This is slightly OT, but as it's a commonly used comparitor (not least in Nosworthy's The Bloody Crucible of Courage) I thought it was appropriate to put here. Sorry for the digression into the Napoleonic War.
A commonly quoted figure of musket rounds fired per hit achieved is 1 in 459. The source of this figure is Henesay (original source). However his figures do not add up. For a start, only 3 British Divisions were heavily engaged at Vittoria (2nd, 3rd and 5th); only 10 British and 3 Portuguese regiments, and the Royal French Chasseurs Brittanique suffered more than 100 casualties. The 3 heavily engaged divisions had marching states of ca. 25,000 Officers and Present Under Arms on their state of 25th May, and had been marching and skirmishing for nearly a month before the main event. Henesay's count of 50,000 engaged infantry is highly unlikely. Also, the nature of the fighting at Vittoria precluded many standup musketry duels. While some may have occurred at river crossings, most of the real fighting was close quarter bayonet work, especially for the 3rd Division.
So, if Hennesay's estimate of over 3.6 million rounds fired is inaccurate, do we know how many rounds were fired? Yes, Henesay himself gives that information.
The way ammunition resupply worked on the Peninsula was that boxes of ball-cartridge were dropped by the Commissary behind companies, who would then send small details back to open them and distribute the rounds, the soldiers cartridge boxes were kept constantly full. Henesay's figures indicate that 1.35 million rounds were thus distributed. However Henesay notes only roughly half of these were fired. Thus we arrive at the approximate number of rounds the British actually fired, about 675,000, which is well within the norms for European combat (which reckoned on 20 rounds per infantryman being used in a battle).
Henesay's estimate of casualties is too high. The French Armies suffered 5,210 killed and wounded, exclusive of much of their artillery (no returns except for the Army of the Centre, whose artillery was overrun at bayonet-point) or the attached Spanish Royal Guards or elements of the Army of the North. Oman estimates (from pro-rating officer casualties, which were recorded) hundreds of extra casualties, probably, in my opinion between 5,700 and 5,900.
The proportion of these hit by artillery will never be known, but the artillery played little role in the British attacks, since the infantry kept outrunning their artllery support. If we make the assumption that no-one was hit by artillery then the proportions of musket rounds expended per hit is about 1 per 116. This is a high estimate, and in all probability the real ratio is in the 1 in 150 to 1 in 200 range common in American Civil War firefights.
Thursday, 24 December 2009
Sunday, 20 December 2009
Confederate Straggling in Maryland and Lee's strength at Antietam
I'm interested in just how badly the Confederate Army straggled in Maryland. Using the 22nd September field returns (ref), the casualties in the campaign (from Harsh's Sounding the Shallows, supplemented by the OR's to add in South Mountain casualties) and the estimated strength 2nd September as reported in Harsh.
Longstreet's Command
The other divisions
If we take the 22nd September morning state, add back in the Confederate casualties for Antietam, and remove Thomas's brigade (absent the field) we arrive at a figure of roughly 50,000. Adding in the cavalry and half the artillery reserve we have roughly 55,000. This is probably close to the strength of Lee's army on the field on the 17th.
Longstreet's Command
- DR Jones straggles heavily. Of his 8,615 man division only 4,403 are with him on 22nd September and 1,435 are casualties, leaving 2,777 stragglers (32%).
- Hood's and Evan's "divisions" have 4,834 on 2nd September, but only 3,403 on the 22nd, with 1,109 casualties. Therefore they do not straggle badly and have only lost 322 (7%),
- Jackson's own division enters the campaign with 5,650 and has 3,494 on the 22nd, after losing 648. Thus they straggle heavily with 1,508 (27%) disappearing. In his report Jackson seems to try and cover up the straggling by moving these into the killed and wounded, exaggerating how hard his division fought (sustaining more casualties than Jackson reported with the colors on the 17th).
- Ewell's division (under Lawton then Early) entered the campaign with 6,383, lost 1,338 and had 4,066 left on the 22nd, implying 979 stragglers (15%)
- The Light Division enter the campaign with 8,570, lost 417 but only have 5,468 on the 22nd, losing 2,685 stragglers (31%)
The other divisions
- DH Hill did not suffer badly from straggling, of his 9,764 on 2nd September, 5,821 are with him and 3,241 as casualties for a balance of 732 (7%) straggling.
- Walker did not suffer badly either. Of his 5,159 he still had 3,871, despite losing 1,120 at Antietam for a difference of 168 (3%).
- McLaws suffers terribly. Of 7,652, he only has 4,018 remaining, after 1,119 casualties. 2,515 men (33%) have straggled out of the ranks
- Anderson's huge division of 11,294 straggles badly. He has only 6,298 remaining on the 22nd after 1,278 casualties. 3,718 men (33%) have taken leave from him.
If we take the 22nd September morning state, add back in the Confederate casualties for Antietam, and remove Thomas's brigade (absent the field) we arrive at a figure of roughly 50,000. Adding in the cavalry and half the artillery reserve we have roughly 55,000. This is probably close to the strength of Lee's army on the field on the 17th.
Friday, 25 September 2009
McClellan, the Signal Corps and his time on USS Galena
The Signals Corps
There are many claims made about the nature of the American Civil War being novel. Many of these are spurious but some are true. One of the most "modern" features of the ACW is the activities of the United States Signal Corps. This small and overlooked body of men ran a tremendously effective communications system. Communiques McClellan sent from a field command post on the outskirts of Richmond would arrive at Washington, DC a mere ten minutes later. Using this system McClellan was able to achieve a level of command and control of his Corps as then unrivaled in the world. Indeed this was the first Signals Corps created in the world ever (in the British Army, for example, Signals would remain a part of the Engineers for decades).
McClellan wasn't working in a void. He'd seen the advances in communications technology made by the armies of Europe, and resolved to implement them fully. The general history of the Signals Corps during the war can be read on wikipedia.
The electric telegraph was short ranged and unreliable. A semaphore based system, the "wig-wag" worked very well within line of sight. It was the wig-wag that McClellan would use to control his army before Richmond. Such "frippery" as signals didn't emerge in the Army of the Tennessee for over a year (although it was very advanced in the Army of the Ohio/ Cumberland), the likes of Grant and Sherman simply had no time for it.
McClellan thus commanded his army from a central command post with signals to the subordinate commands (divisions, even after the establishment of Corps). He could leave his CP and, as long as he had an efficient signals troop with him, he could maintain command of the battle from anywhere.
Glendale and Malvern Hill
This brings me to the accusation that McClellan abandoned his army at either Glendale or Malvern Hill (both are sometimes mentioned), and to the related issue of the fantastic tale of an army commander having lunch on a boat off shore while his army fought.
It is important to note that McClellan established his General Headquarters Command Post at Haxall's Landing on Malvern Hill. From this position he was in communication with all his commanders and with the naval force on the James River (by way of a signals detachment sent on board her).
Figure 1: approximate schematic of McClellan's signals at Glendale (Porter's two divisions preparing positions on Malvern Hill omitted for clarity)
At Glendale, McClellan placed his divisions personally earlier in the day. He had effectively adopted a taskorg of three wings, one at White Oak Swamp with 3 divisions under Franklin, Sumner and Heintzelmann had a line facing west, whilst Keyes and Porter were detached from the main line on other tasks (Keyes would march with the army's trains to Harrison's Landing, whilst Porter was preparing a fallback position and acting as a reserve). He had direct contact with the four divisions to the west and contact with a relay station on the northern flank that connected the other 3 divisions in the line. He also had communications with Porter (whose signals were higher up on Malvern Hill and relayed a lot of intelligence). Keyes was marching, but may well have kept in contact with Porter after he broke contact with McClellan.
According to the report of McClellan's signals detachment show after fighting started McClellan went to the front to check, returned to his CP, then went to the fleet. Whilst with the fleet he maintained contact with all his commanders via his signals and received their reports. He directed the naval gunfire that decisively defeated Holmes's movement (and Lee's battleplan) personally. He then returned to shore and his CP.
The next day, after the withdrawal to the prepared killing area of Malvern Hill. He didn't sleep that night, inspecting positions and positioning divisions, and around 9am boarded the Galena for a personal recce of Harrison's Landing and to consult with the naval commander. During this period he would still have been in contact with his commanders. He had 3 signals stations that could view the river; one at Haxall's Landing, one on Malvern Hill and one at Harrison's Landing. He left the Galena at 1330hrs (after having given the order to open fire with the artillery on the massing Confederates) and was on the field at 1400, over 90 minutes before the Confederate attack. He was thus present for the battle.
Conclusion
On of the great overlooked achievements of the Union Army during these battles is that the commanding general could be anywhere, even miles down a river on a recce. General McClellan commanded from many different places during the battles, but he was always in command.
There are many claims made about the nature of the American Civil War being novel. Many of these are spurious but some are true. One of the most "modern" features of the ACW is the activities of the United States Signal Corps. This small and overlooked body of men ran a tremendously effective communications system. Communiques McClellan sent from a field command post on the outskirts of Richmond would arrive at Washington, DC a mere ten minutes later. Using this system McClellan was able to achieve a level of command and control of his Corps as then unrivaled in the world. Indeed this was the first Signals Corps created in the world ever (in the British Army, for example, Signals would remain a part of the Engineers for decades).
McClellan wasn't working in a void. He'd seen the advances in communications technology made by the armies of Europe, and resolved to implement them fully. The general history of the Signals Corps during the war can be read on wikipedia.
The electric telegraph was short ranged and unreliable. A semaphore based system, the "wig-wag" worked very well within line of sight. It was the wig-wag that McClellan would use to control his army before Richmond. Such "frippery" as signals didn't emerge in the Army of the Tennessee for over a year (although it was very advanced in the Army of the Ohio/ Cumberland), the likes of Grant and Sherman simply had no time for it.
McClellan thus commanded his army from a central command post with signals to the subordinate commands (divisions, even after the establishment of Corps). He could leave his CP and, as long as he had an efficient signals troop with him, he could maintain command of the battle from anywhere.
Glendale and Malvern Hill
This brings me to the accusation that McClellan abandoned his army at either Glendale or Malvern Hill (both are sometimes mentioned), and to the related issue of the fantastic tale of an army commander having lunch on a boat off shore while his army fought.
It is important to note that McClellan established his General Headquarters Command Post at Haxall's Landing on Malvern Hill. From this position he was in communication with all his commanders and with the naval force on the James River (by way of a signals detachment sent on board her).
Figure 1: approximate schematic of McClellan's signals at Glendale (Porter's two divisions preparing positions on Malvern Hill omitted for clarity)
At Glendale, McClellan placed his divisions personally earlier in the day. He had effectively adopted a taskorg of three wings, one at White Oak Swamp with 3 divisions under Franklin, Sumner and Heintzelmann had a line facing west, whilst Keyes and Porter were detached from the main line on other tasks (Keyes would march with the army's trains to Harrison's Landing, whilst Porter was preparing a fallback position and acting as a reserve). He had direct contact with the four divisions to the west and contact with a relay station on the northern flank that connected the other 3 divisions in the line. He also had communications with Porter (whose signals were higher up on Malvern Hill and relayed a lot of intelligence). Keyes was marching, but may well have kept in contact with Porter after he broke contact with McClellan.
According to the report of McClellan's signals detachment show after fighting started McClellan went to the front to check, returned to his CP, then went to the fleet. Whilst with the fleet he maintained contact with all his commanders via his signals and received their reports. He directed the naval gunfire that decisively defeated Holmes's movement (and Lee's battleplan) personally. He then returned to shore and his CP.
The next day, after the withdrawal to the prepared killing area of Malvern Hill. He didn't sleep that night, inspecting positions and positioning divisions, and around 9am boarded the Galena for a personal recce of Harrison's Landing and to consult with the naval commander. During this period he would still have been in contact with his commanders. He had 3 signals stations that could view the river; one at Haxall's Landing, one on Malvern Hill and one at Harrison's Landing. He left the Galena at 1330hrs (after having given the order to open fire with the artillery on the massing Confederates) and was on the field at 1400, over 90 minutes before the Confederate attack. He was thus present for the battle.
Conclusion
On of the great overlooked achievements of the Union Army during these battles is that the commanding general could be anywhere, even miles down a river on a recce. General McClellan commanded from many different places during the battles, but he was always in command.
Thursday, 24 September 2009
The British Ultimatum
Something I'd never read before but found interesting was the text of the British Ultimatum to the US during the Trent Affair:
There was also a covering letter sent to Lord Lyons:
It adds weight to the quotes from Dunlop and other British commanders in theatre that they had already been issued their war orders and were awaiting the decision of whether or not to proceed.
Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1861.
My Lord — Intelligence of a very grave nature has reached her majesty's government.
This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of the admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the contract steamer Trent.
It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated 'Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,' that the Trent left Havana on the 7th instant, with her majesty's mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing her, at 1:15 p. m., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent exploding half a cable's length ahead of her. The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and, compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons he had named were then standing before him. The commander of the Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking by force out of the Trent these four passengers, then under the protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship's company at quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was therefore out of the question and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was not insisted upon.
It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage — an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law.
Her majesty's government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the government of the United States must be fully aware that the British government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty's government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.
Her majesty's government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the government of the United States that government will, of its own accord, offer to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.
Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.
You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secretary of state, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it.
I am, etc., Russell.
There was also a covering letter sent to Lord Lyons:
In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of her majesty, to make certain demands of the government of the United States.
Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her majesty's government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation and repair immediately to London. If, however, you should be of the opinion that the requirements of her majesty's government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her majesty's government for their consideration and remain at your post until you receive further orders.
You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the American government, and you will send him a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think fit to make.
You will also give all the information in your power to the governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other of her majesty's possessions as may be within your reach.
It adds weight to the quotes from Dunlop and other British commanders in theatre that they had already been issued their war orders and were awaiting the decision of whether or not to proceed.
Thursday, 17 September 2009
Longstreet on Straggling in Maryland
"Only a glance at these figures is necessary to impress one with the number of those who were unable to stand the long and rapid marches, and fell by the wayside, viz, 9597. The Virginians who have written of the war have often charged the loss of the Maryland campaign to “laggards”. It is unkind to apply such a term to our soldiers, who were as patient, courageous, and chivalrous as any ever marshaled into phalanx. Writers who do so ignore the facts and circumstances that surrounded our troops. Many were just out of the hospitals, and many were crippled by injuries received in battle. They were marching without sufficient food or clothing, with their muskets, ammunition, provisions, and in fact their all, packed on their backs. They struggled along with bleeding feet, tramping rugged mountain roads through a heated season, seeking another opportunity to offer their lives in defense of their people. Such soldiers should not be called “laggards” by their countrymen. Let them have their well-earned honors though the fame of others suffer thereby."
- James Longstreet, quoted from Century Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 315
Well said Lieutenant General Longstreet.
- James Longstreet, quoted from Century Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 315
Well said Lieutenant General Longstreet.
Wednesday, 16 September 2009
Sherman's "Grand Strategy"
I've just been reading this in the Century Magazine.
I'm totally at a loss as to why Sherman keeps exaggerating Union Losses. Never the less, elements of this article seem truer than his Memoirs. Interesting read...
I'm totally at a loss as to why Sherman keeps exaggerating Union Losses. Never the less, elements of this article seem truer than his Memoirs. Interesting read...
Saturday, 12 September 2009
How Many Bayonets
Clearing out an old folder I found a half written article I thought I'd post:
The American Civil War (ACW) presents an interesting challenge when assessing combat due to the very different reporting systems used in America. For example, the British of the Napoleonic Wars report army strength in terms of Effectives, the number of rank and file in the infantry and cavalry, excluding their officers, excluding those detached (for example to the Wagon Train) and excluding the Ordnance (mainly Artillery) and other attached arms such as the wagon drivers and hospitals. In the ACW however, strengths stated are typically those of all arms, including those detached to the wagon train etc., and sometimes even including the Sick List as combatants.
The digitised records of the 91st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry here, which is a very useful resource.
The figures given in the morning state of 23rd September 1863 are in summary:
Present:
15 Combat Officers (including the Adjutant)
2 Medical Staff (Assistant Surgeon and Hospital Steward)
16 Sergeants
22 Corporals
16 Musicians
22 Blacksmiths and Artificers
146 Riflemen
= 239 Present for Duty, of whom 168 (70%) are “effectives” (i.e. men in the firing line)
On Special, Extra or Daily Duty: 7 (1 offr and 6 ORs)
Sick: 8
Absent
On Detached Service: 56 (6 Offrs and 50 ORs)
Sick: 128
Confined: 1
Thus, a Regiment reporting a total strength of 433 Officers and Men can only put 168 Riflemen (39%) of the men borne on the Rolls into combat.
This problem is not unnoticed by high command. Sherman notes in his Memoirs (and indeed in the Official Records) that on taking command of the Army of the Tennessee fully half his army consisted of non-combatants, and he took steps to limit this to 75%. Typically most of these non-combatants were in the wagon train (which averaged 7-8 men per wagon, thus a typical 5,000 wagon army train could consume 40,000 men, those men still being borne on the rolls and often included as “combatants” in many books), although there were also hospital staff, provosts, officers servants, cooks etc., none of whom were in the firing line.
The American Civil War (ACW) presents an interesting challenge when assessing combat due to the very different reporting systems used in America. For example, the British of the Napoleonic Wars report army strength in terms of Effectives, the number of rank and file in the infantry and cavalry, excluding their officers, excluding those detached (for example to the Wagon Train) and excluding the Ordnance (mainly Artillery) and other attached arms such as the wagon drivers and hospitals. In the ACW however, strengths stated are typically those of all arms, including those detached to the wagon train etc., and sometimes even including the Sick List as combatants.
The digitised records of the 91st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry here, which is a very useful resource.
The figures given in the morning state of 23rd September 1863 are in summary:
Present:
15 Combat Officers (including the Adjutant)
2 Medical Staff (Assistant Surgeon and Hospital Steward)
16 Sergeants
22 Corporals
16 Musicians
22 Blacksmiths and Artificers
146 Riflemen
= 239 Present for Duty, of whom 168 (70%) are “effectives” (i.e. men in the firing line)
On Special, Extra or Daily Duty: 7 (1 offr and 6 ORs)
Sick: 8
Absent
On Detached Service: 56 (6 Offrs and 50 ORs)
Sick: 128
Confined: 1
Thus, a Regiment reporting a total strength of 433 Officers and Men can only put 168 Riflemen (39%) of the men borne on the Rolls into combat.
This problem is not unnoticed by high command. Sherman notes in his Memoirs (and indeed in the Official Records) that on taking command of the Army of the Tennessee fully half his army consisted of non-combatants, and he took steps to limit this to 75%. Typically most of these non-combatants were in the wagon train (which averaged 7-8 men per wagon, thus a typical 5,000 wagon army train could consume 40,000 men, those men still being borne on the rolls and often included as “combatants” in many books), although there were also hospital staff, provosts, officers servants, cooks etc., none of whom were in the firing line.
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