Joseph Harsh showed a decade ago (Taken at the Flood) that the ANV had not yet adopted it's two wing/ corps organisation at the time of the Battle of Antietam. Indeed, a simple reading of Longstreet's and Jackson's reports show that this is not the case. Indeed, the OR even footnotes that the given order of battle is based upon later transfers etc. The divisions of DH Hill, McLaws, RH Anderson and Walker were not part of the Longstreet/Jackson command structure.
Now, strictly speaking, these divisions were part of GW Smith's command. However, GW Smith was too sick to campaign, and command of this force devolved to DH Hill as senior Major General present. This lasted until at least the point where the "reinforcing column" joined the main body of the ANV. The fact that this remaining force at Richmond was a "Wing" is explicit in RE Lee's letter to GW Smith. (As a note, "DH Hill's division" in this letter is in fact under the command of Ripley, with Hill himself detached)
Now, looking at the organisation of Smith's command, to me it seems it is a simple Corps of 3 divisions (plus Hampton's cavalry brigade) under Smith directly (DH Hill's (Ripley's), McLaws' and Anderson's divisions). DH Hill was detached, and had command of a force consisting of Walker's Division. Lee would gradually call this entire force north. Anderson would be called on the 14th August, Hill's and McLaws' on 26th August and Walker on the 31st.
Whilst organising to cross the Potomac, a distinct "wing" structure can be seen in their movements, however, it is the movement of a conventional 4 wing army.
The implied organisation is:
Longstreet's Right Wing (Divisions of Longstreet, Evans and Wilcox)
Jackson's Left Wing (Divisions of Jackson, Ewell and AP Hill)
DH Hill's "Centre Wing" (Divisions of DH Hill and Walker)
McLaws' "Reserve Wing" (Divisions of McLaws and Anderson)
Longstreet's wing will undergo significant alteration before Antietam, with Wilcox's small division being merged into Anderson's, and Evan's division being broken up into Evan's division (of only 1 bde, Evan's) and Hood's Division (Hood's and Law's bdes). All the wings bar DH Hill's will cross at White's Ford, whilst DH Hill and his division (Walker still being en route) will be entrusted with an independent mission and cross at Cheek's Ford etc. Indeed, it is DH Hill that leads the crossing of the Potomac. I can find no evidence that DH Hill suborned to Jackson when Jackson crossed, and indeed, since Jackson was injured after being thrown off his horse on the approach to Frederick, it is DH Hill who assumes command of all forces north of the Potomac until Lee crosses. When Lee holds his council of war at Frederick to decide on the direction of march he has 4 commanders with whom he consults; Longstreet, Jackson, DH Hill and Stuart. McLaws' command only crosses the Potomac late in the day, and McLaws is too far away to have reached Frederick for the conference.
If we make the supposition that Lee's army was indeed divided into four fragments, then SO191 is not as radical as some would make out; the only command to be subdivided is DH Hill's. The number of brigades per command (after Longstreet transfers Wilcox) is:
Longstreet: 9
Jackson: 14
DH Hill: 5
McLaws: 10
Walker (detached from DH Hill): 2
This poses a curious question; why did Jackson make out a copy of SO191 for DH Hill? DH Hill was not part of Jackson's command, nor apparently was he ever. That is a question to muse upon another time.
Also of note is that in his report, DH Hill reports his command was ordered:
"On the 13th, I was ordered by General Lee to dispose of my troops so as to prevent the escape of the Yankees from Harper's Ferry, then besieged, and also to guard the pass in the Blue Ridge near Boons-borough. Major-General Stuart reported to me that two brigades only of the Yankees were pursuing us, and that one brigade would be sufficient to hold the pass. I, however, sent the brigades of Garland and Colquitt, and ordered my other three brigades up to the neighborhood of Boonsborough. " (DH Hill's Report)
To approach Boonsborough would involve going through McLaws, however, if Walker were part of Hill's command then an order relayed via Hill would be perfectly in accord with Walker's mission in SO191:
"General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning [12th], Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy. " (SO191.6, parentness mine)
A supposition would be that Walker had failed to reach his objective of the morning of the 12th by the 13th, and Lee was issuing a definite order to Walker to "hurry up" via his immediate superior (Hill).
Thus, moving into the battle of Antietam proper, after the chaos of South Mountain an odd thing happens; the ANV adopts a formation nearly exactly matching the conventions of the seniorities of the 4 "wing commanders" present (assuming they are such), that is Longstreet (1st) on the right, Jackson (2nd) on the left, DH Hill (3rd) in the centre and McLaws (4th) in reserve. This I intend to explore in greater depth later.
Tuesday, 31 March 2009
Just arrived: Reid's America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield 1861-1863
My apologies for the lack of posts, I've been in Denmark running in the Spring Cup with the British Universities (badly).
On my return I find my copy of Reid's America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield 1861-1863 has arrived. A full review will follow, but in the introduction he makes a case that the US experience in Vietnam has influenced their views of the Civil War. To quote a little:
"Perhaps the most striking feature of the Vietnam Syndrome as it has influenced Civil War history is the ease with which so many historians deprecate "risk". Caution, especially in the attack, is praised. The prime assumption underlying such an approach is that defensive-minded measures are inherently more economical in lives. One is tempted to conclude that such an outlook is founded on the idea that the object of military operations is not to gain victory over the enemy but to economize on the loss of human life."
Not something I ever expect to hear from an American author. British authors seem to be rather iconoclastic with the Civil War (notably Paddy Griffith). The author himself states he's retreading the same ground as Hattaway and Jones, but comes to different conclusions.
Oh, and one other thing from the flick through this morning, the maps are really good. No mean feet these days.
I am genuinely excited, and will review it ASAP.
On my return I find my copy of Reid's America's Civil War: The Operational Battlefield 1861-1863 has arrived. A full review will follow, but in the introduction he makes a case that the US experience in Vietnam has influenced their views of the Civil War. To quote a little:
"Perhaps the most striking feature of the Vietnam Syndrome as it has influenced Civil War history is the ease with which so many historians deprecate "risk". Caution, especially in the attack, is praised. The prime assumption underlying such an approach is that defensive-minded measures are inherently more economical in lives. One is tempted to conclude that such an outlook is founded on the idea that the object of military operations is not to gain victory over the enemy but to economize on the loss of human life."
Not something I ever expect to hear from an American author. British authors seem to be rather iconoclastic with the Civil War (notably Paddy Griffith). The author himself states he's retreading the same ground as Hattaway and Jones, but comes to different conclusions.
Oh, and one other thing from the flick through this morning, the maps are really good. No mean feet these days.
I am genuinely excited, and will review it ASAP.
Monday, 23 March 2009
RUSI Journal
I've just found out that several Royal United Services Institute Journals from around the time of the ACW are online. Nosworthy quotes several of the articles contained therein in the first few chapters of his Bloody Crucible of Courage. It's recommended reading if looking for primary material on the military thought of the time.
Saturday, 21 March 2009
Seven Days Confederate Orbat
A simple quote of the whole of Appendix 2C from Harsh’s “Confederate Tide Rising”:
"In his memoirs, Joseph Johnston referred to Lee’s forces on June 26 as “the largest Confederate army that ever fought.” He estimated Lee’s reinforcements as follows: 15,000 from North Carolina, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia and 16,000 from Jackson, for a total of 53,000. When combined with the 73,000 Johnston had on May 31, this would have given Lee 126,000 men. Johnston later admitted his figures were too high. For example, he counted Lawton twice (with Jackson and with Georgia); he included forces that did not arrive until July and August; and he overestimated Holmes by 150%.
Johnston’s claims affronted that plank of the “Lost Cause” myth that insisted the Confederates had always been heavily outnumbered, and his figures were emphatically rejected by Charles Marshal, Jubal Early, Jefferson Davies, the Reverend J. William Jones, and Walter Taylor, who insisted Lee had 80,000 men or fewer. These defenders of Confederate meagreness indulged in a bad habit of mixing apples and oranges.” They used the figure for their own “effectives”, a stripped down statistic, whilst employing “present for duty” figures for the enemy. Their 80,000 may be fairly effective for Lee’s combat effectives, but then it should be compared to the approximately 70,000 McClellan had in the same category.
The total of 112,220 present for duty for the Army of Northern Virginia…. Breaks down as follows:
Attacking Column North of the Chickahominy
Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129
Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099
Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992 "
Now, Harsh is right about the strength to be certain, but like many he's missed wrinkles in the organisation of Lee's Army. In fact the army seems to be organised as follows (and I wish I'd saved my references when doing this....):
Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet's Wing
- Longstreet's Division (RH Anderson commanding)
-- Anderson's (Pickett commanding) Demi-Division (RH Anderson's, Pickett's and Kempers Bdes)
-- Wilcox's Demi-Division (Wilcox's, Pryor's and Featherstone's bdes)
- AP Hill's Division
-- Field's Demi-Division (Field's, Gregg's and JR Anderson's bdes)
-- Branch's Demi-Division (Branch's, Archer's and Pender's bdes)
- DH Hill's Division
-- Ripley's Demi-Division (Ripley's, Garland's and Rodeo's (GB Anderson's) bdes)
-- Rodes' Demi-Division (Rodes' and Rain's (Colquit's) bdes)
- Stuart's Cavalry Brigade (which operated generally as two demi-brigades)
Jackson's Wing
- Jackson's (Winder commanding) Division (Winder's, Hampton's, JR Jones and Lawton's bdes)
- Ewell's Division (Elzey, Trimble and Taylor's bdes, and the Maryland Line)
- Whiting's Division (Hood's and Law's bdes)
- 2nd Virginia Cavalry
Magruder's Wing
- DR Jones' Division (Toombs' and GT Anderson's bdes)
- McLaws' Division (Semmes' and Kershaw's bdes)
- Magruder's (Cobb commanding) Division (Cobb's and Griffith's bdes)
Huger's Division (Mahone's, Wright's and Armistead's bdes)
Holmes' Division (Ransom's, Daniel's, Walker's and Wise's bdes)
Now, why this structure? Well, the rank order of Major Generals is:
1. Longstreet (07 Oct 61)
2. Holmes (07 Oct 61)
3. Jackson (07 Oct 61)
4. Magruder (07 Oct 61)
5. Huger (07 Oct 61)
6. Ewell (24 Jan 62)
7. DH Hill (26 Mar 62)
8. AP Hill (26 Mar 62)
9. McLaws (23 May 62)
The five Major Generals of 7th October 1861 can be considered to be “senior Major Generals”, while the four later promotions to be “junior Major Generals”. GW Smith, who had recently been recalled to Richmond, was senior to all the Maj Gens present (19 Sep 61) but was now out of the picture. Thus Lee had five General Officers who he couldn’t suborn to their peers, thus at best Lee could reduce his infantry into five fractions.
Leaving Holmes and Huger in command of their divisions, Lee (or in Jackson's case, left) have the other three Snr Maj Gens a command each, effectively a Corps, reducing his required command span from 11 to 5 infantry commands. Ignoring Jackson, his remaining commands could be described as:
Magruder: Centre Wing
Longstreet: Left Wing
Huger: Right Wing
Holmes: Reserve
Which approximates the standard method of deployment of the day.
As an aside, I personally verified several errors in the organisation of the Confederate artillery from the reports of various commanders. Most are minor (Lawton's bde arty being listed as divisional for example), but in the case of AP Hill the OR's do not match the reports. The correct organisation is:
9 batteries appear on the OR to be organised as a single battalion under Maj RL Walker (who was absent sick during the Seven Days, Col Lewis Coleman commanded in lieu). However, closer inspection of the records does reveal that the batteries did maneuver with an assigned brigade, and hence the following is more appropriate. Battery assignments are:
1st Maryland (Andrew’s): Pender’s Brigade
Charleston German (Bachman’s): Artillery Battalion
Fredericksburg (Braxton’s): Archer’s Brigade
Richmond (Crenshaw’s): Gregg’s Brigade
Letcher (Davidson’s): Artillery Battalion
Johnson’s: Branch’s Brigade
Pee Dee (McIntosh’s): JR Anderson’s Brigade
Purcell (Pegram’s): Field’s Brigade
Branch (Latham’s): Artillery Battalion
"In his memoirs, Joseph Johnston referred to Lee’s forces on June 26 as “the largest Confederate army that ever fought.” He estimated Lee’s reinforcements as follows: 15,000 from North Carolina, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia and 16,000 from Jackson, for a total of 53,000. When combined with the 73,000 Johnston had on May 31, this would have given Lee 126,000 men. Johnston later admitted his figures were too high. For example, he counted Lawton twice (with Jackson and with Georgia); he included forces that did not arrive until July and August; and he overestimated Holmes by 150%.
Johnston’s claims affronted that plank of the “Lost Cause” myth that insisted the Confederates had always been heavily outnumbered, and his figures were emphatically rejected by Charles Marshal, Jubal Early, Jefferson Davies, the Reverend J. William Jones, and Walter Taylor, who insisted Lee had 80,000 men or fewer. These defenders of Confederate meagreness indulged in a bad habit of mixing apples and oranges.” They used the figure for their own “effectives”, a stripped down statistic, whilst employing “present for duty” figures for the enemy. Their 80,000 may be fairly effective for Lee’s combat effectives, but then it should be compared to the approximately 70,000 McClellan had in the same category.
The total of 112,220 present for duty for the Army of Northern Virginia…. Breaks down as follows:
Attacking Column North of the Chickahominy
Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129
Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099
Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992 "
Now, Harsh is right about the strength to be certain, but like many he's missed wrinkles in the organisation of Lee's Army. In fact the army seems to be organised as follows (and I wish I'd saved my references when doing this....):
Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet's Wing
- Longstreet's Division (RH Anderson commanding)
-- Anderson's (Pickett commanding) Demi-Division (RH Anderson's, Pickett's and Kempers Bdes)
-- Wilcox's Demi-Division (Wilcox's, Pryor's and Featherstone's bdes)
- AP Hill's Division
-- Field's Demi-Division (Field's, Gregg's and JR Anderson's bdes)
-- Branch's Demi-Division (Branch's, Archer's and Pender's bdes)
- DH Hill's Division
-- Ripley's Demi-Division (Ripley's, Garland's and Rodeo's (GB Anderson's) bdes)
-- Rodes' Demi-Division (Rodes' and Rain's (Colquit's) bdes)
- Stuart's Cavalry Brigade (which operated generally as two demi-brigades)
Jackson's Wing
- Jackson's (Winder commanding) Division (Winder's, Hampton's, JR Jones and Lawton's bdes)
- Ewell's Division (Elzey, Trimble and Taylor's bdes, and the Maryland Line)
- Whiting's Division (Hood's and Law's bdes)
- 2nd Virginia Cavalry
Magruder's Wing
- DR Jones' Division (Toombs' and GT Anderson's bdes)
- McLaws' Division (Semmes' and Kershaw's bdes)
- Magruder's (Cobb commanding) Division (Cobb's and Griffith's bdes)
Huger's Division (Mahone's, Wright's and Armistead's bdes)
Holmes' Division (Ransom's, Daniel's, Walker's and Wise's bdes)
Now, why this structure? Well, the rank order of Major Generals is:
1. Longstreet (07 Oct 61)
2. Holmes (07 Oct 61)
3. Jackson (07 Oct 61)
4. Magruder (07 Oct 61)
5. Huger (07 Oct 61)
6. Ewell (24 Jan 62)
7. DH Hill (26 Mar 62)
8. AP Hill (26 Mar 62)
9. McLaws (23 May 62)
The five Major Generals of 7th October 1861 can be considered to be “senior Major Generals”, while the four later promotions to be “junior Major Generals”. GW Smith, who had recently been recalled to Richmond, was senior to all the Maj Gens present (19 Sep 61) but was now out of the picture. Thus Lee had five General Officers who he couldn’t suborn to their peers, thus at best Lee could reduce his infantry into five fractions.
Leaving Holmes and Huger in command of their divisions, Lee (or in Jackson's case, left) have the other three Snr Maj Gens a command each, effectively a Corps, reducing his required command span from 11 to 5 infantry commands. Ignoring Jackson, his remaining commands could be described as:
Magruder: Centre Wing
Longstreet: Left Wing
Huger: Right Wing
Holmes: Reserve
Which approximates the standard method of deployment of the day.
As an aside, I personally verified several errors in the organisation of the Confederate artillery from the reports of various commanders. Most are minor (Lawton's bde arty being listed as divisional for example), but in the case of AP Hill the OR's do not match the reports. The correct organisation is:
9 batteries appear on the OR to be organised as a single battalion under Maj RL Walker (who was absent sick during the Seven Days, Col Lewis Coleman commanded in lieu). However, closer inspection of the records does reveal that the batteries did maneuver with an assigned brigade, and hence the following is more appropriate. Battery assignments are:
1st Maryland (Andrew’s): Pender’s Brigade
Charleston German (Bachman’s): Artillery Battalion
Fredericksburg (Braxton’s): Archer’s Brigade
Richmond (Crenshaw’s): Gregg’s Brigade
Letcher (Davidson’s): Artillery Battalion
Johnson’s: Branch’s Brigade
Pee Dee (McIntosh’s): JR Anderson’s Brigade
Purcell (Pegram’s): Field’s Brigade
Branch (Latham’s): Artillery Battalion
On the Rifle-Musket
Brent Nosworthy in his Bloody Crucible of Courage does some analysis on the hit rates of troops with muskets and rifled muskets. This is a simple restatement of an old argument, and does show an approximate doubling in the hit rate comparing musket armed Napoleonic troops (typically hitting around 1 round in 800) with more modern troops. Perhaps 1 round in 400 expended in a civil war battle took effect.
This ignores the effects of these rifle-muskets in the hand of then contemporary European troops. In Strachan’s Waterloo to Balaklava (pp 54) he references a 1862 USJ article pointing out that the hit rates of rifle armed troops at Alma and Inkerman were 1 in 16. The current author, with access to ammunition expenditure at Inkerman (in Mercer’s Give Them a Volley and Charge) has personally calculated 18 rounds were expended for every Russian soldier hit. However, there are caveats, including this figure counting hits from artillery and bayonet fighting (and at Inkerman there was a lot of bayonet fighting), and the fact that the dense Russian columns often suffered multiple casualties from a single bullet (the M1851 Minie Rifle would pierce the torsos of 4 men at 500 yards before stopping, it was a very powerful weapon).
At the same time, the author has found references for a 1 in 7 hit rate for a single volley fired by the 93rd at the Alma fired at 60 yards. The shock of this single volley completely disrupted the Russians and psychologically unhinged them to such an extent that the entire regiment broke faced with the wall of Scots bayonets.
Meanwhile, at Inkerman, I have reference (With the Connaught Rangers) to the 88th shaking out into a skirmish line and completely dominating a Russian gunline at 800 yards with accurate rifle fire. This is not an isolated event and from such events the idea that artillery couldn’t operate in close support of the infantry evolved, with tragic consequences in the American War.
As an aside, Bilby’s Small Arms at Gettysburg has an interesting couple of pages on the way the British trained their infantry to shoot. Something he missed is the psychological implications of their training methods. As he notes, the British fired at targets painted with accurate dipictions of infantrymen. This gives another reason for the effectiveness of British riflemen; they were conditioned to kill. As SLA Marshal discovered (Men Against Fire) and Gorman elaborated on (On Killing) most (98% of) human beings have an inbuilt aversion to killing other humans. The best method of conditioning to kill is to bypass higher consciousness entirely, making the act of killing a spinal cord initiated action. This means repetitive practice with a realistic simulation, which for rifle fire means shooting at realistic targets, not bullseyes.
However, even subtracting out factors such as these, it is fairly obvious that the British regular hit with at least ten times (10x) the regularity of a typical American Volunteer. Taken into Lanchester Square Law this would suggest a full strength (peace establishment) British battalion of 800 bayonets (incidently, roughly identical in size to a ACW brigade) would actually win a firefight with the entire Army of the Potomac. This is of course utter silliness, but is suggestive of the gulf between the combat effectiveness of hard trained regular infantry.
This ignores the effects of these rifle-muskets in the hand of then contemporary European troops. In Strachan’s Waterloo to Balaklava (pp 54) he references a 1862 USJ article pointing out that the hit rates of rifle armed troops at Alma and Inkerman were 1 in 16. The current author, with access to ammunition expenditure at Inkerman (in Mercer’s Give Them a Volley and Charge) has personally calculated 18 rounds were expended for every Russian soldier hit. However, there are caveats, including this figure counting hits from artillery and bayonet fighting (and at Inkerman there was a lot of bayonet fighting), and the fact that the dense Russian columns often suffered multiple casualties from a single bullet (the M1851 Minie Rifle would pierce the torsos of 4 men at 500 yards before stopping, it was a very powerful weapon).
At the same time, the author has found references for a 1 in 7 hit rate for a single volley fired by the 93rd at the Alma fired at 60 yards. The shock of this single volley completely disrupted the Russians and psychologically unhinged them to such an extent that the entire regiment broke faced with the wall of Scots bayonets.
Meanwhile, at Inkerman, I have reference (With the Connaught Rangers) to the 88th shaking out into a skirmish line and completely dominating a Russian gunline at 800 yards with accurate rifle fire. This is not an isolated event and from such events the idea that artillery couldn’t operate in close support of the infantry evolved, with tragic consequences in the American War.
As an aside, Bilby’s Small Arms at Gettysburg has an interesting couple of pages on the way the British trained their infantry to shoot. Something he missed is the psychological implications of their training methods. As he notes, the British fired at targets painted with accurate dipictions of infantrymen. This gives another reason for the effectiveness of British riflemen; they were conditioned to kill. As SLA Marshal discovered (Men Against Fire) and Gorman elaborated on (On Killing) most (98% of) human beings have an inbuilt aversion to killing other humans. The best method of conditioning to kill is to bypass higher consciousness entirely, making the act of killing a spinal cord initiated action. This means repetitive practice with a realistic simulation, which for rifle fire means shooting at realistic targets, not bullseyes.
However, even subtracting out factors such as these, it is fairly obvious that the British regular hit with at least ten times (10x) the regularity of a typical American Volunteer. Taken into Lanchester Square Law this would suggest a full strength (peace establishment) British battalion of 800 bayonets (incidently, roughly identical in size to a ACW brigade) would actually win a firefight with the entire Army of the Potomac. This is of course utter silliness, but is suggestive of the gulf between the combat effectiveness of hard trained regular infantry.
Friday, 20 March 2009
Strength of Forces in, or sent to, Canada in December 1861
In Canada, 1st December
1 Field Battery, RA: 7+213 (7 officers and 213 other ranks)
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 16+227
1st Bn, 17th Foot: 40+827
30th Foot: 39+857
47th Foot: 39+849
4th Bn, 60th Rifles: 40+858
Royal Canadian Rifles: 44+1,047
Army Hospital Corps: 12 men
Commissariat: 1 officer
In Nova Scotia, 1st December
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 9+207
Company, Royal Engineers: 5+98
1st Bn, 16th Foot: 40+853
63rd Foot: 40+837 (ordered to march overland to Canada)
Royal Newfoundland Companies: 8+181
Commissariat: 7
Dispatched to travel via St Lawrence to Canada, December 1861
E and F/4 Field Batteries, RA: 14+526
1 Garrison Battery, RA: 8+119
15th and 18th Companies, RE: 10+238
1st Bn, Rifle Brigade: 40+831
1st Bn, 16th Foot: 37+778
1st Bn, Grenadier Guards: 35+863
2nd Bn, Scots Fusilier Guards: 35+862
Commissariat: 3+104
Army Hospital Corps: 45
Military Store Dept.: 4+2
General Officers and Staff: 35+46
Dispatched to travel overland via Nova Scotia to Canada, December 1861
1 Field Battery, RA: 7+263
3 Garrison Batteries, RA: 8+351
4th Company, RE: 5+120
62nd Foot: 49+853
3rd Bn, Military Train: 16+306
Dispatched to Nova Scotia, December 1861
A/8 Field Battery, RA: 7+255
3 Garrison Batteries: 33+595
2nd Bn, 16th Foot: 39+868
2nd Bn, 17th Foot: 879
Army Hospital Corps: 6 men
Military Stores Dept.: 2 officers
General Officers and Staff: 31+30
Dispatched to New Brunswick, December 1861
G/4 Field Battery, RA: 7+255
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 12+234
1st Bn, 15th Foot: 37+867
96th Foot: 37+873
Army Hospital Corps: 40 men
Military Stores Dept.: 3+2
General Officers and Staff: 58+11
Dispatched to Newfoundland, December 1861
1 Garrison Battery, RA: 4+116
1 Field Battery, RA: 7+213 (7 officers and 213 other ranks)
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 16+227
1st Bn, 17th Foot: 40+827
30th Foot: 39+857
47th Foot: 39+849
4th Bn, 60th Rifles: 40+858
Royal Canadian Rifles: 44+1,047
Army Hospital Corps: 12 men
Commissariat: 1 officer
In Nova Scotia, 1st December
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 9+207
Company, Royal Engineers: 5+98
1st Bn, 16th Foot: 40+853
63rd Foot: 40+837 (ordered to march overland to Canada)
Royal Newfoundland Companies: 8+181
Commissariat: 7
Dispatched to travel via St Lawrence to Canada, December 1861
E and F/4 Field Batteries, RA: 14+526
1 Garrison Battery, RA: 8+119
15th and 18th Companies, RE: 10+238
1st Bn, Rifle Brigade: 40+831
1st Bn, 16th Foot: 37+778
1st Bn, Grenadier Guards: 35+863
2nd Bn, Scots Fusilier Guards: 35+862
Commissariat: 3+104
Army Hospital Corps: 45
Military Store Dept.: 4+2
General Officers and Staff: 35+46
Dispatched to travel overland via Nova Scotia to Canada, December 1861
1 Field Battery, RA: 7+263
3 Garrison Batteries, RA: 8+351
4th Company, RE: 5+120
62nd Foot: 49+853
3rd Bn, Military Train: 16+306
Dispatched to Nova Scotia, December 1861
A/8 Field Battery, RA: 7+255
3 Garrison Batteries: 33+595
2nd Bn, 16th Foot: 39+868
2nd Bn, 17th Foot: 879
Army Hospital Corps: 6 men
Military Stores Dept.: 2 officers
General Officers and Staff: 31+30
Dispatched to New Brunswick, December 1861
G/4 Field Battery, RA: 7+255
2 Garrison Batteries, RA: 12+234
1st Bn, 15th Foot: 37+867
96th Foot: 37+873
Army Hospital Corps: 40 men
Military Stores Dept.: 3+2
General Officers and Staff: 58+11
Dispatched to Newfoundland, December 1861
1 Garrison Battery, RA: 4+116
Establishment of the Cavalry and Infantry of the British Army leading upto, and during the Crimean War.
The following is all drawn from the Establishment Books, which are held as WO103 in the National Archives. This book is handwritten and is the official statement of regimental establishments. All the following is drawn from WO103/2, covering 1849-1862.
1853-4
Cavalry
• 1st Life Guards (1LG), 2LG, Royal Horse Guards: 351 ea
• 1st Dragoon Guards (1DG): 438
• 2nd – 7th DG: 328 ea
• 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons: 328 ea
• 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 13th, 16th and 17th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 9th, 10th, 14th and 15th Light Dragoons: 674
• 12th Light Dragoons: 428
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 2,080
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 1,280 ea
Line
• 1/1st, 2/1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 30th – 36th , 38th – 42nd, 46th – 50th, 52nd, 54th, 55th, 57th, 58th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th – 69th, 72nd, 77th, 79th, 81st, 82nd, 85th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 92nd 93rd, 95th, 97th and 2/RB: 850 ea
• 2nd, 6th, 15th, 43rd, 59th, 2/60th, 73rd, 74th and 1/RB: 900 ea
• 5th, 8th, 10th, 18th, 20th, 22nd – 25th, 29th, 32nd, 37th, 44th, 45th, 51st, 53rd, 56th, 1/60th, 61st, 64th, 70th, 75th, 76th, 78th, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 86th, 87th, 94th, 96th, 98th and 99th: 1,000 ea
• 12th, 23rd, 71st and 91st: 1,200 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Cape Corps: 960
• Ceylon Regiment: 1,650
• Maltese: 564
• Canadian Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Ceylon Invalids: 150
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
Recapitulation
• Cavalry: 10,191
• Foot Guards: 4,640
• Infantry of the Line: 94,200
• West India Regiments: 3,000
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Colonial Corps: 4,614
• Total: 116,945
1854-5
New Establishment, 11th May 1854
Cavalry
• 1st Life Guards (1LG), 2LG, Royal Horse Guards: 351 ea
• 1st Dragoon Guards (1DG): 438
• 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 7th DG: 328 ea
• 4th and 5th DG: 428 ea
• 1st and 6th Dragoons: 428 ea
• 2nd Dragoons: 328 ea
• 3rd, 4th, 7th, 15th and 16th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 8th, 11th, 13th and 17th Light Dragoons: 428
• 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Light Dragoons: 674
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 3,200
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 2,200
Line
• 1/1st, 4th, 7th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 63rd, 77th, 88th, 93rd, 95th, 97th, 1/RB and 2/RB: 1,400 ea
• 2/1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 11th – 18th, 22nd, 26th, 27th, 31st, 35th, 36th, 37th, 39th, 40th, 45th, 46th, 48th, 51st, 54th, 56th – 59th, 2/60th, 62nd, 65th – 69th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 76th, 82nd, 85th, 89th – 92nd, 96th and 99th: 1,200 ea
• 8th, 24th, 25th, 29th, 32nd, 43rd, 52nd, 53rd, 1/60th, 61st, 64th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 80th, 81st, 83rd, 84th, 86th, 87th, 94th and 98th: 1,000 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Ceylon Rifles: 1,400
• Ceylon Invalids: 153
• Cape Mounted Rifles: 960
• Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
• Maltese Fencibles: 564
Recapitulation
• Cavalry: 10,891
• Foot Guards: 7,600
• Infantry of the Line: 124,400
• Colonial Corps: 7,664
• Of the augmentations of 28th February and 3rd May to be appropriated: 3,500
• Total: 154,055
1855-6
New Establishment, 29th January 1855
Cavalry
• 1LG, 2LG and RHG: 351 ea
• 1DG: 438
• 2, 3, 6 and 7 DG: 328 ea
• 4 and 5 DG: 639 ea
• 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons: 639
• 3rd, 7th, 15th and 16th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 4th, 8th, 11th, 13th and 17th Light Dragoons: 639 ea
• 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Light Dragoons: 674 ea
• Mounted Staff Corps: 54
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 3,200
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 2,200
Line
• 1/1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 17th – 21st, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 39th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, 46th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 55th, 57th, 3/60th, 62nd, 63rd, 68th, 71st, 77th, 79th, 80th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 97th, 1/RB, 2/RB and 3/RB: 2,000 ea
• 2/1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 22nd, 26th, 31st, 36th, 37th, 40th, 45th, 48th, 54th, 56th, 58th, 59th, 2/60th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 69th, 72nd, 73rd, 76th, 82nd, 85th, 91st, 92nd, 96th and 99th: 1,200 ea
• 8th, 10th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 29th, 35th, 43rd, 52nd, 53rd, 61st, 64th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 78th, 81st, 83rd, 86th and 98th: 1,000 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Ceylon Rifle Regiment: 1,400
• Ceylon Invalids: 153
• Cape Mounted Rifles: 960
• Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
• Royal Malta Fencibles: 564
Discussion
The Times reported the move upto the higher establishments as the establishment of a 2nd Battalion for each Regiment, but this is not substanciated here. Indeed, Lord Panmure’s Papers show that the 2,000 R&F establishment consisted of 20 companies, 4 of whom were with the depot at home, 4 of whom were a reserve at Malta and 12 with the service battalion.
This is interesting, the service battalions started with 8 companies each, then were increased to 10, then 12, and in 1856, the reserve battalion was due to be sent to the Crimea raising the service battalion to 16 companies. I wonder whether they would have finally been divided into 2 battalion regiments at that point.
1853-4
Cavalry
• 1st Life Guards (1LG), 2LG, Royal Horse Guards: 351 ea
• 1st Dragoon Guards (1DG): 438
• 2nd – 7th DG: 328 ea
• 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons: 328 ea
• 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 13th, 16th and 17th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 9th, 10th, 14th and 15th Light Dragoons: 674
• 12th Light Dragoons: 428
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 2,080
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 1,280 ea
Line
• 1/1st, 2/1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 21st, 26th, 27th, 28th, 30th – 36th , 38th – 42nd, 46th – 50th, 52nd, 54th, 55th, 57th, 58th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th – 69th, 72nd, 77th, 79th, 81st, 82nd, 85th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 92nd 93rd, 95th, 97th and 2/RB: 850 ea
• 2nd, 6th, 15th, 43rd, 59th, 2/60th, 73rd, 74th and 1/RB: 900 ea
• 5th, 8th, 10th, 18th, 20th, 22nd – 25th, 29th, 32nd, 37th, 44th, 45th, 51st, 53rd, 56th, 1/60th, 61st, 64th, 70th, 75th, 76th, 78th, 80th, 83rd, 84th, 86th, 87th, 94th, 96th, 98th and 99th: 1,000 ea
• 12th, 23rd, 71st and 91st: 1,200 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Cape Corps: 960
• Ceylon Regiment: 1,650
• Maltese: 564
• Canadian Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Ceylon Invalids: 150
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
Recapitulation
• Cavalry: 10,191
• Foot Guards: 4,640
• Infantry of the Line: 94,200
• West India Regiments: 3,000
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Colonial Corps: 4,614
• Total: 116,945
1854-5
New Establishment, 11th May 1854
Cavalry
• 1st Life Guards (1LG), 2LG, Royal Horse Guards: 351 ea
• 1st Dragoon Guards (1DG): 438
• 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 7th DG: 328 ea
• 4th and 5th DG: 428 ea
• 1st and 6th Dragoons: 428 ea
• 2nd Dragoons: 328 ea
• 3rd, 4th, 7th, 15th and 16th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 8th, 11th, 13th and 17th Light Dragoons: 428
• 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Light Dragoons: 674
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 3,200
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 2,200
Line
• 1/1st, 4th, 7th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 55th, 63rd, 77th, 88th, 93rd, 95th, 97th, 1/RB and 2/RB: 1,400 ea
• 2/1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 11th – 18th, 22nd, 26th, 27th, 31st, 35th, 36th, 37th, 39th, 40th, 45th, 46th, 48th, 51st, 54th, 56th – 59th, 2/60th, 62nd, 65th – 69th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 76th, 82nd, 85th, 89th – 92nd, 96th and 99th: 1,200 ea
• 8th, 24th, 25th, 29th, 32nd, 43rd, 52nd, 53rd, 1/60th, 61st, 64th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 80th, 81st, 83rd, 84th, 86th, 87th, 94th and 98th: 1,000 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Ceylon Rifles: 1,400
• Ceylon Invalids: 153
• Cape Mounted Rifles: 960
• Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
• Maltese Fencibles: 564
Recapitulation
• Cavalry: 10,891
• Foot Guards: 7,600
• Infantry of the Line: 124,400
• Colonial Corps: 7,664
• Of the augmentations of 28th February and 3rd May to be appropriated: 3,500
• Total: 154,055
1855-6
New Establishment, 29th January 1855
Cavalry
• 1LG, 2LG and RHG: 351 ea
• 1DG: 438
• 2, 3, 6 and 7 DG: 328 ea
• 4 and 5 DG: 639 ea
• 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons: 639
• 3rd, 7th, 15th and 16th Light Dragoons: 328 ea
• 4th, 8th, 11th, 13th and 17th Light Dragoons: 639 ea
• 9th, 10th, 12th and 14th Light Dragoons: 674 ea
• Mounted Staff Corps: 54
Infantry
Guards
• Foot Guards, 1st Regiment: 3,200
• Foot Guards, 2nd and 3rd Regiments: 2,200
Line
• 1/1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 17th – 21st, 23rd, 28th, 30th, 33rd, 34th, 38th, 39th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, 46th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 55th, 57th, 3/60th, 62nd, 63rd, 68th, 71st, 77th, 79th, 80th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 97th, 1/RB, 2/RB and 3/RB: 2,000 ea
• 2/1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 22nd, 26th, 31st, 36th, 37th, 40th, 45th, 48th, 54th, 56th, 58th, 59th, 2/60th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 69th, 72nd, 73rd, 76th, 82nd, 85th, 91st, 92nd, 96th and 99th: 1,200 ea
• 8th, 10th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 29th, 35th, 43rd, 52nd, 53rd, 61st, 64th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 78th, 81st, 83rd, 86th and 98th: 1,000 ea
Colonial Corps
• 1st, 2nd and 3rd West India Regiments: 1,000 ea
• Ceylon Rifle Regiment: 1,400
• Ceylon Invalids: 153
• Cape Mounted Rifles: 960
• Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment: 600
• St. Helena Regiment: 375
• Royal Newfoundland Companies: 300
• Gold Coast Corps: 312
• Royal Malta Fencibles: 564
Discussion
The Times reported the move upto the higher establishments as the establishment of a 2nd Battalion for each Regiment, but this is not substanciated here. Indeed, Lord Panmure’s Papers show that the 2,000 R&F establishment consisted of 20 companies, 4 of whom were with the depot at home, 4 of whom were a reserve at Malta and 12 with the service battalion.
This is interesting, the service battalions started with 8 companies each, then were increased to 10, then 12, and in 1856, the reserve battalion was due to be sent to the Crimea raising the service battalion to 16 companies. I wonder whether they would have finally been divided into 2 battalion regiments at that point.
British vs French 1793-1815
Battles between French and British Forces in the French Revolutionary Wars and their victors:
1st Coalition
Battle of Hondschoote French Victory
Battle of Beaumont-en Cabresis Allied Victory
Battle of Tourcoing French Victory
Battle of Tournai Allied Victory
Egyptian Campaign
2nd Battle of Abukir British Victory
Battle of Canopus British Victory
2nd Coalition
1st Battle of Bergen-Op-Zoom French Victory
2nd Battle of Bergen-Op-Zoom Allied Victory
Battle of Castricum French Victory
Peninsula War
Battle of Roliça Allied Victory
Battle of Vimeiro Allied Victory
Battle of Coruña Allied Victory
2nd Battle of Oporto Allied Victory
Battle of Talavera Allied Victory
Battle of Bussaco Allied Victory
Battle of Barrosa Allied Victory
Battle of Sabugal Allied Victory
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro Allied Victory
Battle of Albuera Allied Pyrrhic Victory
Battle of Arroyo dos Molinos Allied Victory
Battle of Salamanca Allied Victory
Battle of Garcia Hernandez Allied Victory
Battle of Tordesillas French Victory
Battle of Castalla Allied Victory
Battle of Vittoria Allied Victory
Battle of Roncesvalles French Victory
Battle of Maya French Victory
1st Battle of Sorauren Allied Victory
2nd Battle of Sorauren Allied Victory
Battle of Lizaso undecided
Battle of San Marcial Allied Victory
Battle of Nivelle Allied Victory
Battle of Villefranque Allied Victory
Battle of Nive Allied Victory
Battle of St. Pierre Allied Victory
Battle of Orthez Allied Victory
Battle of Toulouse Allied Victory
Battle of Bayonne undecided
The Hundred Days
Battle of Quatre Bras Allied Victory
Battle of Waterloo Allied Victory
Total: 30 British and Allied victories, 1 Allied pyrrhic victory, 2 undecided and 7 French victories
1st Coalition
Battle of Hondschoote French Victory
Battle of Beaumont-en Cabresis Allied Victory
Battle of Tourcoing French Victory
Battle of Tournai Allied Victory
Egyptian Campaign
2nd Battle of Abukir British Victory
Battle of Canopus British Victory
2nd Coalition
1st Battle of Bergen-Op-Zoom French Victory
2nd Battle of Bergen-Op-Zoom Allied Victory
Battle of Castricum French Victory
Peninsula War
Battle of Roliça Allied Victory
Battle of Vimeiro Allied Victory
Battle of Coruña Allied Victory
2nd Battle of Oporto Allied Victory
Battle of Talavera Allied Victory
Battle of Bussaco Allied Victory
Battle of Barrosa Allied Victory
Battle of Sabugal Allied Victory
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro Allied Victory
Battle of Albuera Allied Pyrrhic Victory
Battle of Arroyo dos Molinos Allied Victory
Battle of Salamanca Allied Victory
Battle of Garcia Hernandez Allied Victory
Battle of Tordesillas French Victory
Battle of Castalla Allied Victory
Battle of Vittoria Allied Victory
Battle of Roncesvalles French Victory
Battle of Maya French Victory
1st Battle of Sorauren Allied Victory
2nd Battle of Sorauren Allied Victory
Battle of Lizaso undecided
Battle of San Marcial Allied Victory
Battle of Nivelle Allied Victory
Battle of Villefranque Allied Victory
Battle of Nive Allied Victory
Battle of St. Pierre Allied Victory
Battle of Orthez Allied Victory
Battle of Toulouse Allied Victory
Battle of Bayonne undecided
The Hundred Days
Battle of Quatre Bras Allied Victory
Battle of Waterloo Allied Victory
Total: 30 British and Allied victories, 1 Allied pyrrhic victory, 2 undecided and 7 French victories
Some Napoleonic Data: British Regimental Establishments
I've got a lot of random data on my HD and I'm just going to post it.
British Regimental Establishment
25th December 1806
Taken from WO/103/1 in the British National Archives. There is no return in the list for the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, or any Guards Regiment.
Note the establishments are for Rank and File men only. That is Privates and Corporals in the line of battle only. Of note is that establishments are set based on actual strength on Christmas Day, a battalions strength is set to the nearest establishment, rounded up.
Cavalry
Royal Horse Guards: 560
Dragoon Guards
1st: 900
2nd – 7th: 800
Light Dragoons
1st – 7th, 9th – 18th, 20th, 21st and 23rd: 800
8th, 19th, 22nd, 24th and 25th: 600
King’s German Legion
1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Dragoons: 608
Infantry
Units separated by commas (,) are different battalions of the same unit, with no gaps in the numbering. Hence the 1st Foot has a 1st Bn of 800, a 2nd Bn of 800, a 3rd of 600 etc.
The two with question marks (?) were slightly chopped of when I copied, and may be 600 and 1,200 respectively, but I think they’re right.
Infantry of the Line
1st Foot: 800, 800, 600, 400
2nd: 600
3rd: 1,000, 400
4th: 1,000, 400
5th: 1,000, 600
6th: 1,000, 600
7th: 800, 400
8th: 800, 400
9th: 1,000, 400
10th: 800, 400
11th: 600
12th: 1,000
13th: 800
14th: 1,000, 400
15th: 800,400
16th: 800
17th: 1,208
18th: 1,000, 600
19th: 608
20th: 1,000
21st: 1,000, 400
22nd: 1,008
23rd: 800, 400
24th: 800, 400
25th: 800 (?), 400
26th: 800, 400
27th: 1,000, 1,000, 400
28th: 1,000, 600
29th: 800
30th: 1,200, 600
31st: 1,000, 600
32nd: 800, 400
33rd: 1,008
34th: 1,000, 600
35th: 1,000, 600
36th: 1,000, 400
37th: 800
38th: 1,000, 600
39th: 1,000, 600
40th: 1,000, 400
41st: 1,000, 400
42nd: 1,000, 400
43rd: 1,000, 600
44th: 800, 600
45th: 800, 400
46th: 800
47th: 1,000, 400
48th: 800, 400
49th: 800
50th: 800, 400
51st: 808
52nd: 1,000 (?), 800
53rd: 1,000, 400
54th: 800
55th: 800
56th: 1,000, 800
57th: 800, 400
58th: 1,000, 600
59th: 1,000, 400
60th: 800, 800, 1,000, 800, 800, 800
61st: 1,000, 400
62nd: 800, 400
63rd: 800, 400
64th: 800
65th: 1,008
66th: 800, 600
67th: 1,200, 600
68th: 600
69th: 1,000, 400
70th: 800
71st: 1,000, 400
72nd: 800, 400
73rd: 800
74th: 800
75th: 800
76th: 800
77th: 1,008
78th: 808, 800
79th: 800, 800
80th: 800
81st: 800, 600
82nd: 800, 400
83rd: 800, 600
84th: 800
85th: 800
86th: 1,008
87th: 1,000, 800
88th: 800, 400
89th: 800, 400
90th: 800, 400
91st: 800, 400
92nd: 1,000, 600
93rd: 800
94th: 1,008
95th: 1,000, 1,000
96th: 800, 400
97th: 800
98th: 800
99th: 800
100th: 600
101st 800
West India Regiments
1st – 8th West India: 1,000
Garrison Battalions
1st – 9th Garrison Battalions: 1,000
Royal Veteran Battalions
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Royal Veteran Battalions: 650
4th and 7th: 1,000
Miscellaneous
Royal Staff Corps: 400
New South Wales Corps: 800
Royal African Corps: 800
Royal West India Rangers: 800
Champagne’s Regiment: 1,200
Ramsay’s Regiment: 1,200
Baillie’s Regiment: 1,200
York Light Infantry Volunteers: 800
Corsican Rangers: 1,000
Chasseurs Brittaniques: 800
Watteville’s Regiment: 1,000
Dillon’s Regiment: 800
De Rolle’s Regiment: 800
De Meuron’s Regiment: 400
Royal Regiment of Malta: 1,000
[unintelligible regiment of 800, struck through, Froburg's Levy]
Garrison Company, West Indies: 275
Newfoundland Fencibles: 600
New Brunswick Fencibles: 600
Nova Scotia Fencibles: 600
Canadian Fencibles: - (no return?)
Manx Fencibles: 444
Cape Regiment: 600
Royal Wagon Corps: 200
King’s German Legion Infantry
(also, Horse Artillery: 372 and Foot Artillery: 630)
1st and 2nd Light, 1st – 8th Line: 800
Garrison Company: 50
Total: 203,683
British Regimental Establishment
25th December 1806
Taken from WO/103/1 in the British National Archives. There is no return in the list for the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, or any Guards Regiment.
Note the establishments are for Rank and File men only. That is Privates and Corporals in the line of battle only. Of note is that establishments are set based on actual strength on Christmas Day, a battalions strength is set to the nearest establishment, rounded up.
Cavalry
Royal Horse Guards: 560
Dragoon Guards
1st: 900
2nd – 7th: 800
Light Dragoons
1st – 7th, 9th – 18th, 20th, 21st and 23rd: 800
8th, 19th, 22nd, 24th and 25th: 600
King’s German Legion
1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Dragoons: 608
Infantry
Units separated by commas (,) are different battalions of the same unit, with no gaps in the numbering. Hence the 1st Foot has a 1st Bn of 800, a 2nd Bn of 800, a 3rd of 600 etc.
The two with question marks (?) were slightly chopped of when I copied, and may be 600 and 1,200 respectively, but I think they’re right.
Infantry of the Line
1st Foot: 800, 800, 600, 400
2nd: 600
3rd: 1,000, 400
4th: 1,000, 400
5th: 1,000, 600
6th: 1,000, 600
7th: 800, 400
8th: 800, 400
9th: 1,000, 400
10th: 800, 400
11th: 600
12th: 1,000
13th: 800
14th: 1,000, 400
15th: 800,400
16th: 800
17th: 1,208
18th: 1,000, 600
19th: 608
20th: 1,000
21st: 1,000, 400
22nd: 1,008
23rd: 800, 400
24th: 800, 400
25th: 800 (?), 400
26th: 800, 400
27th: 1,000, 1,000, 400
28th: 1,000, 600
29th: 800
30th: 1,200, 600
31st: 1,000, 600
32nd: 800, 400
33rd: 1,008
34th: 1,000, 600
35th: 1,000, 600
36th: 1,000, 400
37th: 800
38th: 1,000, 600
39th: 1,000, 600
40th: 1,000, 400
41st: 1,000, 400
42nd: 1,000, 400
43rd: 1,000, 600
44th: 800, 600
45th: 800, 400
46th: 800
47th: 1,000, 400
48th: 800, 400
49th: 800
50th: 800, 400
51st: 808
52nd: 1,000 (?), 800
53rd: 1,000, 400
54th: 800
55th: 800
56th: 1,000, 800
57th: 800, 400
58th: 1,000, 600
59th: 1,000, 400
60th: 800, 800, 1,000, 800, 800, 800
61st: 1,000, 400
62nd: 800, 400
63rd: 800, 400
64th: 800
65th: 1,008
66th: 800, 600
67th: 1,200, 600
68th: 600
69th: 1,000, 400
70th: 800
71st: 1,000, 400
72nd: 800, 400
73rd: 800
74th: 800
75th: 800
76th: 800
77th: 1,008
78th: 808, 800
79th: 800, 800
80th: 800
81st: 800, 600
82nd: 800, 400
83rd: 800, 600
84th: 800
85th: 800
86th: 1,008
87th: 1,000, 800
88th: 800, 400
89th: 800, 400
90th: 800, 400
91st: 800, 400
92nd: 1,000, 600
93rd: 800
94th: 1,008
95th: 1,000, 1,000
96th: 800, 400
97th: 800
98th: 800
99th: 800
100th: 600
101st 800
West India Regiments
1st – 8th West India: 1,000
Garrison Battalions
1st – 9th Garrison Battalions: 1,000
Royal Veteran Battalions
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Royal Veteran Battalions: 650
4th and 7th: 1,000
Miscellaneous
Royal Staff Corps: 400
New South Wales Corps: 800
Royal African Corps: 800
Royal West India Rangers: 800
Champagne’s Regiment: 1,200
Ramsay’s Regiment: 1,200
Baillie’s Regiment: 1,200
York Light Infantry Volunteers: 800
Corsican Rangers: 1,000
Chasseurs Brittaniques: 800
Watteville’s Regiment: 1,000
Dillon’s Regiment: 800
De Rolle’s Regiment: 800
De Meuron’s Regiment: 400
Royal Regiment of Malta: 1,000
[unintelligible regiment of 800, struck through, Froburg's Levy]
Garrison Company, West Indies: 275
Newfoundland Fencibles: 600
New Brunswick Fencibles: 600
Nova Scotia Fencibles: 600
Canadian Fencibles: - (no return?)
Manx Fencibles: 444
Cape Regiment: 600
Royal Wagon Corps: 200
King’s German Legion Infantry
(also, Horse Artillery: 372 and Foot Artillery: 630)
1st and 2nd Light, 1st – 8th Line: 800
Garrison Company: 50
Total: 203,683
The Organisation of the Army of Northern Virginia, part 1: Creation to January 1862
Introduction
The Army of Northern Virginia was the largest field command created by the Confederate States of America during their struggle for independence during 1861 and 1865. It was consistently larger than any other field force, and for the period concerned was composed of more than a third of the entire Confederate Army. [1]
During its’ existence there were several changes to its’ organisation, and this article will endeavour to chart the changing organisation of the Army.
Military Formation Hierarchy
The now familiar hierarchy of battalion-brigade-division-corps was a fairly recent invention, being only mandated by the French government in 1795, and not fully implemented in France for almost a decade [2]. However, emerging from the Napoleonic Wars was an understanding of this hierarchy as a convenient way to organise large armies.
The United States had never created a Corps organisation, and had only had divisions for very brief periods of time, mostly during the Revolutionary Wars [3]. Thus when the time came for both sides to form armies neither initially formed intermediate commands between brigades and armies. Both sides introduced the divisional level of organisation in July-August 1861, and the first “Corps” came into existence on 20th July 1861, when the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah and the Army of the Potomac concentrated for the 1st Battle of Bull Run.
In the CS Army, an oddity occurred; that oddity was the demi-division. Having extremely large divisions, some Generals decided to divide their divisions in two. Each demi-division was placed under a senior brigadier, who stepped up to being a functional division commander. These large divisions were thus functional equivalents to army corps, before the Corps was officially adopted in November 1862. This oddity extends up yet another level; when Longstreet’s command officially became the 1st Army Corps, and consisted of 5 divisions, Longstreet appears to have divided it into two distinct wings, each functioning as a Corps. This doesn’t appear to have happened in Jackson’s 2nd Corps.
Within a formation, there were rules of priority. The senior commander always took the right wing, the second senior the left, and this worked into the centre. If the army was divided into three wings, all under Maj Gens, the right wing would be under the senior Maj Gen, the left wing under the 2nd Maj Gen, and the centre under the 3rd [4].
Johnson’s Army
The 31st August 1861 return for the 1st Corps, Army of Northern Virginia lists 8 brigades [5] under General Beauregard. GW Smith was assigned to command the 2nd Corps consisting of “all troops of this army not heretofore assigned to the First Corps” on 25th September [6].
The next major reform is on the 22nd October 1861, with the creation of the Department of Northern Virginia. This was initially to consist of three districts, Potomac (Beauregard), Aquia (Holmes) and the Valley (Jackson). This order discontinued the Corps, but imposed a division organisation on the army. Essentially the Army of the Potomac halved it’s two Corps to form four divisions with no intermediate. The Divisions (1st-4th, in order) were under Earl van Dorn (2 Mississippi infantry brigades under Clark and Whitting, Stuart with his cavalry and Hampton with his Legion), GW Smith (3 Virginia brigades under Ewell, S. Jones and Early, and a West Virginian-East-Tennessee-Kentucky brigade under Crittenden), Longstreet (2 South Carolina brigades under DR Jones and Bonham, two Alabaman brigade under Wilcox and Rodes, and a Louisiana brigade under Taylor) and Kirby-Smith (Walker, Toombs and Elzey with Georgia brigades, the latter having the 1st Maryland, Evans with a North Carolina brigade and Wigfall with 3 regiments of Texans and 1 of Louisianans). This was not implemented without some modification [7].
On 14th January 1862, Johnson reports that the following has been implemented [8]:
Potomac District (Beauregard)
• 1st Division (van Dorn is absent): Bonham, Early and Rodes
• 2nd Division (GW Smith): Wilcox, Toombs and a vacancy (GT Anderson commanding)
• 3rd Division (Longstreet): Ewell, DR Jones and a vacancy
• 4th Division (Kirby-Smith): Elzey, Trimble and Taylor
• Whitting’s Division: Wigfall, Hampton and a vacancy (Dumfies, incorporated into the main army on 4th February [9])
• DH Hill’s Brigade (Leesburg)
• Anderson’s Brigade (Manassas)
• Stuart’s Cavalry Brigade
• Pendleton’s Reserve Artillery
Aquia District (Holmes)
• 1st Brigade under French
• 2nd Brigade under Walker
Valley District (Jackson)
• Garnett’s Brigade (“Stonewall”)
• Loring’s Division
After asking for a replacement for van Dorn, Johnson puts Early in command of the division, but renumbers the divisions in accordance with seniority [10].
1. See Harsh, J.L, Confederate Tide Rising, Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows for discussion of this matter.
2. See Griffith, P, The Art of War of Revolutionary France for discussion on this matter. Of particular interest is that the term Corps du Armee did exist prior to the creation of “Army Corps”, but referred to the “Main Body” of a Division, exclusive of Vanguard, Reserve and Flankers.
3. McGrath, J.J., The Brigade, online at http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KWrLJj-iTlAC and Wilson, J.B., The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, online at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Divisions_and_Separate_Brigades for discussion on previous U.S. military hierarchy
4. See Muir et. al, Inside Wellington’s Peninsula Army for a discussion of the practice, and also Wellington’s practice for finding commanders for his five army corps.
5. OR, Ch XIV, pg 825. The brigades are numbers 1st – 8th and are, in order, Bonham’s, Ewell’s, DR Jones’, Longstreet’s, Cocke’s, Early’s, Evans’ and Seymour’s.
6. OR, Ch XIV, pg 881
7. OR, Ch XIV, pg 913-4 and 960-1
8. OR Ch XIV, pg 1028-32
9. OR, Ch XIV, pg 1060
10. OR Ch XIV, pg 1061-2
The Army of Northern Virginia was the largest field command created by the Confederate States of America during their struggle for independence during 1861 and 1865. It was consistently larger than any other field force, and for the period concerned was composed of more than a third of the entire Confederate Army. [1]
During its’ existence there were several changes to its’ organisation, and this article will endeavour to chart the changing organisation of the Army.
Military Formation Hierarchy
The now familiar hierarchy of battalion-brigade-division-corps was a fairly recent invention, being only mandated by the French government in 1795, and not fully implemented in France for almost a decade [2]. However, emerging from the Napoleonic Wars was an understanding of this hierarchy as a convenient way to organise large armies.
The United States had never created a Corps organisation, and had only had divisions for very brief periods of time, mostly during the Revolutionary Wars [3]. Thus when the time came for both sides to form armies neither initially formed intermediate commands between brigades and armies. Both sides introduced the divisional level of organisation in July-August 1861, and the first “Corps” came into existence on 20th July 1861, when the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah and the Army of the Potomac concentrated for the 1st Battle of Bull Run.
In the CS Army, an oddity occurred; that oddity was the demi-division. Having extremely large divisions, some Generals decided to divide their divisions in two. Each demi-division was placed under a senior brigadier, who stepped up to being a functional division commander. These large divisions were thus functional equivalents to army corps, before the Corps was officially adopted in November 1862. This oddity extends up yet another level; when Longstreet’s command officially became the 1st Army Corps, and consisted of 5 divisions, Longstreet appears to have divided it into two distinct wings, each functioning as a Corps. This doesn’t appear to have happened in Jackson’s 2nd Corps.
Within a formation, there were rules of priority. The senior commander always took the right wing, the second senior the left, and this worked into the centre. If the army was divided into three wings, all under Maj Gens, the right wing would be under the senior Maj Gen, the left wing under the 2nd Maj Gen, and the centre under the 3rd [4].
Johnson’s Army
The 31st August 1861 return for the 1st Corps, Army of Northern Virginia lists 8 brigades [5] under General Beauregard. GW Smith was assigned to command the 2nd Corps consisting of “all troops of this army not heretofore assigned to the First Corps” on 25th September [6].
The next major reform is on the 22nd October 1861, with the creation of the Department of Northern Virginia. This was initially to consist of three districts, Potomac (Beauregard), Aquia (Holmes) and the Valley (Jackson). This order discontinued the Corps, but imposed a division organisation on the army. Essentially the Army of the Potomac halved it’s two Corps to form four divisions with no intermediate. The Divisions (1st-4th, in order) were under Earl van Dorn (2 Mississippi infantry brigades under Clark and Whitting, Stuart with his cavalry and Hampton with his Legion), GW Smith (3 Virginia brigades under Ewell, S. Jones and Early, and a West Virginian-East-Tennessee-Kentucky brigade under Crittenden), Longstreet (2 South Carolina brigades under DR Jones and Bonham, two Alabaman brigade under Wilcox and Rodes, and a Louisiana brigade under Taylor) and Kirby-Smith (Walker, Toombs and Elzey with Georgia brigades, the latter having the 1st Maryland, Evans with a North Carolina brigade and Wigfall with 3 regiments of Texans and 1 of Louisianans). This was not implemented without some modification [7].
On 14th January 1862, Johnson reports that the following has been implemented [8]:
Potomac District (Beauregard)
• 1st Division (van Dorn is absent): Bonham, Early and Rodes
• 2nd Division (GW Smith): Wilcox, Toombs and a vacancy (GT Anderson commanding)
• 3rd Division (Longstreet): Ewell, DR Jones and a vacancy
• 4th Division (Kirby-Smith): Elzey, Trimble and Taylor
• Whitting’s Division: Wigfall, Hampton and a vacancy (Dumfies, incorporated into the main army on 4th February [9])
• DH Hill’s Brigade (Leesburg)
• Anderson’s Brigade (Manassas)
• Stuart’s Cavalry Brigade
• Pendleton’s Reserve Artillery
Aquia District (Holmes)
• 1st Brigade under French
• 2nd Brigade under Walker
Valley District (Jackson)
• Garnett’s Brigade (“Stonewall”)
• Loring’s Division
After asking for a replacement for van Dorn, Johnson puts Early in command of the division, but renumbers the divisions in accordance with seniority [10].
1. See Harsh, J.L, Confederate Tide Rising, Taken at the Flood and Sounding the Shallows for discussion of this matter.
2. See Griffith, P, The Art of War of Revolutionary France for discussion on this matter. Of particular interest is that the term Corps du Armee did exist prior to the creation of “Army Corps”, but referred to the “Main Body” of a Division, exclusive of Vanguard, Reserve and Flankers.
3. McGrath, J.J., The Brigade, online at http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KWrLJj-iTlAC and Wilson, J.B., The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, online at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Divisions_and_Separate_Brigades for discussion on previous U.S. military hierarchy
4. See Muir et. al, Inside Wellington’s Peninsula Army for a discussion of the practice, and also Wellington’s practice for finding commanders for his five army corps.
5. OR, Ch XIV, pg 825. The brigades are numbers 1st – 8th and are, in order, Bonham’s, Ewell’s, DR Jones’, Longstreet’s, Cocke’s, Early’s, Evans’ and Seymour’s.
6. OR, Ch XIV, pg 881
7. OR, Ch XIV, pg 913-4 and 960-1
8. OR Ch XIV, pg 1028-32
9. OR, Ch XIV, pg 1060
10. OR Ch XIV, pg 1061-2
Wednesday, 18 March 2009
RN Screw Warships in American Waters
A few years ago I went through the list of major screw warships at this website, and used their service careers to work out which ones served in the North American and West Indies Squadron during the Trent Crisis. The result was:
Terror (Armoured Battery, 16) - Captain Frederick Hutton
Saint George (Screw Battleship, 120) - Captain Francis Egerton
Aboukir (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Charles Frederick Alexander Shadwell
Agamemnon (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Thomas Hope
Edgar (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain George Pechell Mends, Flagship of Rear-Admiral John Elphinstone Erskine (Fleet Second and Division Commander)
Hero (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Alfred Phillipps Ryder
James Watt (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Edward Codd
Nile (Screw Battleship, 90) - Captain Edward King Barnard, Flagship of Rear-Admiral Alexander Milne (Fleet Commander)
Algiers (Screw Battleship, 89) - Captain Edward Bridges Rice
Queen (Screw Battleship, 86) - Captain Charles Farrell Hillyar
Immortalité (Screw Frigate, 51) - Captain George Hancock
Melpomene (Screw Frigate, 51) - Captain Charles Joseph Frederick Ewart
Phaeton (Screw Frigate, 50) - Captain Edward Tatham
Mersey (Screw Frigate, 40) - Captain Henry Caldwell
Orlando (Screw Frigate, 40) - Captain Francis Scott
Diadem (Screw Frigate, 32) - Captain George Granville Randolph
Ariadne (Screw Frigate, 26) - Captain Edward Westby Vansittart
Galatea (Screw Frigate, 26) - Captain Rochford Maguire
Gladiator (Paddle Frigade, 6) - Commander Henry Dennis Hickey
Challenger (Screw Corvette, 21) - Captain John James Kennedy
Jason (Screw Corvette, 21) - Captain Edward Pelham Brenton Von Donop
Cadmus (Screw Sloop, 21) - Captain Henry Shank Hillyar
Cossack (Screw Corvette, 20) - Captain Richard Moorman (May have gone to China)
Greyhound (Screw Sloop, 17) - Commander Henry Dennis Hickey
Rinaldo (Screw Sloop, 17) - Commander William Nathan Wrighte Hewett
Racer (Screw Sloop, 11) - Commander Algernon McLennan Lyons
Basilisk (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander George Annesley Phayre
Buzzard (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander Francis Peel (?)
Firebrand (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander Joseph Dayman
Styx (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander John Halliday Cave
Vesuvius (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Captain Richard Vesey Hamilton
Flying Fish (Screw Gunvesel, 6) - Commander Charles Webley Hope (Intrepid class)
Steady (Screw Gunvessel, 5) - Commander Henry Duncan Grant (Philomel class)
Victor (Screw Gunvessel, 6) - ? (Intrepid class, sold to CS in 1863)
Alacrity (Screw Gunvessel, 4) - Commander John Kennedy Erskine Baird (Vigilant class)
Foxhound (Screw Gunvessel, 4) -
In addition the Shannon and Liffey (both 51's) and others were on orders, and at least 33 gunboats were ordered to American waters.
Terror (Armoured Battery, 16) - Captain Frederick Hutton
Saint George (Screw Battleship, 120) - Captain Francis Egerton
Aboukir (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Charles Frederick Alexander Shadwell
Agamemnon (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Thomas Hope
Edgar (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain George Pechell Mends, Flagship of Rear-Admiral John Elphinstone Erskine (Fleet Second and Division Commander)
Hero (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Alfred Phillipps Ryder
James Watt (Screw Battleship, 91) - Captain Edward Codd
Nile (Screw Battleship, 90) - Captain Edward King Barnard, Flagship of Rear-Admiral Alexander Milne (Fleet Commander)
Algiers (Screw Battleship, 89) - Captain Edward Bridges Rice
Queen (Screw Battleship, 86) - Captain Charles Farrell Hillyar
Immortalité (Screw Frigate, 51) - Captain George Hancock
Melpomene (Screw Frigate, 51) - Captain Charles Joseph Frederick Ewart
Phaeton (Screw Frigate, 50) - Captain Edward Tatham
Mersey (Screw Frigate, 40) - Captain Henry Caldwell
Orlando (Screw Frigate, 40) - Captain Francis Scott
Diadem (Screw Frigate, 32) - Captain George Granville Randolph
Ariadne (Screw Frigate, 26) - Captain Edward Westby Vansittart
Galatea (Screw Frigate, 26) - Captain Rochford Maguire
Gladiator (Paddle Frigade, 6) - Commander Henry Dennis Hickey
Challenger (Screw Corvette, 21) - Captain John James Kennedy
Jason (Screw Corvette, 21) - Captain Edward Pelham Brenton Von Donop
Cadmus (Screw Sloop, 21) - Captain Henry Shank Hillyar
Cossack (Screw Corvette, 20) - Captain Richard Moorman (May have gone to China)
Greyhound (Screw Sloop, 17) - Commander Henry Dennis Hickey
Rinaldo (Screw Sloop, 17) - Commander William Nathan Wrighte Hewett
Racer (Screw Sloop, 11) - Commander Algernon McLennan Lyons
Basilisk (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander George Annesley Phayre
Buzzard (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander Francis Peel (?)
Firebrand (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander Joseph Dayman
Styx (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Commander John Halliday Cave
Vesuvius (Paddle Sloop, 6) - Captain Richard Vesey Hamilton
Flying Fish (Screw Gunvesel, 6) - Commander Charles Webley Hope (Intrepid class)
Steady (Screw Gunvessel, 5) - Commander Henry Duncan Grant (Philomel class)
Victor (Screw Gunvessel, 6) - ? (Intrepid class, sold to CS in 1863)
Alacrity (Screw Gunvessel, 4) - Commander John Kennedy Erskine Baird (Vigilant class)
Foxhound (Screw Gunvessel, 4) -
In addition the Shannon and Liffey (both 51's) and others were on orders, and at least 33 gunboats were ordered to American waters.
Where did the Union acquire the majority of their small arms?
The Official Records contain details of the equipment the Ordnance Department acquired to prosecute the war. Of interest to me is where their equipment upto 30th June 1862 was acquired (see the OR)
It's notable that the vast majority of Union small arms were acquired from Europe, with only slightly more than 30,000 infantry weapons acquired from domestic sources. Incidently "Army Rifles with Bayonet" are the M1861 Springfield. From my reading (to be expanded upon later) most of the imports arrived after the Trent Affair, and hence would have had to run the British blockade. I shall endeavour to find and read Davis' Arming the Union. I am fortunate that the British Library has a copy, and I live almost across the road from it.
It's notable that the vast majority of Union small arms were acquired from Europe, with only slightly more than 30,000 infantry weapons acquired from domestic sources. Incidently "Army Rifles with Bayonet" are the M1861 Springfield. From my reading (to be expanded upon later) most of the imports arrived after the Trent Affair, and hence would have had to run the British blockade. I shall endeavour to find and read Davis' Arming the Union. I am fortunate that the British Library has a copy, and I live almost across the road from it.
Tuesday, 17 March 2009
Wellington in Grey
In Weller and Uffindell's On Wellington: The Duke and His Art of War there is a chapter discussing a what-if involving replacing R.E. Lee with Arthur Wellesey at the Battle of Gettysburg. The authors dwell on five major differences:
1. Wellington had a far superior intelligence system
2. Wellington had a more controlling, less laissez-faire system of command
3. Wellington consistently placed himself at the decision point, rather than hanging back at the mapboard
4. Wellington would likely not have launched the tactically wasteful attacks of 2nd July.
5. Wellington would have gone all in had he attacked on the 3rd July.
It should perhaps be noted this paints a picture of Lee as far closer to Napoleon than Wellington. Like Napoleon, Lee's Recce and Intelligence system was abysmal. Indeed, Napoleon's "masterful" turning and enveloping movement during the Ulm Campaign was due to Napoleon failing to recce properly and not knowing where the enemy was! Only a failure of unity of command on the Austrian side stopped Mack from tearing north, cutting Napoleon's supply lines, seizing his depot and treasury and linking up with the Prussians. At Gettysburg Lee literally blundered into the Federal Army and paid dearly.
The second point above is also Napoleon-like. Napoleon had little time for details (and less as his career progressed, retreating into an almost fantasy-like world). Lee's command system was based upon him making vague delphic utterances to his subordinates, which allowed them great latitude in interpretation. At Gettysburg alone we have two major examples of this dysfunction in command coming into play; firstly the failure to seize Cemetery Hill by Ewell on the first day (Cemetery Hill being the only piece of Vital Ground on that battlefield); and then secondly the complete alteration of the plan of attack by Longstreet on the 3rd July. Lee had indeed intended to go all in on the 3rd, but Longstreet was independent enough to alter the plan to a partial engagement which was ultimately unsuccessful. In this Lee would appear to be closer to Wellington on point five above, but both Wellington and Napoleon would be agreement here.
This second point also feeds into the first. JEB Stuart's cavalry was utterly out of control in the week preceding Gettysburg, and Stuart's career did not suffer for such an egregious blunder. That said, Lee is closer to Auftragstaktik than many, but he fails because he is not being definite. He has the worst of both worlds.
The third point is also telling. Lee commanded from the rear, usually from a tented HQ from which he rarely strayed. Wellington commanded from near the front. To Lee, bypassing a division or even brigade commander on the spot was usually unthinkable; while for Wellington it was common.
The fourth point is less interesting. It simply points out that the authors could see no point to Lee's attacks of the 2nd or 3rd July. In this they should probably read Harman's Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. Lee's concept of operations was sound in principle, but was very poorly executed by both Lee, and his major subordinates.
Overall, the book chapter was interesting, if slightly flawed.
1. Wellington had a far superior intelligence system
2. Wellington had a more controlling, less laissez-faire system of command
3. Wellington consistently placed himself at the decision point, rather than hanging back at the mapboard
4. Wellington would likely not have launched the tactically wasteful attacks of 2nd July.
5. Wellington would have gone all in had he attacked on the 3rd July.
It should perhaps be noted this paints a picture of Lee as far closer to Napoleon than Wellington. Like Napoleon, Lee's Recce and Intelligence system was abysmal. Indeed, Napoleon's "masterful" turning and enveloping movement during the Ulm Campaign was due to Napoleon failing to recce properly and not knowing where the enemy was! Only a failure of unity of command on the Austrian side stopped Mack from tearing north, cutting Napoleon's supply lines, seizing his depot and treasury and linking up with the Prussians. At Gettysburg Lee literally blundered into the Federal Army and paid dearly.
The second point above is also Napoleon-like. Napoleon had little time for details (and less as his career progressed, retreating into an almost fantasy-like world). Lee's command system was based upon him making vague delphic utterances to his subordinates, which allowed them great latitude in interpretation. At Gettysburg alone we have two major examples of this dysfunction in command coming into play; firstly the failure to seize Cemetery Hill by Ewell on the first day (Cemetery Hill being the only piece of Vital Ground on that battlefield); and then secondly the complete alteration of the plan of attack by Longstreet on the 3rd July. Lee had indeed intended to go all in on the 3rd, but Longstreet was independent enough to alter the plan to a partial engagement which was ultimately unsuccessful. In this Lee would appear to be closer to Wellington on point five above, but both Wellington and Napoleon would be agreement here.
This second point also feeds into the first. JEB Stuart's cavalry was utterly out of control in the week preceding Gettysburg, and Stuart's career did not suffer for such an egregious blunder. That said, Lee is closer to Auftragstaktik than many, but he fails because he is not being definite. He has the worst of both worlds.
The third point is also telling. Lee commanded from the rear, usually from a tented HQ from which he rarely strayed. Wellington commanded from near the front. To Lee, bypassing a division or even brigade commander on the spot was usually unthinkable; while for Wellington it was common.
The fourth point is less interesting. It simply points out that the authors could see no point to Lee's attacks of the 2nd or 3rd July. In this they should probably read Harman's Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. Lee's concept of operations was sound in principle, but was very poorly executed by both Lee, and his major subordinates.
Overall, the book chapter was interesting, if slightly flawed.
Monday, 16 March 2009
Reinforcements for Canada
It's worth considering just what forces the British had available to deploy during the Trent Crisis.
The force available in England was essentially:
1 Guards Infantry Brigade (another Guards Brigade exists, but essentially acts as a depot)
13 Line Infantry Brigades (1 of the battalions was a Guards Bn, there was a "spare", which was rotated on normal General Service)
5 Cavalry Brigades (1 of the Regiments would have been a composite Household Cavalry Regiment)
Conceptually these were organised as Divisions.
Another couple of Battalions were in Scotland.
In Ireland there were:
2 Line Infantry Brigades
1 Cavalry Brigade
The British got as far as sending 2 line brigades, and most of the Fleet Guards Brigade to Canada in the few weeks of the crisis.
They were a long way short of their ideal of having 6 full Corps available. By inspection, the 6 Cavalry Brigades were there, but one of the Corps Logistics Trains was in New Zealand. They only had 15 infantry brigades, rather than the required 24. It seems (from my reading of an old RUSI long ago) that around this time the British accepted 5 Corps (20 infantry brigades) as being a reasonable figure.
One of these was already in Canada (reinforced in Summer 1861), whilst two more were in New Zealand fighting the Maori. Perhaps another two, even three brigades could be pulled out of garrisoning Britain's imperial fortresses in the Mediterranean, but this risks Russian aggression.
However, if they'd called the militia out, pulled a couple of brigades from the Med, and reinforced Canada, a figure of 5 Corps is a reasonable one. In context, this means roughly 60 infantry battalions in Canada, out of 139 (ignoring colonial forces), or about 43% of Britain's Army being committed. This compares with late 1854, when 42 out of 110 battalions were committed to the Crimean proper, or about 38%. However, another way of viewing this is that in 1854 the British had 68 battalions committed elsewhere apart from the main thrust of the war, whilst in 1862 it would have been 79. Such was the growth of the British Army ca 1855-8.
The force available in England was essentially:
1 Guards Infantry Brigade (another Guards Brigade exists, but essentially acts as a depot)
13 Line Infantry Brigades (1 of the battalions was a Guards Bn, there was a "spare", which was rotated on normal General Service)
5 Cavalry Brigades (1 of the Regiments would have been a composite Household Cavalry Regiment)
Conceptually these were organised as Divisions.
Another couple of Battalions were in Scotland.
In Ireland there were:
2 Line Infantry Brigades
1 Cavalry Brigade
The British got as far as sending 2 line brigades, and most of the Fleet Guards Brigade to Canada in the few weeks of the crisis.
They were a long way short of their ideal of having 6 full Corps available. By inspection, the 6 Cavalry Brigades were there, but one of the Corps Logistics Trains was in New Zealand. They only had 15 infantry brigades, rather than the required 24. It seems (from my reading of an old RUSI long ago) that around this time the British accepted 5 Corps (20 infantry brigades) as being a reasonable figure.
One of these was already in Canada (reinforced in Summer 1861), whilst two more were in New Zealand fighting the Maori. Perhaps another two, even three brigades could be pulled out of garrisoning Britain's imperial fortresses in the Mediterranean, but this risks Russian aggression.
However, if they'd called the militia out, pulled a couple of brigades from the Med, and reinforced Canada, a figure of 5 Corps is a reasonable one. In context, this means roughly 60 infantry battalions in Canada, out of 139 (ignoring colonial forces), or about 43% of Britain's Army being committed. This compares with late 1854, when 42 out of 110 battalions were committed to the Crimean proper, or about 38%. However, another way of viewing this is that in 1854 the British had 68 battalions committed elsewhere apart from the main thrust of the war, whilst in 1862 it would have been 79. Such was the growth of the British Army ca 1855-8.
Effects Based Warfare
Another thing I hope to do is some analysis of ACW battles using the effects based theory of warfare. This was how I was trained to analyse tactical situations and how to win battles.
The ACW contains some wonderful examples of effects based warfare, such as Bragg's destruction of Rosecrans' Boyd Cycle (or "OODA Loop") at Chickamauga. However, these aspects of the war are rarely considered, and are usually given lip service. Why did Lee do so well at 2nd Bull Run? He disrupted Pope's Boyd cycle completely. Similarly the Union Boyd cycle broke down at Chancellorville, this later breakdown saving the Confederate Army from the utter debacle that was Jackson's turning movement (a subject for later is to discuss the utter lack of ability Jackson consistently showed during his career).
I have so far found an exception in the literature, Wood's "Civil War Generalship" actually makes an effort to place peoples actions within the context of an early iteration of effects based warfare, and is truly worth reading.
The ACW contains some wonderful examples of effects based warfare, such as Bragg's destruction of Rosecrans' Boyd Cycle (or "OODA Loop") at Chickamauga. However, these aspects of the war are rarely considered, and are usually given lip service. Why did Lee do so well at 2nd Bull Run? He disrupted Pope's Boyd cycle completely. Similarly the Union Boyd cycle broke down at Chancellorville, this later breakdown saving the Confederate Army from the utter debacle that was Jackson's turning movement (a subject for later is to discuss the utter lack of ability Jackson consistently showed during his career).
I have so far found an exception in the literature, Wood's "Civil War Generalship" actually makes an effort to place peoples actions within the context of an early iteration of effects based warfare, and is truly worth reading.
Strength of the US North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Trent Affair
From the ORs:
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron Dispositions, 7th February 1862 (combatant vessels only) :
• Hampton Roads: Minnesota (Screw, 44), Roanoke (Screw, 44), Brandywine (Sail, 44) and Braziliera (Sail, 6)
• Newport News: Congress (Sail, 52) and Cumberland (Sail, 24)
• Cape Henry: Cambridge (Screw Gunvessel, 2)
• Wilmington, NC: Jamestown (Sail, 22), Mount Vernon (Screw Gunboat, 1) and Amanda (Sail, 6)
• Beaufort, NC: State of Georgia (Paddle Gunvessel, 7)
• York River: Daylight (Screw Gunboat, 4)
• Rappahanock River: Young Rover (Bark, 5)
• Hatteras Inlet: Louisiana (Screw Gunboat, 3), Stars and Stripes (ScGb, 5), Underwriter (Paddle Gunboat, 2), Valley City (ScGb, 4), Hetzel (PGb, 2), Commodore Perry (PGb, 5) Commodore Barney (PGb, 4), Shawsheen (PGb, 2), Lockwood (PGb, 3), Ceres (PGb, 2), Morse (PGb, 2), Whitehead (SGb, 1), L.N. Seymour (PGb, 2), Philadelphia (PGb, 2), Henry Brinker (SGb, 1), Hunchback (PGb, 4), Southfield (PGb, 4) and General Putnam (PGb, 1) = 18 Improvised GB (49 guns)
• Chincoteague Inlet: Granite (Sail, 2)
Total 32 vessels (8 sail) with 312 guns (156 under sail)
The combat power of the NABS rests massively with the two large Screw Frigates Minnesota and Roanoke. Aside from these two ships the NABS has three older sailing warships, and a host of rather less than impressive gunboats. Many of these gunboats are paddlewheelers (and so liable to loose propulsion very quickly in action), and many of their guns are 12 and 18 pounders, with a smattering of larger shell guns (including a couple of 9").
This force wouldn't even ruffle Milne's immediately available forces, which (by Lanchester Square Law) shows at least a 10:1 superiority in combat power.
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron Dispositions, 7th February 1862 (combatant vessels only) :
• Hampton Roads: Minnesota (Screw, 44), Roanoke (Screw, 44), Brandywine (Sail, 44) and Braziliera (Sail, 6)
• Newport News: Congress (Sail, 52) and Cumberland (Sail, 24)
• Cape Henry: Cambridge (Screw Gunvessel, 2)
• Wilmington, NC: Jamestown (Sail, 22), Mount Vernon (Screw Gunboat, 1) and Amanda (Sail, 6)
• Beaufort, NC: State of Georgia (Paddle Gunvessel, 7)
• York River: Daylight (Screw Gunboat, 4)
• Rappahanock River: Young Rover (Bark, 5)
• Hatteras Inlet: Louisiana (Screw Gunboat, 3), Stars and Stripes (ScGb, 5), Underwriter (Paddle Gunboat, 2), Valley City (ScGb, 4), Hetzel (PGb, 2), Commodore Perry (PGb, 5) Commodore Barney (PGb, 4), Shawsheen (PGb, 2), Lockwood (PGb, 3), Ceres (PGb, 2), Morse (PGb, 2), Whitehead (SGb, 1), L.N. Seymour (PGb, 2), Philadelphia (PGb, 2), Henry Brinker (SGb, 1), Hunchback (PGb, 4), Southfield (PGb, 4) and General Putnam (PGb, 1) = 18 Improvised GB (49 guns)
• Chincoteague Inlet: Granite (Sail, 2)
Total 32 vessels (8 sail) with 312 guns (156 under sail)
The combat power of the NABS rests massively with the two large Screw Frigates Minnesota and Roanoke. Aside from these two ships the NABS has three older sailing warships, and a host of rather less than impressive gunboats. Many of these gunboats are paddlewheelers (and so liable to loose propulsion very quickly in action), and many of their guns are 12 and 18 pounders, with a smattering of larger shell guns (including a couple of 9").
This force wouldn't even ruffle Milne's immediately available forces, which (by Lanchester Square Law) shows at least a 10:1 superiority in combat power.
The relative strength of the two armies at 1st Bull Run
While searching for strength data, I found that the Adjutants of the two armies at first Bull Run had published their strengths in the Century Magazine, and someone has put them online:
The Union Army reports a strength of 896 officers, 17,676 men and 24 guns. Further reading shows that some of the guns listed as not present by the AAG in fact moved to cover the retreat.
The Confederate Army reports a strength 16,099 infantry rank and file, 1,300 cavalry rank and file and 37 guns (and their crews) engaged.
I suspect that should I break down the battle in phases and apply Lanchester analysis, the battle simply hinges on which side had the most effectives. One day I'll buy Donnybrook and do a proper analysis.
The Union Army reports a strength of 896 officers, 17,676 men and 24 guns. Further reading shows that some of the guns listed as not present by the AAG in fact moved to cover the retreat.
The Confederate Army reports a strength 16,099 infantry rank and file, 1,300 cavalry rank and file and 37 guns (and their crews) engaged.
I suspect that should I break down the battle in phases and apply Lanchester analysis, the battle simply hinges on which side had the most effectives. One day I'll buy Donnybrook and do a proper analysis.
Welcome to my new Blog.
By way of introduction, my name is Bryn, and I will mostly be posting on the American Civil War. One of my objectives in this is going to try and remove some of the parochialism that sometimes surrounds Americans talking about their most significant war; I hope to bring a "European" view. It helps in this that I'm British, and was once a rather overthinking junior infantry officer. These days I'm conducting research for a PhD in Chemistry at Imperial College (which is currently ranked 5th or 6th in the world ISTR), and so posts may be slightly erratic.
What I intend to publish in the next year or so is:
* A lot of data on the Trent Affair, and some reasoned comparisons of British to Union strengths, plans etc.
* Some analysis on the tactical verities of the ACW, showing that it was in fact a badly fought linear war, rather than a harbringer of the trenches of WW1. In this I suspect I will have to deviate into comparisons with other wars.
*Analysis, using a modified version of Lanchester's Laws (both linear and square) showing the relative abilities of various commanders etc.
* Various bits of ephemera....
By way of introduction, my name is Bryn, and I will mostly be posting on the American Civil War. One of my objectives in this is going to try and remove some of the parochialism that sometimes surrounds Americans talking about their most significant war; I hope to bring a "European" view. It helps in this that I'm British, and was once a rather overthinking junior infantry officer. These days I'm conducting research for a PhD in Chemistry at Imperial College (which is currently ranked 5th or 6th in the world ISTR), and so posts may be slightly erratic.
What I intend to publish in the next year or so is:
* A lot of data on the Trent Affair, and some reasoned comparisons of British to Union strengths, plans etc.
* Some analysis on the tactical verities of the ACW, showing that it was in fact a badly fought linear war, rather than a harbringer of the trenches of WW1. In this I suspect I will have to deviate into comparisons with other wars.
*Analysis, using a modified version of Lanchester's Laws (both linear and square) showing the relative abilities of various commanders etc.
* Various bits of ephemera....
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