Friday, 29 May 2009
An 1864 book....
I'm currently reading a rather strange book called "English and French Neutrality and the Anglo-French alliance in their relationships to the United States & Russia" (link). An interesting, if paranoid read. It seems to represent a fringe opinion in the US that they should crush Britain (historically the old enemy of course) and that it would be easy. However some of its' data is sound (even if the interpretation is seriously whacky), and it's a useful source.
Wednesday, 27 May 2009
Lee offered command in the Union
Several times I've encountered the idea that Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee, 2d U.S. Cavalry was offered the post of Federal Commander in Chief in early 1861. This is of course a nonsense. It seems to be based around Scott wanting Lee (who he knew from Mexico) for "a top command". Note it is not "the top command".
One thing that needs understanding is the nature of the U.S. Army List. Promotion upto the rank of Captain was entirely by seniority. Promotion to Major and beyond was more complex, but your ranking in the list was decided by the date of promotion to Major (i.e. entry into the Field Officer grades). Lee was an Engineer, a branch of service with extremely low promotion rates. Despite a Brevet Majority (some sources mention a Brevet Colonelcy, but this was never confirmed) he remained a Captain (seniority of 1838) until 1855, when he was assigned to be 2i/c of the newly formed 2d U.S. Cavalry. He remained in this post until 1861.
As war loomed Scott started to think about forming military departments. He initially selected 3 officers for the three departments; his choices were (in order of seniority) Fremont, McClellan and Lee.
Lee was moved to staff in Washington and was promoted Colonel of 1st U.S. Cavalry on 28th March 1861 (vice E.V. Sumner, promoted Brigadier-General*). He also provisionally accepted the offer of Major General of Regulars if Virginia didn't secede. After it was clear Virginia was seceding, Lee told Blair in person he could not accept a General Officer position on the 18th April, before resigning his Commission on the 20th. Shortly thereafter he accepted the Commission in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States of Brigadier-General offered over a month before.
Lee's putative Union command was given to McDowell. Thus if all other things had been equal then Lee would have commanded at 1st Bull Run.
* Congress offered 4 officers the rank of Brigadier-General of Regulars at this time; Sumner, Wool and Harney accepted, J.E. Johnston turned it down.
One thing that needs understanding is the nature of the U.S. Army List. Promotion upto the rank of Captain was entirely by seniority. Promotion to Major and beyond was more complex, but your ranking in the list was decided by the date of promotion to Major (i.e. entry into the Field Officer grades). Lee was an Engineer, a branch of service with extremely low promotion rates. Despite a Brevet Majority (some sources mention a Brevet Colonelcy, but this was never confirmed) he remained a Captain (seniority of 1838) until 1855, when he was assigned to be 2i/c of the newly formed 2d U.S. Cavalry. He remained in this post until 1861.
As war loomed Scott started to think about forming military departments. He initially selected 3 officers for the three departments; his choices were (in order of seniority) Fremont, McClellan and Lee.
Lee was moved to staff in Washington and was promoted Colonel of 1st U.S. Cavalry on 28th March 1861 (vice E.V. Sumner, promoted Brigadier-General*). He also provisionally accepted the offer of Major General of Regulars if Virginia didn't secede. After it was clear Virginia was seceding, Lee told Blair in person he could not accept a General Officer position on the 18th April, before resigning his Commission on the 20th. Shortly thereafter he accepted the Commission in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States of Brigadier-General offered over a month before.
Lee's putative Union command was given to McDowell. Thus if all other things had been equal then Lee would have commanded at 1st Bull Run.
* Congress offered 4 officers the rank of Brigadier-General of Regulars at this time; Sumner, Wool and Harney accepted, J.E. Johnston turned it down.
Monday, 25 May 2009
Artillery in America
One thing that strikes me as odd is just how small artillery batteries are in the ACW. They seem to usually be around 15-20 men/gun. Meanwhile the British (and I assume other Europeans) manned batteries at 40-45 men/gun. Now the British have never been noted for their generosity of manpower, so I have to wonder what was sacrificed in making American batteries so small.
As an aside, the British had equipped all their regular field artillery the wrought iron tubed Armstrong 12 pounder, 8cwt breechloading rifle. The accuracy of the piece is amazing, and this is the first field gun in history fitted with a traverse, meaning the gunners can alter the aim without moving the piece. It also totally outranges any US piece:
British
Armstrong 12 pdr RBL: 2,500 yds (sighted to 3,400 yds)
Royal Ordnance 9 pdr 13 cwt SBML: 1,900 yds
American
3" Ordnance RML: 1,830 yds
10 pdr Parrott RML: 1,900 yds
12 pdr M1857 "Napoleon" SBML: 1,619 yds
I was unsure why the British pieces outrange the American pieces. However, an explanation has been found; the British guns used a heavier load of gunpowder. The British 9pdr SBML used 3lbs of powder to fire a 9lb shot, resulting in a muzzle velocity of 1,600fps; the roughly equivalent US gun was the Napoleon, using 2.5lbs of powder to throw a 12.3lb ball at 1,440fps. In fact the British 9pdr is a heavier piece than the French M1853 (i.e. US M1857), being 13cwt vs 11cwt (weight of barrel). This is perhaps one clue to the larger size of British batteries, the heavier weight of the guns.
Looking at the Rifled guns, the Armstrong 12pdr (8cwt) used a 1lb 8oz charge to throw a 11lb 4oz round (shell) at 1,239fps. The 3" Ordnance (7.3cwt) and 10pdr Parrott (8cwt) both used a 1lb charge to throw a 9.5lb round. MW was 1,215fps and 1,230fps respectively.
Calculating muzzle energies:
Royal Ordnance 9pdr: 0.48Mj
M1857 Napoleon: 0.53Mj
Armstrong 12pdr: 0.36Mj
3" Ordnance: 0.29Mj
10pdr Parrott: 0.3Mj
Thus any increased range can't be due to energies.
Finally, I look to mean deviation (the measure of a guns accuracy). The CSA noted that the 3" rifles made in the Americas averaged a lateral deviation of about 12 feet at 1,200 yds. This is incredible if true, because this is in the same ballpark as smoothbore pieces; if true then the Parrott and Rodman 10pdr rifles are no more capable than a 10pdr smoothbore. The Armstrong and Whitworths built in the UK had lateral deviations of about 4-5" at this range.
I have yet to locate definitive test data, but this could help explain why the rifled gun revolution seen on European battlefields (with accurate counterbattery fire at thousands of yards) just didn't seem to happen in the Americas. The preparatory bombardment for the Confederate assault on the 3rd day of Gettysburg only knocked out 35 Union guns with 5-6,000 rounds expended.
As an aside, I have seen drift data for the James Rifle a while back, and it's deviation was far greater than any smoothbore. I'll state that more plainly, the James Rifle was less accurate than a smoothbore. The reasons for this seem to be due to faulty rifling causing the round to displace randomly to the left.
This is something I will come back too, but, if proven, we perhaps should cease thinking of artillery as rifled, and generally treat that all artillery is smoothbore regardless of whether rifled or not.
As an aside, the British had equipped all their regular field artillery the wrought iron tubed Armstrong 12 pounder, 8cwt breechloading rifle. The accuracy of the piece is amazing, and this is the first field gun in history fitted with a traverse, meaning the gunners can alter the aim without moving the piece. It also totally outranges any US piece:
British
Armstrong 12 pdr RBL: 2,500 yds (sighted to 3,400 yds)
Royal Ordnance 9 pdr 13 cwt SBML: 1,900 yds
American
3" Ordnance RML: 1,830 yds
10 pdr Parrott RML: 1,900 yds
12 pdr M1857 "Napoleon" SBML: 1,619 yds
I was unsure why the British pieces outrange the American pieces. However, an explanation has been found; the British guns used a heavier load of gunpowder. The British 9pdr SBML used 3lbs of powder to fire a 9lb shot, resulting in a muzzle velocity of 1,600fps; the roughly equivalent US gun was the Napoleon, using 2.5lbs of powder to throw a 12.3lb ball at 1,440fps. In fact the British 9pdr is a heavier piece than the French M1853 (i.e. US M1857), being 13cwt vs 11cwt (weight of barrel). This is perhaps one clue to the larger size of British batteries, the heavier weight of the guns.
Looking at the Rifled guns, the Armstrong 12pdr (8cwt) used a 1lb 8oz charge to throw a 11lb 4oz round (shell) at 1,239fps. The 3" Ordnance (7.3cwt) and 10pdr Parrott (8cwt) both used a 1lb charge to throw a 9.5lb round. MW was 1,215fps and 1,230fps respectively.
Calculating muzzle energies:
Royal Ordnance 9pdr: 0.48Mj
M1857 Napoleon: 0.53Mj
Armstrong 12pdr: 0.36Mj
3" Ordnance: 0.29Mj
10pdr Parrott: 0.3Mj
Thus any increased range can't be due to energies.
Finally, I look to mean deviation (the measure of a guns accuracy). The CSA noted that the 3" rifles made in the Americas averaged a lateral deviation of about 12 feet at 1,200 yds. This is incredible if true, because this is in the same ballpark as smoothbore pieces; if true then the Parrott and Rodman 10pdr rifles are no more capable than a 10pdr smoothbore. The Armstrong and Whitworths built in the UK had lateral deviations of about 4-5" at this range.
I have yet to locate definitive test data, but this could help explain why the rifled gun revolution seen on European battlefields (with accurate counterbattery fire at thousands of yards) just didn't seem to happen in the Americas. The preparatory bombardment for the Confederate assault on the 3rd day of Gettysburg only knocked out 35 Union guns with 5-6,000 rounds expended.
As an aside, I have seen drift data for the James Rifle a while back, and it's deviation was far greater than any smoothbore. I'll state that more plainly, the James Rifle was less accurate than a smoothbore. The reasons for this seem to be due to faulty rifling causing the round to displace randomly to the left.
This is something I will come back too, but, if proven, we perhaps should cease thinking of artillery as rifled, and generally treat that all artillery is smoothbore regardless of whether rifled or not.
Thursday, 21 May 2009
British Infantry Tactics 1859
Sorry to anyone for any delays, life has been hectic. So, with half a dozen half written articles incomplete (all need further research) I thought I'd give a post on comparative tactics. Useful the 1859 British Infantry Manual is online. I've taking this prettymuch from that. This is an improvement on the 1857 manual, which incorporated the lessons of the Crimean, including the lessons from the Mutiny.
One of the major alterations is that the distinctions between, Rifles, Light Infantry and Line Infantry are all abolished. The manual is clear that all infantry are now light infantry equipped with rifles, and all appellations such as "Rifles" and "Light Infantry" are ceremonial only. Part of this included the redesignation of Grenadier and Light Companies. In all cases the Grenadier company took the position of the new No. 1 company and the Light company as the new No. 10 company. The battalion companies moved to become the new No.s 2-9.
The establishment for a British infantry battalion in 1859 was 12 companies. Normally 10 would form the active battalion and the remaining 2 were left as a depot. Regimental depots had been merged into depot battalions, with each depot battalion supplying several regiments. During the Crimean War each battalion had been raised to 20 companies; the original idea of this was a straight doubling of the army (most Regiments having 2 battalions of 8 companies, plus a 4 company depot). In practice the 1st battalion kept being reinforced by additional companies, and right at the end the Regiments had 16 active companies (plus 4 depot companies), complete with the staff for 2 battalions* but had never formally separated them into 1st and 2nd battalions (although newspaper reports in The Times indicated that the 8 companies left at home initially were redesignated as the 2nd Battalion).
The 1859 service battalions were now structured into 3 roughly equal parts, rather than two wings. These were a skirmish line of 3 companies, a support line of 3 companies and a reserve of 4 companies. In practice it is likely to have been 3 balanced groups of 3 companies since the reserve would also likely deploy a company of skirmishers for flank security. These groupings were not permanent, but would rotate during the action. The following picture is a plate from the manual, showing the rotation of the 3 groupings during the movement through a defile:
What strikes me about this is that in some ways the tactics described are exceptionally modern, especially the rotation of groupings and the fire and maneouvre nature of the tactics.
This is the set of tactics that the British had adopted in the years before the American Civil War, and is the manner in which they intended to fight. It is notable that instructors sent to the Canadian Militia found it was their inability to perform these light drill evolutions which was the most frustrating feature of that force. They remained a 2 rank linear army with some occasional skirmisher companies, much like the armies of 1812 or, to some extent, the American armies of 1862. I would suspect that at war establishment the British of the 1860's will quickly adopt a 12 company organisation, with 3 wings of 4 companies in a battalion.
* The war establishment of officers for a Battalion was a Colonel (not regimentally effective), 2 Lieutenant Colonels, 2 Majors, 16 Captains, 26 Lieutenants and 14 Ensigns. This is line of command officers only, adjutants, paymasters, surgeons &c. are not included. This allowed for the division of the regiment into 4 "wings" of 4 companies.
One of the major alterations is that the distinctions between, Rifles, Light Infantry and Line Infantry are all abolished. The manual is clear that all infantry are now light infantry equipped with rifles, and all appellations such as "Rifles" and "Light Infantry" are ceremonial only. Part of this included the redesignation of Grenadier and Light Companies. In all cases the Grenadier company took the position of the new No. 1 company and the Light company as the new No. 10 company. The battalion companies moved to become the new No.s 2-9.
The establishment for a British infantry battalion in 1859 was 12 companies. Normally 10 would form the active battalion and the remaining 2 were left as a depot. Regimental depots had been merged into depot battalions, with each depot battalion supplying several regiments. During the Crimean War each battalion had been raised to 20 companies; the original idea of this was a straight doubling of the army (most Regiments having 2 battalions of 8 companies, plus a 4 company depot). In practice the 1st battalion kept being reinforced by additional companies, and right at the end the Regiments had 16 active companies (plus 4 depot companies), complete with the staff for 2 battalions* but had never formally separated them into 1st and 2nd battalions (although newspaper reports in The Times indicated that the 8 companies left at home initially were redesignated as the 2nd Battalion).
The 1859 service battalions were now structured into 3 roughly equal parts, rather than two wings. These were a skirmish line of 3 companies, a support line of 3 companies and a reserve of 4 companies. In practice it is likely to have been 3 balanced groups of 3 companies since the reserve would also likely deploy a company of skirmishers for flank security. These groupings were not permanent, but would rotate during the action. The following picture is a plate from the manual, showing the rotation of the 3 groupings during the movement through a defile:
What strikes me about this is that in some ways the tactics described are exceptionally modern, especially the rotation of groupings and the fire and maneouvre nature of the tactics.
This is the set of tactics that the British had adopted in the years before the American Civil War, and is the manner in which they intended to fight. It is notable that instructors sent to the Canadian Militia found it was their inability to perform these light drill evolutions which was the most frustrating feature of that force. They remained a 2 rank linear army with some occasional skirmisher companies, much like the armies of 1812 or, to some extent, the American armies of 1862. I would suspect that at war establishment the British of the 1860's will quickly adopt a 12 company organisation, with 3 wings of 4 companies in a battalion.
* The war establishment of officers for a Battalion was a Colonel (not regimentally effective), 2 Lieutenant Colonels, 2 Majors, 16 Captains, 26 Lieutenants and 14 Ensigns. This is line of command officers only, adjutants, paymasters, surgeons &c. are not included. This allowed for the division of the regiment into 4 "wings" of 4 companies.
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