Sunday, 16 May 2010

Ballistics

I'm interested in why the rifle didn't revolutionise combat in the Civil War, as per Griffith etc.; here are some thoughts.

Using a ballistic coefficient of 0.145 for the Burton ball and the calculator here I've calculated the ballistic arcs of the 0.58 Springfield rifle-musket.


Figure 1: Springfield with sights set at 100, 300 and 500 yards. -60 inches is the approximate ground level (edit: as Fred points out below, there was no real "zeroing" of the weapons, and is sloppy nomenclature on my part).

The purple line is 12 inches above the bore and the turcoise line at -60 inches is approximately the ground. When the arc is between these two lines it may hit a target.

The default 100 yard sight setting means that the bullet describes a single dangerous space out to roughly 200 yards (assuming the musket is approximately 5 feet above the ground, i.e. shoulder height, if the shooter is prone the bullet strikes the ground roughly at 120 yards). Set at 300 yards we get the pattern described in Fred Ray's recent blog post. At 500 yards setting the round is out of the dangerous space around 10 yards into flight, and comes down on a step plunging trajectory with a very small dangerous space of about 50 yards. As an aside, these arcs are not symmetrical, the round is accelerating towards the ground in them.

If we make a comparison with the smoothbore musket then we find that if both are zeroed at 100 yards there is no significant difference, both are still in the dangerous space out to about 200 yards. The superior muzzle velocity of the smoothbore beats the superior ballistic coefficient of the rifle.


Figure 2: Comparison of M1861 rifle musket and M1842 smoothbore musket

This of course ignores the fact that the rifle bullet will disperse less and is effected by wind only around a third of the ball. For firing at picked targets on the skirmish line the rifle will be better at 200 yards. If firing at a massed target (i.e. a battleline) there is essentially no difference. At around 100 yards there is little discernable difference in whether or not the target is hit.

Assuming the following minutes of arc, figure 3 shows the chances of hitting a 2 foot circular target (roughly a torso) for various weapons:

M1861 Springfield rifle-musket: 10.5 MOA
M1842 Springfield percussion musket: 24 MOA (edit: this may have been a patched ball)
P1853 Enfield rifle-musket: 7.5 MOA
British Baker Rifle (Napoleonic weapon): 18 MOA
French Charville Musket (Napoleonic weapon): 36 MOA


Figure 3: Chance of hitting a 2 foot target. "Effective range" was reckoned on the 20% hit line.

This shows that, ignoring the problem of rangefinding and wind effects, the Springfield had 3.5x the range of an old flintlock, and twice the range of the percussion musket it replaced. It also shows that the Confederate were right that the Enfield was a far more accurate weapon. In fact this accuracy was never achieved for the Springfield due to concerns over loading; after only a few rounds the barrel would become so clogged that the .58 bullet could not be loaded, the Ordnance bureau started supplying the 0.57 bullet for the Enfield as standard, which increased windage (and ease of loading) at the expense of accuracy.

Figures 1 and 3 must be considered together, and can be summed (which I won't do here as it is a lot of work). Firing at a target 225 yards away with a Springfield is difficult, you must set your sights at 300 yards, then aim below the targets feet, awkward when poorly trained soldiers naturally shoot high. The solution adopted for the line infantry of the US, CS and also most of continental Europe was to set sights at 100 yards, and only shoot at 150 yards or less. Sharpshooters, jaegars, chasseurs and other specialist troops would be trained in the full use of sights and long range shooting. Only the British would stick to training their line infantry to shoot at long ranges.

Sunday, 9 May 2010

CS Industry

Recently I ran into an argument about whether the trans-Mississippi had any military value. As a counter I surveyed the 1860 US Census and took the value of bar, sheet and railroad iron produced as an indicator of heavy industry. The result for the Confederacy was:


Figure 1: Breakdown of CSA (not including border states) heavy industry

This only reflects heavy industry. If all manufactures (which include such goods as liquor and cider) are measured then by value the CSA breaks down as follows:


Figure 2: Manufacturing output of the CSA by state

This shows the disparity between the rich trading states of the coasts (and Tennessee, which could access the coast using the river) and the rest. However, this is small potatoes compared to the whole US:


Figure 3: Manufacturing output of the US, 1860.

It shows just what the border states were worth, they would have doubled the CSA manufacturing output. In heavy industry they would more than double the percentage and a CSA including the border states has a clear third of the combined US heavy industry. As it stands the CSA had 15% of the heavy industry and the border states had 17%. US heavy industry is dominated by four states; Ohio (17%), Massachusetts (16%), New York (13%) and New Jersey (10%). The first two have more heavy industry than the whole CSA. Virginia in the Union also had a 10% share of heavy industry, equal to New Jersey.

My point being an agreement with Brian Holden Reid (America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield 1861-3, pg 130); Virginia was by far the most important state of the Confederacy and that the focus on defending it was fully justified. The Mississippi theatre mattered little to the Confederacy's military power.