson's Division: 4,029 infantry (Carman)
Sedgwick: 5,437 (Carman)
French: 5,740 (Carman)

The slaughter of 2nd Corps is oft described, their aggregate loss for the day was 5,138, over a third. The Corps effectively ceased to exist for most of the battle.

5th Corps
Official Strength: 12,939 (2 Divisions only)
Buchanan's brigade: 1,640 (Carman, but no supporting text could be found)
Lovell's brigade: 1,060 PFD consolidated into 4 battalions on the 20th (OR)
5th NY: less than 115 (effective strength at 2nd Bull Run minus casualties at said battle, battlefield marker)
10th NY: unknown
Morell: 5,407 PFD
Estimate: 6,990

5th Corps was only lightly engaged, and Morell's division never even crossed the Antietam.

6th Corps
Official Strength: 12,300 (of which 75-80% were combatants, B&L II, pp 595)
Force engaged at Crampton's Gap (Slocum's Div and Brooks' and Irwin's Bdes of Smith's Div): ca. 6,500 (of which 533 were casualties)
Strength of Smith's Division: ca. 4,500 (B&L II, pp 596)
PFD of Hancock's Bde (not included in the 6,500 engaged above, but in the strength of Smith's Division): 2,114, or ca. 1,600 combatants
Irwin's brigade: 1,684 (Carman)
Infantry Strength of 6th Corps: 8,324 (75% of present minus 901 for the artillery (figure from Carman)

Aside from Irwin, only the skirmishers were engaged.

9th Corps: 13,819 (Including Kanawha Division, attached)
Official Strength: 13,819
Carman: 11,714 (but several of the regimental strengths are PFD)

Wrecked crossing Burnside Bridge etc.

12th Corps: 10,126
Official Strength: 10,126
Carman: 7,239

Essentially part of 2nd Corps.

Carman states 46,146 officers and men were "engaged", but this figure excludes much of the 5th and 6th Army Corps. For 5th Corps we should add in Lovell's brigade at 795 (1,060 minus 25% for non-effectives) and Warren's little brigade (maybe 400-500, I'll use 500 unless I can find better data), and of course Morell at 4,055 (estimated at 75% of 5,407 PFD). For 6th Corps we should add 6,640 (Carman included Irwin's brigade).

We thus arrive at an estimate of 54,081 infantry serving as such on the field of Antietam on the 17th. We can estimate in infantry McClellan had a numerical advantage of roughly 7:4 in infantry. The question of their combat experience is another matter.

I am a bit suspicious of the apparently large number of effectives in 2nd and 9th Corps. Their figures show much less dimutation than the other Corps.

As to the casualty rates of the formations using these figures:

1st Corps: 30%
2nd Corps: 34%
5th Corps: 2%
6th Corps: 5%
9th Corps: 20%
12th Corps: 24%

Neither Couch's nor Humphrey's Divisions were on the field during the battle.

Lanchester Linear Law

2009-08-21T11:58:00.000+01:00

I'm working on analysing combat data using Lanchester's Laws. In the process I've noticed linear law seems a better fit. This actually doesn't surprise me as recently the academia that works with these laws has renamed them. Linear law is now the unaimed fire law, whilst square law is the aimed fire law.

The argument I will make is that for the ACW era artillery will obey the square law, whilst musketry will obey the linear law. This makes things very complicated. Further complicating the matter is the possibility that well entrenched infantry may indeed fire using the square law, whilst receiving return fire under the linear law; this would be a far more powerful model than Dupuy's modifiers he developed for his Quantitative Judgement Model.

Overall it fits with a general observations that casualties in battles are usually roughly equal, regardless of differences in manpower. Exceptions certainly occur, and are quite often tracable to one side having sufficient fire superiority to make a bayonet charge of it and settle the matter.

Anyway, just an observation....

Mobilisation, March 1862

2009-08-20T13:53:00.000+01:00

A long time ago I had a massive spreadsheet with every Federal unit embodied by the end of March 1862. This was for comparison purposes. Joseph Harsh has done a similar thing for the Confederate Army, and reduces the numbers to regiments of all arms, assuming that a regiment is 10 companies. On 30th June 1862 he finds 577.7 Regiments in CS service.

I've recently recovered the spreadsheet off an old harddrive, and intend to present it all. The most immediate thing I can offer is a breakdown of what each state provided:

California: 5.5
Colorado: 2
Connecticut: 10.3
Delaware: 2
DC: 2
Illinois: 75.1
Indiana: 48.9
Iowa: 21.3
Kansas: 9.3
Kentucky: 33.4
Maine: 14.8
Maryland: 11.8
Massachusetts: 28.7
Michigan: 19.8
Minnesota: 3.1
Missouri: 36.8
Nebraska: 1
New Hampshire: 7.1
New Jersey: 11.2
New Mexico: 5
New York: 124.1
Ohio: 87
Oregon: 0.6
Pennsylvania: 92.4
Rhode Island: 4.9 (but most of these were "New England" regiments redesignated to RI)
(East) Tennessee: 5
Vermont:8.2
(West) Virginia: 12.1
Wisconsin: 25
Regular Army: 31.9

TOTAL: 740.3 "Regiments of All Arms"

Using an estimated aggregate of 100 men per company I also looked at the degree of mobilisation per state, obviously ignoring the regulars. The lowest mobilisation (estimated aggregate above/ total population) was Oregon (0.9%) and then California (1.4%).

Next is NJ (1.6%), Delaware (1.8%), Minnesota (1.8%) and Maryland (2%). Although none of these left the Union, they were fairly pro-Confederate.

Next is the bulk of the New England states, ranging from 2.2-2.6%, with the exception of RI (3.6%), which was got recruits from elsewhere as well.

The bulk of the states are in the 2.6-3.8% bracket.

The interesting exception seems to be the border states and midwest (also naturally pro-Confederate but not leaving the Union) which show much higher than normal enlistment. The most mobilised state is Kansas (7.6%), then Colorado (5.8%) and New Mexico (4.2%).

As a level of nominal manpower mobilisation, this is exceptionally impressive. The British in WW1 mobilised a similar portion of their manpower in a similar time, and indeed the French and German figures.

The movement to the Peninsula

2009-08-19T14:33:00.000+01:00

I've recently had cause to try and work out when units and formations arrived on the Peninsula during the siege of Yorktown Period. Not finding the data immediately available anywhere I decided to construct the data myself. To do this I took Brett Schultze's Yorktown Orbat, and went through each regiment and battery comparing to the service records online here. It's crude, but here is the finding:

(Date is the apparent issuing of an order to move to the Peninsula)

16th March: Porter's Division (3rd Corps), complete on Peninsula (excluding divisional cavalry, but including attached 1st US Sharpshooters) on 24th March

17th March: Hamilton's Division (3rd Corps), unknown arrival date, but complete by end of March.

22nd March: WF Smith's Division (4th Corps), complete at Ft Monroe on 25th March

25th March: Couch's Division (4th Corps), units embarked 25th-28th March, complete before 5th April

27th March: Sedgwick's Division (2nd Corps), confusion over embarkation date as Lincoln suspended their move. Complete at Ft Monroe 2nd April

28th March: Casey's Division (4th Corps), units embarked around the 30th, complete before 5th April

4th April: Richardson's Division (2nd Corps), complete at Ft Monroe ca. 11th April, joins siege force at Yorktown 16th.

7th April: Hooker's Division (3rd Corps), joined the siegelines between the 10th and 16th April.

17th April: Kearny's Brigade, Franklin's Division (detached from 1st Corps), embarks 17th April but remains afloat as a turning force

24th April: the remains of Franklin's Division

The artillery reserve is all on the Peninsula before the 5th April, as is the Cavalry Reserve (complete 30th March).

Cored Shot

2009-07-21T11:58:00.000+01:00

I've come across several references on groups to "steel cored shot" fired from 15" Dahlgren guns. This is a myth. The 400lb cored shot has no steel core (which would be heavier than the 440lb cast iron shot); it is simply cast hollow to lower the rounds mass. Since the lost 40 lbs is equivalent to about 6" or so, we can say that it has a 6" void space in the centre of the round, and the walls are 4.5" thick or so.

(See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9asFAAAAQAAJ&pg=RA3-PA7 )

Another note on rifle ranges

2009-07-20T16:34:00.000+01:00

I've just been rereading part of Urwin's "The United States Infantry", on page 131 there is a discussion about the training of riflemen in the late 1870's. It notes that in 1877 the troops were still training to fire massed volleys at 1-200 yards. Food for thought.

Beaten to the Punch

2009-07-17T14:47:00.001+01:00

A while ago I started follow Hattaway and Jones's methodology of analysing combat effectiveness. Now I find someone has already done it. It's worth a read: http://www.civilwardispatch.com/

The conclusions are in line with my initial data with 2 exceptions, Jackson and Bragg. In both these case my initial findings were that they were poor commanders. However, unlike Collie I was using the Lanchester Square Law as an analytical tool. I am not however convinced of that tool's veracity in this situation. Lanchester square breaks down and trends towards Lanchester Linear Law.

One of the reasons I've sat on my initial findings for so long is that challenging Jackson's reputation seems fraught. Perhaps I should polish up the data, publish and be damned.

Wikipedia

2009-06-27T15:18:00.000+01:00

I've decided that the wikipedia article for George McClellan is hopelessly biased and needs some updating. If anyone is able to provide a more balanced PoV please do. I'll start making modifications as I dig my books out.

The effect of temperature on iron

2009-06-18T14:50:00.000+01:00

This post covers a very odd, but utterly vital fact about iron armour. The source is Andrew Lambert's Warrior: Restoring the World's First Ironclad (London, 1987), a book a read many years ago and partially misremembered. However, while looking for a copy on the Handbook of Polymers in the Imperial College library the other day I realised it also housed the Science Museum Library, with a lot of source material on ironclads.

On page 70 of the aforementioned they discuss a series of tests conducted on a section of Warrior's hull removed when she was made into a jetty, but stored aboard. On testing something unexpected was observed, the armours resistance to impact is highly dependent on the temperature:

Temp (degrees C): Absorbed Energy (j)
0: 11
15: 17
40: 24
100: 26

The observation that iron is less ductile and more brittle at lower temperatures is not a new one, but the degree to which protection changes is astounding. The armour offers twice the protection in the tropics than in the arctic. Thus Lambert concludes that the temperature, weather &c. all play a role, and this can explain the erratic results of armour tests.

My own observation is that it implies armour is probably more effective in a steaming warship (which is kicking out a lot of heat) than on the firing range.

In the ACW it implies that the ambient temperature of the armour is a major factor. The operating temperature in a Monitor turret was pretty high, so I guess the armour was near full strength. This bears further investigation.