Over a year ago I visited the PRO at Kew and read the defence plan for Canada published in mid-1862. To the best of my memory (having lost a sheet from my pad) it was published in WO33/11.
The defences and dispositions were:
Military District 1 (London)
Permanant Works
Fort Edward at Sarnia: 500 men and 20 guns
Fort Malvern and a Fort on Bois Blanc Island at Amherstburgh, both 500 men and 20 guns
A fortified place of arms at Sarnia with 1,000 men and 50 guns
Temporary Works
North and south side of Goderich Harbor, east and west side of Port Stanley, and the mouths of the Thames River and Sydenham, each with 150 men and 10 guns
Entrenched positions at London, Paris and Chatham with ca 11,600 men
Military District 2 (Toronto)
Permanant Works
On the Niagara frontier and Welland Canal:
Fort Erie with 500 men and 20 guns
Fort Mississagua with 500 men and 20 guns
Port Dalhousie with 300 men and 15 guns
Port Colborne with 200 men and 10 guns
A fortified place of arms with 1,000 men and 50 guns
At Burlington Bay (Hamilton) a battery with 100 men and 6 guns
At Toronto New Barracks 500 men and 25 guns
New naval dockyards to be constructed at Dunnville and Port Maitland
Temporary Works
Opposite Black Rock on the Niagara River; a battery with 150 men and 5 guns
At the entrances to Collingham and Sydenham Harbours; 150 men with 10 guns each
At Port Hope several batteries totalling 400 men and 20 guns
Entrenchments on the Queenstown Heights (a Corps of Observation of 10,000), in front of Hamilton and at Toronto near the Holland River (2,200 between the two)
Military District 3 (Kingston)
Permanant Works
At Kingston; Murney Tower, Shoal Tower, Market Battery, Cedar Tower, Fort Henry and Fort Patrick totalling 94 guns (no manning figure, but by inspection 3,300 men in the district are remaining after other positions filled)
Prescott: a fort with 500 men and 20 guns
Bay of Quinte: a new naval dockyard
Temporary Works
Port Cobourg: a battery with 100 men and 5 guns
Kingston Mills: a fort at the mouth of the canal with 500 men and 12 guns
Brockville: a battery on a St Lawrence river island with 100 men and 10 guns
An entrenched camp at Prescott with 500 men
A field division of 5,000 men to be based at Prescott
Military District 4 (Montreal)
Permanant Works
Montreal: Citadel with 2,000 men and 50 guns, St. Helen's Island with 500 men and 15 guns, St. Lambert's Island and Tete de Pont with a total of 400 men and 40 guns
St Johns: the fort was to be rearmed with 20 modern guns
Isle aux Noir: this fort was also to be rearmed with 20 modern guns
Temporary Works
Cornwall canal: 200 men and 10 guns to protect of locks
Coteau du Lac: on the site of the old fort a battery of 100 men and 4 guns
At Montreal:
Vandreuil: 200 men and 10 guns
Isle Perrot: 300 men and 20 guns
Nun's Island: 300 men and 20 guns
St. Lambert: 600 men and 40 guns
St. Helen's Island: 30 guns to reequip the existing garrison
Bout de l'isle: 150 men and 10 guns
Lachine: 150 men and 10 guns
St John's, at Tete du Pont 200 men and 15 guns
Chambley, at Tete de Pont 150 men and 10 guns
Richmond, redoubts with 400 men and 25 guns
Entrenchments west of Montreal Mountain, at Sherbrooke and at St. John's with 10,650 men (including some manning works above, probably 10,000 troops in the field force)
Military District 5 (Quebec)
Permanant Works
Repair of Quebec Citadel, the addition of a battery of 10x 110 pounder rifles and a new work replacing the old French works with 200 men and 15 guns (number garrisoning the Citadel unknown, but probably 2-3,000)
Point Levi: enclosed work with 500 men and 30 guns
Temporary Works
On the left bank of the St. Charles a battery of 200 men and 12 guns, and an entrenched position on the Plains of Abraham
At Riviere du Loup, 200 men with field artillery to protect the railway, at Fort Ingall and Black Rover another 100 men each with field artillery also protecting the railway
Naval force:
A force of 550 guns manned by 9,350 men, including 9 small ironclads to be placed on the Lakes
Manpower:
The planning figure for Canada is 50,000 regulars and 100,000 militia. Around 20,000 militia are in the garrisons above, leaving 130,000 for the field army. Around half this field force is spread out in 5 Corps de Observation of 10,000 men at 1 per military district. The remaining 60-70,000, including the bulk of the regulars, were to form a field army to counterattack any US invasion force.
This of course excludes the Maritimes, which expected to receive 25,000 regulars, 25,000 militia and a force of 10,000 British militia to guard Halifax.
Tuesday, 29 December 2009
Thursday, 24 December 2009
Slightly OT: Hits per round at Vittoria (1813)
This is slightly OT, but as it's a commonly used comparitor (not least in Nosworthy's The Bloody Crucible of Courage) I thought it was appropriate to put here. Sorry for the digression into the Napoleonic War.
A commonly quoted figure of musket rounds fired per hit achieved is 1 in 459. The source of this figure is Henesay (original source). However his figures do not add up. For a start, only 3 British Divisions were heavily engaged at Vittoria (2nd, 3rd and 5th); only 10 British and 3 Portuguese regiments, and the Royal French Chasseurs Brittanique suffered more than 100 casualties. The 3 heavily engaged divisions had marching states of ca. 25,000 Officers and Present Under Arms on their state of 25th May, and had been marching and skirmishing for nearly a month before the main event. Henesay's count of 50,000 engaged infantry is highly unlikely. Also, the nature of the fighting at Vittoria precluded many standup musketry duels. While some may have occurred at river crossings, most of the real fighting was close quarter bayonet work, especially for the 3rd Division.
So, if Hennesay's estimate of over 3.6 million rounds fired is inaccurate, do we know how many rounds were fired? Yes, Henesay himself gives that information.
The way ammunition resupply worked on the Peninsula was that boxes of ball-cartridge were dropped by the Commissary behind companies, who would then send small details back to open them and distribute the rounds, the soldiers cartridge boxes were kept constantly full. Henesay's figures indicate that 1.35 million rounds were thus distributed. However Henesay notes only roughly half of these were fired. Thus we arrive at the approximate number of rounds the British actually fired, about 675,000, which is well within the norms for European combat (which reckoned on 20 rounds per infantryman being used in a battle).
Henesay's estimate of casualties is too high. The French Armies suffered 5,210 killed and wounded, exclusive of much of their artillery (no returns except for the Army of the Centre, whose artillery was overrun at bayonet-point) or the attached Spanish Royal Guards or elements of the Army of the North. Oman estimates (from pro-rating officer casualties, which were recorded) hundreds of extra casualties, probably, in my opinion between 5,700 and 5,900.
The proportion of these hit by artillery will never be known, but the artillery played little role in the British attacks, since the infantry kept outrunning their artllery support. If we make the assumption that no-one was hit by artillery then the proportions of musket rounds expended per hit is about 1 per 116. This is a high estimate, and in all probability the real ratio is in the 1 in 150 to 1 in 200 range common in American Civil War firefights.
A commonly quoted figure of musket rounds fired per hit achieved is 1 in 459. The source of this figure is Henesay (original source). However his figures do not add up. For a start, only 3 British Divisions were heavily engaged at Vittoria (2nd, 3rd and 5th); only 10 British and 3 Portuguese regiments, and the Royal French Chasseurs Brittanique suffered more than 100 casualties. The 3 heavily engaged divisions had marching states of ca. 25,000 Officers and Present Under Arms on their state of 25th May, and had been marching and skirmishing for nearly a month before the main event. Henesay's count of 50,000 engaged infantry is highly unlikely. Also, the nature of the fighting at Vittoria precluded many standup musketry duels. While some may have occurred at river crossings, most of the real fighting was close quarter bayonet work, especially for the 3rd Division.
So, if Hennesay's estimate of over 3.6 million rounds fired is inaccurate, do we know how many rounds were fired? Yes, Henesay himself gives that information.
The way ammunition resupply worked on the Peninsula was that boxes of ball-cartridge were dropped by the Commissary behind companies, who would then send small details back to open them and distribute the rounds, the soldiers cartridge boxes were kept constantly full. Henesay's figures indicate that 1.35 million rounds were thus distributed. However Henesay notes only roughly half of these were fired. Thus we arrive at the approximate number of rounds the British actually fired, about 675,000, which is well within the norms for European combat (which reckoned on 20 rounds per infantryman being used in a battle).
Henesay's estimate of casualties is too high. The French Armies suffered 5,210 killed and wounded, exclusive of much of their artillery (no returns except for the Army of the Centre, whose artillery was overrun at bayonet-point) or the attached Spanish Royal Guards or elements of the Army of the North. Oman estimates (from pro-rating officer casualties, which were recorded) hundreds of extra casualties, probably, in my opinion between 5,700 and 5,900.
The proportion of these hit by artillery will never be known, but the artillery played little role in the British attacks, since the infantry kept outrunning their artllery support. If we make the assumption that no-one was hit by artillery then the proportions of musket rounds expended per hit is about 1 per 116. This is a high estimate, and in all probability the real ratio is in the 1 in 150 to 1 in 200 range common in American Civil War firefights.
Sunday, 20 December 2009
Confederate Straggling in Maryland and Lee's strength at Antietam
I'm interested in just how badly the Confederate Army straggled in Maryland. Using the 22nd September field returns (ref), the casualties in the campaign (from Harsh's Sounding the Shallows, supplemented by the OR's to add in South Mountain casualties) and the estimated strength 2nd September as reported in Harsh.
Longstreet's Command
The other divisions
If we take the 22nd September morning state, add back in the Confederate casualties for Antietam, and remove Thomas's brigade (absent the field) we arrive at a figure of roughly 50,000. Adding in the cavalry and half the artillery reserve we have roughly 55,000. This is probably close to the strength of Lee's army on the field on the 17th.
Longstreet's Command
- DR Jones straggles heavily. Of his 8,615 man division only 4,403 are with him on 22nd September and 1,435 are casualties, leaving 2,777 stragglers (32%).
- Hood's and Evan's "divisions" have 4,834 on 2nd September, but only 3,403 on the 22nd, with 1,109 casualties. Therefore they do not straggle badly and have only lost 322 (7%),
- Jackson's own division enters the campaign with 5,650 and has 3,494 on the 22nd, after losing 648. Thus they straggle heavily with 1,508 (27%) disappearing. In his report Jackson seems to try and cover up the straggling by moving these into the killed and wounded, exaggerating how hard his division fought (sustaining more casualties than Jackson reported with the colors on the 17th).
- Ewell's division (under Lawton then Early) entered the campaign with 6,383, lost 1,338 and had 4,066 left on the 22nd, implying 979 stragglers (15%)
- The Light Division enter the campaign with 8,570, lost 417 but only have 5,468 on the 22nd, losing 2,685 stragglers (31%)
The other divisions
- DH Hill did not suffer badly from straggling, of his 9,764 on 2nd September, 5,821 are with him and 3,241 as casualties for a balance of 732 (7%) straggling.
- Walker did not suffer badly either. Of his 5,159 he still had 3,871, despite losing 1,120 at Antietam for a difference of 168 (3%).
- McLaws suffers terribly. Of 7,652, he only has 4,018 remaining, after 1,119 casualties. 2,515 men (33%) have straggled out of the ranks
- Anderson's huge division of 11,294 straggles badly. He has only 6,298 remaining on the 22nd after 1,278 casualties. 3,718 men (33%) have taken leave from him.
If we take the 22nd September morning state, add back in the Confederate casualties for Antietam, and remove Thomas's brigade (absent the field) we arrive at a figure of roughly 50,000. Adding in the cavalry and half the artillery reserve we have roughly 55,000. This is probably close to the strength of Lee's army on the field on the 17th.
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