As per before.
Greene's Division
Greene simply gives the aggregate present, 2,504. Carman states he believes the number taken into action was far less, but accepts it. I shall make a 25% reduction to 1,878 engaged, this includes attached artillery. The division suffered 651 casualties.
Williams' Division
Gordon's Brigade
Gordon states he carried into action 2,210 (OR). He suffered 646 casualties.
Crawford's Brigade
10th ME: An officer states it went into action with 21 officers and 276 men. This appears to be a morning state, hence PFD. Assume 223 combatants. Casualties were 72 (32.2% of estimated engaged).
68th NY: The adjutant states the regiment had 68 in action. Casualties were 12 (17.6%).
46th PA: Survivors estimate 135-140 in action, say 140. Casualties were 19 (13.6%).
124th, 125th and 128th PA: New regiments, "quite full when they left Washington". Carman estimates 2,010 PFD for all three, which I will take to mean (40% reduction) 1,206 engaged. Combined casualties were 327 (27.1% of estimated engaged).
5th CT: Stated as "not in action" and not included in reports. It was left at Frederick, assumidly as a train guard.
CORPS TOTAL: 5,585
Add in artillery (392) = 5,977 (59% of PFD)
This is slightly lower than 1st Corps effective percentage, but this Corps was largely new levies only weeks in the army. I'm inclined to believe they would have straggled more.
Sunday, 30 August 2009
Strength of 9th Corps at Antietam
As per the last post:
Willcox's Division
1st Brigade
28th MA: Less than 200 in line, quoted from Fox. Estimate of 200 accepted. Casualties were 48 (24%).
17th MI: 525 from an interview. Assume PFD, therefore 394 on the firing line. Casualties were 107 (27.2%)
79th NY: Carman quotes an unknown history of the regiment as 300 engaged. Casualties were 32, which indicates this may be PFD. Assuming as much the firing line may be 225 officers and men strong.
50th PA: Carman gives 370 officers and men with no source. Casualties were 57, so assume this is PFD for a combat strength of 278.
TOTAL: 1,097
2nd Brigade
8th MI: At an estimate of the surviving officers Carman quotes 435 officers and men. Casualties are 31. Assume PFD, so 326 combatants.
46th NY: The OR gives strength at both South Mountain and Antietam, giving us a chance to examine straggling. At South Mountain there were 23 officers and 369 men, marching strength (i.e. PFD), they suffered 1 killed and 6 wounded. At Antietam the PFD ("went into battle with") is 16 officers and 262 men. 7 Officers and 100 men have disappeared in the meantime. Another 19 were killed or wounded at Antietam.
This means roughly a quarter of the regiments strength has disappeared. Had it not been for the dimutation of officers I would be willing to accept this is a case of comparing PFD with effectives (officers and men). For the moment I will accept the figure (278) until further evidence comes to light.
45th PA: Carman says 20 officers and 540 men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 420 combatants. Casualties were 38 (9% of combatants).
100th PA: Carman says 350 officers and men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 263 combatants. Casualties were 8 (3% of combatants).
TOTAL: 1,287
DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,384
Sturgis' Division
1st Brigade
2nd MD: Carman states 162 officers and men "engaged" from an unknown source. I accept this. Casualties were 67 (41.4%).
6th NH: Carman's interview with the regimental historian says 150 officers and men. I accept this. Casualties were 18 (12%).
9th NH: Carman's interview with surviving officers states 30 officers and 680 men in action, but it had suffered heavily from straggling. Deducting 40% as a PFD to engaged conversion yields 426 engaged. Casualties were 59 (13.8% of estimated engaged).
48th PA: Estimated to have 390 officers and men by survivors. Assuming PFD this is 293 engaged. Casualties were 60 (20.5% of estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 1,031
2nd Brigade
21st MA: A regimental history shows about 150 engaged. This I accept. Casualties were 48 (32%).
35th MA: The regimental historian states 30 officers (including Surgeons) and 750 muskets. This must be a PFD figure. The 35th MA was only formed from new recruits 26 days before, had undergone a hard march (see Gallagher), and major battle and had blue on blued at South Mountain (see Murfin). Applying a 40% reduction yields 426 combatants. Casualties were 214 (50.2% of the estimated engaged).
51st PA: Carman has the muster roll, showing 336 PFD on the 17th September. Taking this and deducting 25% yields 252 engaged. Casualties were 120 (47.6% of the estimated engaged).
51st NY: Carman has no data, simply saying it was about the same strength as the 51st PA with nothing to back the claim up. They lost 87 casualties. Given that they were exposed to the same fire as the 51st PA, I will prorate by casualties instead, estimating 183 engaged.
TOTAL: 1,011
DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,042
Rodman's Division
1st Brigade
9th NY: Fox says 373, which is a PFD figure. This yield 280 engaged. Casualties were 235 (84%). However, I have found a reference in Battles and Leaders which states around 600 crossed the Antietam.
89th NY: Carman states it was about the same size as the 9th NY, without justification. Casualties were 103, which while far less than those for the 9th NY are about right for a regiment of that strength heavily engaged, so I accept it and estimate 280 officers and men.
103rd NY: Only 6 coys present, at an estimated 200 officers and men. Assuming PFD this gives them 150 combatants. Casualties were 117 (78% of the estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 710 (or 930 if the higher figure for the 9th NY)
2nd Brigade
8th CT: Two officers interviewed by Carman said 23 officers and either 398 or 396 men present. Assuming PFD then there were about 315 combatants. Casualties were 194 (61.6% of the estimated engaged).
11th CT: Carman sats 430 officers and men without a source. Assuming PFD this yields 323 engaged. Casualties were 139 (43% of the estimated engaged).
16th CT: Carman simply states "it was a new regiment" and seems to assume 750. This regiment was so new it only loaded muskets for the first time the day before the battle. Taking the guess above and reducing by 40% yields 450 engaged. Casualties were 185 (41.1% of the estimated engaged).
4th RI: Carman states "our best information" gives the regiment 247. Assuming this is PFD the engaged was 185. Casualties were 100 (54%).
TOTAL: 1,273
DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,983
The Kanawha Division
1st Brigade
12th OH: Carman states about 200 engaged. I accept this. Casualties were 33 (16.5%)
23rd OH: Carman states it was about the size of the 30th OH with no justification. Casualties were 69, prorating against the 30th OH yields 223 men engaged.
30th OH: Carman has the morning's muster state: 22 officers and 321 men. Adjusting down 25th to engaged figures yields 257. Casualties were 80 (31% of the estimated engaged)
TOTAL: 680
2nd Brigade
11th OH: Carman's "best information" was 430 officers and men. Assuming PFD this is 323 combatants. Casualties were 21 (6.5% of the estimated engaged)
28th OH: From a memorandum of one of the officers the regiment had 25 officers and 750 men. This must be a PFD figure and adjusted down 40% yields 465 engaged. Casualties were 21 (4.5% of estimated engaged).
30th OH: An officer of the regiment simply states that it was quite full when it started to march to join McClellan's force, and must have been over 800 strong at Antietam. Assuming this is PFD and adjusting down 40% yields 480. Casualties were 25 (5.2% of the estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 1,268
DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,948
TOTAL INFANTRY: 8,357
Add in artillery at 979 (Carman): 9,336 (67.6%)
The final figure sits around that of the calculations for 1st Corps, and is thus not unacceptable.
Willcox's Division
1st Brigade
28th MA: Less than 200 in line, quoted from Fox. Estimate of 200 accepted. Casualties were 48 (24%).
17th MI: 525 from an interview. Assume PFD, therefore 394 on the firing line. Casualties were 107 (27.2%)
79th NY: Carman quotes an unknown history of the regiment as 300 engaged. Casualties were 32, which indicates this may be PFD. Assuming as much the firing line may be 225 officers and men strong.
50th PA: Carman gives 370 officers and men with no source. Casualties were 57, so assume this is PFD for a combat strength of 278.
TOTAL: 1,097
2nd Brigade
8th MI: At an estimate of the surviving officers Carman quotes 435 officers and men. Casualties are 31. Assume PFD, so 326 combatants.
46th NY: The OR gives strength at both South Mountain and Antietam, giving us a chance to examine straggling. At South Mountain there were 23 officers and 369 men, marching strength (i.e. PFD), they suffered 1 killed and 6 wounded. At Antietam the PFD ("went into battle with") is 16 officers and 262 men. 7 Officers and 100 men have disappeared in the meantime. Another 19 were killed or wounded at Antietam.
This means roughly a quarter of the regiments strength has disappeared. Had it not been for the dimutation of officers I would be willing to accept this is a case of comparing PFD with effectives (officers and men). For the moment I will accept the figure (278) until further evidence comes to light.
45th PA: Carman says 20 officers and 540 men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 420 combatants. Casualties were 38 (9% of combatants).
100th PA: Carman says 350 officers and men from an unidentified source. Assume PFD, therefore 263 combatants. Casualties were 8 (3% of combatants).
TOTAL: 1,287
DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,384
Sturgis' Division
1st Brigade
2nd MD: Carman states 162 officers and men "engaged" from an unknown source. I accept this. Casualties were 67 (41.4%).
6th NH: Carman's interview with the regimental historian says 150 officers and men. I accept this. Casualties were 18 (12%).
9th NH: Carman's interview with surviving officers states 30 officers and 680 men in action, but it had suffered heavily from straggling. Deducting 40% as a PFD to engaged conversion yields 426 engaged. Casualties were 59 (13.8% of estimated engaged).
48th PA: Estimated to have 390 officers and men by survivors. Assuming PFD this is 293 engaged. Casualties were 60 (20.5% of estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 1,031
2nd Brigade
21st MA: A regimental history shows about 150 engaged. This I accept. Casualties were 48 (32%).
35th MA: The regimental historian states 30 officers (including Surgeons) and 750 muskets. This must be a PFD figure. The 35th MA was only formed from new recruits 26 days before, had undergone a hard march (see Gallagher), and major battle and had blue on blued at South Mountain (see Murfin). Applying a 40% reduction yields 426 combatants. Casualties were 214 (50.2% of the estimated engaged).
51st PA: Carman has the muster roll, showing 336 PFD on the 17th September. Taking this and deducting 25% yields 252 engaged. Casualties were 120 (47.6% of the estimated engaged).
51st NY: Carman has no data, simply saying it was about the same strength as the 51st PA with nothing to back the claim up. They lost 87 casualties. Given that they were exposed to the same fire as the 51st PA, I will prorate by casualties instead, estimating 183 engaged.
TOTAL: 1,011
DIVISION INFANTRY: 2,042
Rodman's Division
1st Brigade
9th NY: Fox says 373, which is a PFD figure. This yield 280 engaged. Casualties were 235 (84%). However, I have found a reference in Battles and Leaders which states around 600 crossed the Antietam.
89th NY: Carman states it was about the same size as the 9th NY, without justification. Casualties were 103, which while far less than those for the 9th NY are about right for a regiment of that strength heavily engaged, so I accept it and estimate 280 officers and men.
103rd NY: Only 6 coys present, at an estimated 200 officers and men. Assuming PFD this gives them 150 combatants. Casualties were 117 (78% of the estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 710 (or 930 if the higher figure for the 9th NY)
2nd Brigade
8th CT: Two officers interviewed by Carman said 23 officers and either 398 or 396 men present. Assuming PFD then there were about 315 combatants. Casualties were 194 (61.6% of the estimated engaged).
11th CT: Carman sats 430 officers and men without a source. Assuming PFD this yields 323 engaged. Casualties were 139 (43% of the estimated engaged).
16th CT: Carman simply states "it was a new regiment" and seems to assume 750. This regiment was so new it only loaded muskets for the first time the day before the battle. Taking the guess above and reducing by 40% yields 450 engaged. Casualties were 185 (41.1% of the estimated engaged).
4th RI: Carman states "our best information" gives the regiment 247. Assuming this is PFD the engaged was 185. Casualties were 100 (54%).
TOTAL: 1,273
DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,983
The Kanawha Division
1st Brigade
12th OH: Carman states about 200 engaged. I accept this. Casualties were 33 (16.5%)
23rd OH: Carman states it was about the size of the 30th OH with no justification. Casualties were 69, prorating against the 30th OH yields 223 men engaged.
30th OH: Carman has the morning's muster state: 22 officers and 321 men. Adjusting down 25th to engaged figures yields 257. Casualties were 80 (31% of the estimated engaged)
TOTAL: 680
2nd Brigade
11th OH: Carman's "best information" was 430 officers and men. Assuming PFD this is 323 combatants. Casualties were 21 (6.5% of the estimated engaged)
28th OH: From a memorandum of one of the officers the regiment had 25 officers and 750 men. This must be a PFD figure and adjusted down 40% yields 465 engaged. Casualties were 21 (4.5% of estimated engaged).
30th OH: An officer of the regiment simply states that it was quite full when it started to march to join McClellan's force, and must have been over 800 strong at Antietam. Assuming this is PFD and adjusting down 40% yields 480. Casualties were 25 (5.2% of the estimated engaged).
TOTAL: 1,268
DIVISION INFANTRY: 1,948
TOTAL INFANTRY: 8,357
Add in artillery at 979 (Carman): 9,336 (67.6%)
The final figure sits around that of the calculations for 1st Corps, and is thus not unacceptable.
Saturday, 29 August 2009
Strength of 2nd Corps at Antietam
I'm checking up on Carman's figures. The two sets of figures I'm most worried about are 2nd and 9th Corps. Even a casual inspection of 9th Corps has shown several PFD or even just Present figures adopted as "engaged", leaving a obvious overestimation of Burnside's/ Cox's fighting strength. 2nd Corps is more difficult. Annoyingly there is a whole book about 2nd Corps at Antietam, Armstrong's Unfurl Those Colors, but it never addresses the strength of the Corps even one.
One thing I noticed is that in a few cases Carman has the strength at South Mountain, deducts the losses, and finds the unit at Antietam was short of this (often by about 20%). This would be indicative of considerable straggling on the Federal approach march to Antietam.
One of Carman's sources is Fox's Regimental Losses. Footnotes occasionally comparing the strength given in the table with that in the OR's makes it clear Fox's "engaged" figure is in fact generally PFD, and in at least one case from a brief inspection possibly aggregate present. I will treat all figures derived from Fox as PFD.
Richardson's Division
1st Brigade
5th NH: Stated to be 300 Rifles and 19 Officers, but the official report mentions 21 officers. The received 111 casualties (34.8%), however, their killed to wounded ratio is very low (13 wounded per man killed!), indicative that something is wrong with the figures. In all probability the number of wounded is exaggerated, by at least a factor of two, maybe even three. Comparing the report for Fredericksburg I find a similar exaggeration.
7th NY: The OR contains only the casualties (61). Assuming casualties were 20%, then strength was around 305 at an estimate.
61st NY: From an interview carried into action 23 officers and 205 muskets. Assume this is the combat strength. They received 41 casualties (18%).
64th NY: 214 officers and men in action. They received 50 casualties (23.4%)
81st PA: The OR contains only the casualties (51). Assuming casualties were around 20% then strength was about 255 at an estimate.
TOTAL: 1,107
2nd Brigade
29th MA: From an interview about 20 officers and 360 men, probably PFD. Casualties were 39 (10.1% of the PFD).
63rd NY: 341 according to Fox. Casualties were 202 (59.2%!)
69th NY: 317 according to Fox. Carman states this is exclusive of officers, bringing the total up to 331. Casualties were 196 (59.2%!)
88th NY: Stated to have 302 men (OR). Casualties were 102 (33.8%). This may be exclusive of officers.
TOTAL: 1,354 (assume the duty men and the officers of the 88th NY cancel out)
3rd Brigade
2nd DE: Carman states members of this regiment stated there were about 310 officers and men. The OR shows 16 officers engaged, a ratio of more than 18:1 (very high), but the officer to men hit ratio shows this estimate to be reasonable. Thus about 16 officers and 294 men. Casualties were 58 (18.7%).
52nd NY: 12 Officers and 107 R&F (OR). Casualties were 18 (15.1%).
57th NY: 309 officers and men (OR), possibly a PFD figure given the mention of the Surgeon. Casualties were 101 (32.7%), but with a higher than normal killed to wounded ratio.
66th NY: Carman simply states survivors believed it about the size of the 2nd DE and 57th NY and assigns it 310 officers and men. The OR shows an extreme dimutation of officers, with 3 Captains occupying the field positions and 2nd Lts commanding nearly all the companies. Casualties were 103 (33.2% of the given figure), but with an even worse killed to wounded ratio.
53rd PA: No figures known, but the casualties were 25. This implies a fairly small organisation of, assuming a 20% casualty figure, 125 officers and men.
TOTAL: 1,173 (if a 25% deduction is taken for the regiments which appear to be PF the figure reduces to 845)
DIVISION INFANTRY: 3,306 (including reduction)
Sedgwick's Division
1st Brigade
15th MA: Carman states 606. The OR shows 582 muskets "ready to march", thus this is a PFD value. This includes an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 344, including the sharpshooters. This is 56.8% of the PFD.
1st MN: Carman gives the regiment 405, the OR shows 445 men, including an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 114 (25.6%). The figure is probably PFD.
34th NY: Carman gives 311, using Fox as a reference. Thus this is certainly PFD. Casualties were 154 (49.5%)
82nd NY: Carman gives 339, again using Fox, so PFD. Casualties were 128 (37.8%).
TOTAL: 1,701 PFD (but excluding the officers of 1st Minnesota). This is slightly higher than Carman, probably because he excluded the MN SS. A reasonable deduction of 25% for non-effectives suggests a combat strength of about 1,275.
2nd Brigade
Howard's brigade is awkward, even Carman can find no hard data, relying on the fact that survivors reckoned the casualties were about 1/3rd of the total taken in, and then adding on a bit for good measure. I have the 30th September morning states for present, and have added back in the casualties from Antietam to yield a "present" figure of 2,262 in the whole brigade, this of course includes sick and wounded. If we assume 25% non-effectives, and ignore the sick etc. then strength would be 1,697, close to the figure of 1,635 taken by multiplying the killed, wounded and missing by 3.
I thus have to accept the 1,635 figure. I see no justification behind Carman rounding it up to 1,800.
69th PA: 92 casualties = 276 officers and men. Present at Antietam (working back from 30th September muster state) = 505
71st PA: 135 casualties = 405 officers and men. Present (as above) = 536
72nd PA: 237 casualties = 711 officers and men. Present (as above) = 719
106th PA: 77 casualties = 231 officers and men. Present (as above) = 502
TOTAL: 1,635 (very rough)
3rd Brigade
19th MA: From estimates of the survivors it had 26 officers and 392 men (Carman). 146 casualties (34.9%)
20th MA: Carman quotes about 400 men. No further data. 124 casualties (31%)
7th MI: Carman finds, by interview, 27 officers and 375 men "present". Assume this is PFD. Casualties were 221 (55%)
42nd NY: 345, from Fox, treat as PFD. 181 casualties (52.4%)
59th NY: 381, from Fox, treat as PFD. 225 casualties (59.1%)
TOTAL: 1,946, deducting 25% for the PFD regiments leaves 1,664.
DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,584 (including reductions)
French's Division
14th IN: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 320 officers and men in action. The OR actually says men. 180 casualties (56.3%)
8th OH: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 17 officers and 324 men. 161 casualties (47.2%)
132nd PA: Carman uses the OR, but it is interesting and contradictory. The colonel states he took ca. 750 into action but only had 364 left after the action (not counting officers), since casualties were only 152, this would imply a strength of 516. My reading is that 750 was the regiment's muster state, it probably carried around 540 officers and men into action (using this figure casualties are still only 28.1%, much lower than the veteran regiments of the brigade and hence still suspiciously low).
7th VA (note, West Virginia hasn't been admitted to the Union, the Regiment fought the battle as the 7th Virginia, and changed to the 7th WV about a year later): Carman's interviews show 340 officers and men, with no indication whether this is present, PFD or engaged. Casualties were 145 (42.6%), roughly in line with the other two veteran regiments of the brigade.
TOTAL: 1,541 (and probably high, I believe the 132nd PA straggled badly and wasn't on the firing line in anything like the above strength)
2nd Brigade
14th CT: Carman acquired a figure from an oral interview of 31 officers and 720 men. I believe this is present or PFD rather than engaged. Deducting 40% (the top of Carman's estimate for the worst disciplined organisations) yields an estimate of 451. Casualties were 156 (20.8% of the present)
108th NY: Carman simply assigns it a similar figure to the 14th CT. It suffered 195 casualties. I shall do the same and give it about 450 officers and men engaged.
130th PA: Oral interviews by Carman show 690 officers and men. Again, this is likely present or PFD. A 40% reduction gives 414 engaged. Casualties were 178 (25.8% of present)
TOTAL: 1,315 (but highly questionable)
3rd Brigade
1st DE: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 708. I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 230 (32.4%)
5th MD: An oral interview by Carman assigns this regiment about 550 officers and men. This is likely PFD. Casualties were 163 (29.6%)
4th NY: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 540. Again, I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 187 (34.6%)
TOTAL: 2,191 PFD, a 25% reduction would give them 1,643 engaged.
DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,499
Total infantry of 2nd Corps: 12,389
Add Artillery of 859 (Carman's figures): 13,248 (70.4% of present)
This is still slightly higher than 1st Corps (which was meticulously assessed at the time to get only 63% of it's PFD into the firing line), but is at least in the believable range.
A note of sources
I downloaded Fox's Regimental Losses from archive.org.
One thing I noticed is that in a few cases Carman has the strength at South Mountain, deducts the losses, and finds the unit at Antietam was short of this (often by about 20%). This would be indicative of considerable straggling on the Federal approach march to Antietam.
One of Carman's sources is Fox's Regimental Losses. Footnotes occasionally comparing the strength given in the table with that in the OR's makes it clear Fox's "engaged" figure is in fact generally PFD, and in at least one case from a brief inspection possibly aggregate present. I will treat all figures derived from Fox as PFD.
Richardson's Division
1st Brigade
5th NH: Stated to be 300 Rifles and 19 Officers, but the official report mentions 21 officers. The received 111 casualties (34.8%), however, their killed to wounded ratio is very low (13 wounded per man killed!), indicative that something is wrong with the figures. In all probability the number of wounded is exaggerated, by at least a factor of two, maybe even three. Comparing the report for Fredericksburg I find a similar exaggeration.
7th NY: The OR contains only the casualties (61). Assuming casualties were 20%, then strength was around 305 at an estimate.
61st NY: From an interview carried into action 23 officers and 205 muskets. Assume this is the combat strength. They received 41 casualties (18%).
64th NY: 214 officers and men in action. They received 50 casualties (23.4%)
81st PA: The OR contains only the casualties (51). Assuming casualties were around 20% then strength was about 255 at an estimate.
TOTAL: 1,107
2nd Brigade
29th MA: From an interview about 20 officers and 360 men, probably PFD. Casualties were 39 (10.1% of the PFD).
63rd NY: 341 according to Fox. Casualties were 202 (59.2%!)
69th NY: 317 according to Fox. Carman states this is exclusive of officers, bringing the total up to 331. Casualties were 196 (59.2%!)
88th NY: Stated to have 302 men (OR). Casualties were 102 (33.8%). This may be exclusive of officers.
TOTAL: 1,354 (assume the duty men and the officers of the 88th NY cancel out)
3rd Brigade
2nd DE: Carman states members of this regiment stated there were about 310 officers and men. The OR shows 16 officers engaged, a ratio of more than 18:1 (very high), but the officer to men hit ratio shows this estimate to be reasonable. Thus about 16 officers and 294 men. Casualties were 58 (18.7%).
52nd NY: 12 Officers and 107 R&F (OR). Casualties were 18 (15.1%).
57th NY: 309 officers and men (OR), possibly a PFD figure given the mention of the Surgeon. Casualties were 101 (32.7%), but with a higher than normal killed to wounded ratio.
66th NY: Carman simply states survivors believed it about the size of the 2nd DE and 57th NY and assigns it 310 officers and men. The OR shows an extreme dimutation of officers, with 3 Captains occupying the field positions and 2nd Lts commanding nearly all the companies. Casualties were 103 (33.2% of the given figure), but with an even worse killed to wounded ratio.
53rd PA: No figures known, but the casualties were 25. This implies a fairly small organisation of, assuming a 20% casualty figure, 125 officers and men.
TOTAL: 1,173 (if a 25% deduction is taken for the regiments which appear to be PF the figure reduces to 845)
DIVISION INFANTRY: 3,306 (including reduction)
Sedgwick's Division
1st Brigade
15th MA: Carman states 606. The OR shows 582 muskets "ready to march", thus this is a PFD value. This includes an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 344, including the sharpshooters. This is 56.8% of the PFD.
1st MN: Carman gives the regiment 405, the OR shows 445 men, including an attached sharpshooter company. Casualties were 114 (25.6%). The figure is probably PFD.
34th NY: Carman gives 311, using Fox as a reference. Thus this is certainly PFD. Casualties were 154 (49.5%)
82nd NY: Carman gives 339, again using Fox, so PFD. Casualties were 128 (37.8%).
TOTAL: 1,701 PFD (but excluding the officers of 1st Minnesota). This is slightly higher than Carman, probably because he excluded the MN SS. A reasonable deduction of 25% for non-effectives suggests a combat strength of about 1,275.
2nd Brigade
Howard's brigade is awkward, even Carman can find no hard data, relying on the fact that survivors reckoned the casualties were about 1/3rd of the total taken in, and then adding on a bit for good measure. I have the 30th September morning states for present, and have added back in the casualties from Antietam to yield a "present" figure of 2,262 in the whole brigade, this of course includes sick and wounded. If we assume 25% non-effectives, and ignore the sick etc. then strength would be 1,697, close to the figure of 1,635 taken by multiplying the killed, wounded and missing by 3.
I thus have to accept the 1,635 figure. I see no justification behind Carman rounding it up to 1,800.
69th PA: 92 casualties = 276 officers and men. Present at Antietam (working back from 30th September muster state) = 505
71st PA: 135 casualties = 405 officers and men. Present (as above) = 536
72nd PA: 237 casualties = 711 officers and men. Present (as above) = 719
106th PA: 77 casualties = 231 officers and men. Present (as above) = 502
TOTAL: 1,635 (very rough)
3rd Brigade
19th MA: From estimates of the survivors it had 26 officers and 392 men (Carman). 146 casualties (34.9%)
20th MA: Carman quotes about 400 men. No further data. 124 casualties (31%)
7th MI: Carman finds, by interview, 27 officers and 375 men "present". Assume this is PFD. Casualties were 221 (55%)
42nd NY: 345, from Fox, treat as PFD. 181 casualties (52.4%)
59th NY: 381, from Fox, treat as PFD. 225 casualties (59.1%)
TOTAL: 1,946, deducting 25% for the PFD regiments leaves 1,664.
DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,584 (including reductions)
French's Division
14th IN: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 320 officers and men in action. The OR actually says men. 180 casualties (56.3%)
8th OH: Carman quotes the OR as the regiment having 17 officers and 324 men. 161 casualties (47.2%)
132nd PA: Carman uses the OR, but it is interesting and contradictory. The colonel states he took ca. 750 into action but only had 364 left after the action (not counting officers), since casualties were only 152, this would imply a strength of 516. My reading is that 750 was the regiment's muster state, it probably carried around 540 officers and men into action (using this figure casualties are still only 28.1%, much lower than the veteran regiments of the brigade and hence still suspiciously low).
7th VA (note, West Virginia hasn't been admitted to the Union, the Regiment fought the battle as the 7th Virginia, and changed to the 7th WV about a year later): Carman's interviews show 340 officers and men, with no indication whether this is present, PFD or engaged. Casualties were 145 (42.6%), roughly in line with the other two veteran regiments of the brigade.
TOTAL: 1,541 (and probably high, I believe the 132nd PA straggled badly and wasn't on the firing line in anything like the above strength)
2nd Brigade
14th CT: Carman acquired a figure from an oral interview of 31 officers and 720 men. I believe this is present or PFD rather than engaged. Deducting 40% (the top of Carman's estimate for the worst disciplined organisations) yields an estimate of 451. Casualties were 156 (20.8% of the present)
108th NY: Carman simply assigns it a similar figure to the 14th CT. It suffered 195 casualties. I shall do the same and give it about 450 officers and men engaged.
130th PA: Oral interviews by Carman show 690 officers and men. Again, this is likely present or PFD. A 40% reduction gives 414 engaged. Casualties were 178 (25.8% of present)
TOTAL: 1,315 (but highly questionable)
3rd Brigade
1st DE: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 708. I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 230 (32.4%)
5th MD: An oral interview by Carman assigns this regiment about 550 officers and men. This is likely PFD. Casualties were 163 (29.6%)
4th NY: Carman quotes the brigade commanders report in the OR, giving the regiment 540. Again, I believe this is PFD. Casualties were 187 (34.6%)
TOTAL: 2,191 PFD, a 25% reduction would give them 1,643 engaged.
DIVISION INFANTRY: 4,499
Total infantry of 2nd Corps: 12,389
Add Artillery of 859 (Carman's figures): 13,248 (70.4% of present)
This is still slightly higher than 1st Corps (which was meticulously assessed at the time to get only 63% of it's PFD into the firing line), but is at least in the believable range.
A note of sources
I downloaded Fox's Regimental Losses from archive.org.
Friday, 28 August 2009
Dave Powell has a blog
Dave Powell has recently started a blog on the Battle of Chickamauga. I've read a few of his bits over the years and find him excellent in his tactical analysis.
Its URL is http://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/
Its URL is http://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/
Wednesday, 26 August 2009
McClellan's Infantry Strength at Antietam
Recently I've had call to defend McClellan over the fact that his army was utterly wrecked when he canceled Franklin's attack at Antietam, and indeed Lee was planning exactly the counterattack McClellan feared (see Harsh or Rafuse on this matter).
However, I've previously started an article estimating the strength of the AoP at Antietam, and I'm going to merge the two.
By deducting out non-infantry capbadges we've gotten a closer comparison to Lee's army (which is typically reported in terms of effective infantry, in an attempt to further the lost cause theory).
The infantry effectives in Lee's army are reported by Carman as 29,222 engaged (this excludes ca. 1,339 effectives of 2 of AP Hill's brigades not engaged, estimated at 60% of the 3 that were). The estimate is thus 30,561 infantry.
Going Corps by Corps for the Union:
1st Corps
Official Strength: 14,856
Meade's statement of those carried into battle: ca. 9000
Approximate infantry strength: 8,619 (Carman)
Casualties: 2,590
Approximate infantry strength the morning of the 18th: 5,327 (Sears, p300)
Sears notes that in addition to Meade's complaints about large numbers of men on the roster ("present for duty") simply not being present, at least another 800 had straggled and were never in the firing line. We can thus estimate that on the morning of the 18th, 1st Corps fielded around 4,000 effectives. We should not forget estimates that 3rd Division only had 300 men with the Colours on the afternoon of the 17th; this implies that the formation was so wrecked it could probably only muster 1,000 or so men at that point.
Of the 10 brigades in the corps, only Hoffman's brigade (727 PFD) wasn't wrecked, since it had been detached as the right flank guard and wasn't used in the attack. They only suffered 10 casualties during the day.
2nd Corps
Official Strength: 18,813
Richardson's Division: 4,029 infantry (Carman)
Sedgwick: 5,437 (Carman)
French: 5,740 (Carman)
The slaughter of 2nd Corps is oft described, their aggregate loss for the day was 5,138, over a third. The Corps effectively ceased to exist for most of the battle.
5th Corps
Official Strength: 12,939 (2 Divisions only)
Buchanan's brigade: 1,640 (Carman, but no supporting text could be found)
Lovell's brigade: 1,060 PFD consolidated into 4 battalions on the 20th (OR)
5th NY: less than 115 (effective strength at 2nd Bull Run minus casualties at said battle, battlefield marker)
10th NY: unknown
Morell: 5,407 PFD
Estimate: 6,990
5th Corps was only lightly engaged, and Morell's division never even crossed the Antietam.
6th Corps
Official Strength: 12,300 (of which 75-80% were combatants, B&L II, pp 595)
Force engaged at Crampton's Gap (Slocum's Div and Brooks' and Irwin's Bdes of Smith's Div): ca. 6,500 (of which 533 were casualties)
Strength of Smith's Division: ca. 4,500 (B&L II, pp 596)
PFD of Hancock's Bde (not included in the 6,500 engaged above, but in the strength of Smith's Division): 2,114, or ca. 1,600 combatants
Irwin's brigade: 1,684 (Carman)
Infantry Strength of 6th Corps: 8,324 (75% of present minus 901 for the artillery (figure from Carman)
Aside from Irwin, only the skirmishers were engaged.
9th Corps: 13,819 (Including Kanawha Division, attached)
Official Strength: 13,819
Carman: 11,714 (but several of the regimental strengths are PFD)
Wrecked crossing Burnside Bridge etc.
12th Corps: 10,126
Official Strength: 10,126
Carman: 7,239
Essentially part of 2nd Corps.
Carman states 46,146 officers and men were "engaged", but this figure excludes much of the 5th and 6th Army Corps. For 5th Corps we should add in Lovell's brigade at 795 (1,060 minus 25% for non-effectives) and Warren's little brigade (maybe 400-500, I'll use 500 unless I can find better data), and of course Morell at 4,055 (estimated at 75% of 5,407 PFD). For 6th Corps we should add 6,640 (Carman included Irwin's brigade).
We thus arrive at an estimate of 54,081 infantry serving as such on the field of Antietam on the 17th. We can estimate in infantry McClellan had a numerical advantage of roughly 7:4 in infantry. The question of their combat experience is another matter.
I am a bit suspicious of the apparently large number of effectives in 2nd and 9th Corps. Their figures show much less dimutation than the other Corps.
As to the casualty rates of the formations using these figures:
1st Corps: 30%
2nd Corps: 34%
5th Corps: 2%
6th Corps: 5%
9th Corps: 20%
12th Corps: 24%
Neither Couch's nor Humphrey's Divisions were on the field during the battle.
However, I've previously started an article estimating the strength of the AoP at Antietam, and I'm going to merge the two.
By deducting out non-infantry capbadges we've gotten a closer comparison to Lee's army (which is typically reported in terms of effective infantry, in an attempt to further the lost cause theory).
The infantry effectives in Lee's army are reported by Carman as 29,222 engaged (this excludes ca. 1,339 effectives of 2 of AP Hill's brigades not engaged, estimated at 60% of the 3 that were). The estimate is thus 30,561 infantry.
Going Corps by Corps for the Union:
1st Corps
Official Strength: 14,856
Meade's statement of those carried into battle: ca. 9000
Approximate infantry strength: 8,619 (Carman)
Casualties: 2,590
Approximate infantry strength the morning of the 18th: 5,327 (Sears, p300)
Sears notes that in addition to Meade's complaints about large numbers of men on the roster ("present for duty") simply not being present, at least another 800 had straggled and were never in the firing line. We can thus estimate that on the morning of the 18th, 1st Corps fielded around 4,000 effectives. We should not forget estimates that 3rd Division only had 300 men with the Colours on the afternoon of the 17th; this implies that the formation was so wrecked it could probably only muster 1,000 or so men at that point.
Of the 10 brigades in the corps, only Hoffman's brigade (727 PFD) wasn't wrecked, since it had been detached as the right flank guard and wasn't used in the attack. They only suffered 10 casualties during the day.
2nd Corps
Official Strength: 18,813
Richardson's Division: 4,029 infantry (Carman)
Sedgwick: 5,437 (Carman)
French: 5,740 (Carman)
The slaughter of 2nd Corps is oft described, their aggregate loss for the day was 5,138, over a third. The Corps effectively ceased to exist for most of the battle.
5th Corps
Official Strength: 12,939 (2 Divisions only)
Buchanan's brigade: 1,640 (Carman, but no supporting text could be found)
Lovell's brigade: 1,060 PFD consolidated into 4 battalions on the 20th (OR)
5th NY: less than 115 (effective strength at 2nd Bull Run minus casualties at said battle, battlefield marker)
10th NY: unknown
Morell: 5,407 PFD
Estimate: 6,990
5th Corps was only lightly engaged, and Morell's division never even crossed the Antietam.
6th Corps
Official Strength: 12,300 (of which 75-80% were combatants, B&L II, pp 595)
Force engaged at Crampton's Gap (Slocum's Div and Brooks' and Irwin's Bdes of Smith's Div): ca. 6,500 (of which 533 were casualties)
Strength of Smith's Division: ca. 4,500 (B&L II, pp 596)
PFD of Hancock's Bde (not included in the 6,500 engaged above, but in the strength of Smith's Division): 2,114, or ca. 1,600 combatants
Irwin's brigade: 1,684 (Carman)
Infantry Strength of 6th Corps: 8,324 (75% of present minus 901 for the artillery (figure from Carman)
Aside from Irwin, only the skirmishers were engaged.
9th Corps: 13,819 (Including Kanawha Division, attached)
Official Strength: 13,819
Carman: 11,714 (but several of the regimental strengths are PFD)
Wrecked crossing Burnside Bridge etc.
12th Corps: 10,126
Official Strength: 10,126
Carman: 7,239
Essentially part of 2nd Corps.
Carman states 46,146 officers and men were "engaged", but this figure excludes much of the 5th and 6th Army Corps. For 5th Corps we should add in Lovell's brigade at 795 (1,060 minus 25% for non-effectives) and Warren's little brigade (maybe 400-500, I'll use 500 unless I can find better data), and of course Morell at 4,055 (estimated at 75% of 5,407 PFD). For 6th Corps we should add 6,640 (Carman included Irwin's brigade).
We thus arrive at an estimate of 54,081 infantry serving as such on the field of Antietam on the 17th. We can estimate in infantry McClellan had a numerical advantage of roughly 7:4 in infantry. The question of their combat experience is another matter.
I am a bit suspicious of the apparently large number of effectives in 2nd and 9th Corps. Their figures show much less dimutation than the other Corps.
As to the casualty rates of the formations using these figures:
1st Corps: 30%
2nd Corps: 34%
5th Corps: 2%
6th Corps: 5%
9th Corps: 20%
12th Corps: 24%
Neither Couch's nor Humphrey's Divisions were on the field during the battle.
Friday, 21 August 2009
Lanchester Linear Law
I'm working on analysing combat data using Lanchester's Laws. In the process I've noticed linear law seems a better fit. This actually doesn't surprise me as recently the academia that works with these laws has renamed them. Linear law is now the unaimed fire law, whilst square law is the aimed fire law.
The argument I will make is that for the ACW era artillery will obey the square law, whilst musketry will obey the linear law. This makes things very complicated. Further complicating the matter is the possibility that well entrenched infantry may indeed fire using the square law, whilst receiving return fire under the linear law; this would be a far more powerful model than Dupuy's modifiers he developed for his Quantitative Judgement Model.
Overall it fits with a general observations that casualties in battles are usually roughly equal, regardless of differences in manpower. Exceptions certainly occur, and are quite often tracable to one side having sufficient fire superiority to make a bayonet charge of it and settle the matter.
Anyway, just an observation....
The argument I will make is that for the ACW era artillery will obey the square law, whilst musketry will obey the linear law. This makes things very complicated. Further complicating the matter is the possibility that well entrenched infantry may indeed fire using the square law, whilst receiving return fire under the linear law; this would be a far more powerful model than Dupuy's modifiers he developed for his Quantitative Judgement Model.
Overall it fits with a general observations that casualties in battles are usually roughly equal, regardless of differences in manpower. Exceptions certainly occur, and are quite often tracable to one side having sufficient fire superiority to make a bayonet charge of it and settle the matter.
Anyway, just an observation....
Thursday, 20 August 2009
Mobilisation, March 1862
A long time ago I had a massive spreadsheet with every Federal unit embodied by the end of March 1862. This was for comparison purposes. Joseph Harsh has done a similar thing for the Confederate Army, and reduces the numbers to regiments of all arms, assuming that a regiment is 10 companies. On 30th June 1862 he finds 577.7 Regiments in CS service.
I've recently recovered the spreadsheet off an old harddrive, and intend to present it all. The most immediate thing I can offer is a breakdown of what each state provided:
California: 5.5
Colorado: 2
Connecticut: 10.3
Delaware: 2
DC: 2
Illinois: 75.1
Indiana: 48.9
Iowa: 21.3
Kansas: 9.3
Kentucky: 33.4
Maine: 14.8
Maryland: 11.8
Massachusetts: 28.7
Michigan: 19.8
Minnesota: 3.1
Missouri: 36.8
Nebraska: 1
New Hampshire: 7.1
New Jersey: 11.2
New Mexico: 5
New York: 124.1
Ohio: 87
Oregon: 0.6
Pennsylvania: 92.4
Rhode Island: 4.9 (but most of these were "New England" regiments redesignated to RI)
(East) Tennessee: 5
Vermont:8.2
(West) Virginia: 12.1
Wisconsin: 25
Regular Army: 31.9
TOTAL: 740.3 "Regiments of All Arms"
Using an estimated aggregate of 100 men per company I also looked at the degree of mobilisation per state, obviously ignoring the regulars. The lowest mobilisation (estimated aggregate above/ total population) was Oregon (0.9%) and then California (1.4%).
Next is NJ (1.6%), Delaware (1.8%), Minnesota (1.8%) and Maryland (2%). Although none of these left the Union, they were fairly pro-Confederate.
Next is the bulk of the New England states, ranging from 2.2-2.6%, with the exception of RI (3.6%), which was got recruits from elsewhere as well.
The bulk of the states are in the 2.6-3.8% bracket.
The interesting exception seems to be the border states and midwest (also naturally pro-Confederate but not leaving the Union) which show much higher than normal enlistment. The most mobilised state is Kansas (7.6%), then Colorado (5.8%) and New Mexico (4.2%).
As a level of nominal manpower mobilisation, this is exceptionally impressive. The British in WW1 mobilised a similar portion of their manpower in a similar time, and indeed the French and German figures.
I've recently recovered the spreadsheet off an old harddrive, and intend to present it all. The most immediate thing I can offer is a breakdown of what each state provided:
California: 5.5
Colorado: 2
Connecticut: 10.3
Delaware: 2
DC: 2
Illinois: 75.1
Indiana: 48.9
Iowa: 21.3
Kansas: 9.3
Kentucky: 33.4
Maine: 14.8
Maryland: 11.8
Massachusetts: 28.7
Michigan: 19.8
Minnesota: 3.1
Missouri: 36.8
Nebraska: 1
New Hampshire: 7.1
New Jersey: 11.2
New Mexico: 5
New York: 124.1
Ohio: 87
Oregon: 0.6
Pennsylvania: 92.4
Rhode Island: 4.9 (but most of these were "New England" regiments redesignated to RI)
(East) Tennessee: 5
Vermont:8.2
(West) Virginia: 12.1
Wisconsin: 25
Regular Army: 31.9
TOTAL: 740.3 "Regiments of All Arms"
Using an estimated aggregate of 100 men per company I also looked at the degree of mobilisation per state, obviously ignoring the regulars. The lowest mobilisation (estimated aggregate above/ total population) was Oregon (0.9%) and then California (1.4%).
Next is NJ (1.6%), Delaware (1.8%), Minnesota (1.8%) and Maryland (2%). Although none of these left the Union, they were fairly pro-Confederate.
Next is the bulk of the New England states, ranging from 2.2-2.6%, with the exception of RI (3.6%), which was got recruits from elsewhere as well.
The bulk of the states are in the 2.6-3.8% bracket.
The interesting exception seems to be the border states and midwest (also naturally pro-Confederate but not leaving the Union) which show much higher than normal enlistment. The most mobilised state is Kansas (7.6%), then Colorado (5.8%) and New Mexico (4.2%).
As a level of nominal manpower mobilisation, this is exceptionally impressive. The British in WW1 mobilised a similar portion of their manpower in a similar time, and indeed the French and German figures.
Wednesday, 19 August 2009
The movement to the Peninsula
I've recently had cause to try and work out when units and formations arrived on the Peninsula during the siege of Yorktown Period. Not finding the data immediately available anywhere I decided to construct the data myself. To do this I took Brett Schultze's Yorktown Orbat, and went through each regiment and battery comparing to the service records online here. It's crude, but here is the finding:
(Date is the apparent issuing of an order to move to the Peninsula)
16th March: Porter's Division (3rd Corps), complete on Peninsula (excluding divisional cavalry, but including attached 1st US Sharpshooters) on 24th March
17th March: Hamilton's Division (3rd Corps), unknown arrival date, but complete by end of March.
22nd March: WF Smith's Division (4th Corps), complete at Ft Monroe on 25th March
25th March: Couch's Division (4th Corps), units embarked 25th-28th March, complete before 5th April
27th March: Sedgwick's Division (2nd Corps), confusion over embarkation date as Lincoln suspended their move. Complete at Ft Monroe 2nd April
28th March: Casey's Division (4th Corps), units embarked around the 30th, complete before 5th April
4th April: Richardson's Division (2nd Corps), complete at Ft Monroe ca. 11th April, joins siege force at Yorktown 16th.
7th April: Hooker's Division (3rd Corps), joined the siegelines between the 10th and 16th April.
17th April: Kearny's Brigade, Franklin's Division (detached from 1st Corps), embarks 17th April but remains afloat as a turning force
24th April: the remains of Franklin's Division
The artillery reserve is all on the Peninsula before the 5th April, as is the Cavalry Reserve (complete 30th March).
(Date is the apparent issuing of an order to move to the Peninsula)
16th March: Porter's Division (3rd Corps), complete on Peninsula (excluding divisional cavalry, but including attached 1st US Sharpshooters) on 24th March
17th March: Hamilton's Division (3rd Corps), unknown arrival date, but complete by end of March.
22nd March: WF Smith's Division (4th Corps), complete at Ft Monroe on 25th March
25th March: Couch's Division (4th Corps), units embarked 25th-28th March, complete before 5th April
27th March: Sedgwick's Division (2nd Corps), confusion over embarkation date as Lincoln suspended their move. Complete at Ft Monroe 2nd April
28th March: Casey's Division (4th Corps), units embarked around the 30th, complete before 5th April
4th April: Richardson's Division (2nd Corps), complete at Ft Monroe ca. 11th April, joins siege force at Yorktown 16th.
7th April: Hooker's Division (3rd Corps), joined the siegelines between the 10th and 16th April.
17th April: Kearny's Brigade, Franklin's Division (detached from 1st Corps), embarks 17th April but remains afloat as a turning force
24th April: the remains of Franklin's Division
The artillery reserve is all on the Peninsula before the 5th April, as is the Cavalry Reserve (complete 30th March).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
